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"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."
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CONST.

art. I, § 9
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Kansas Defender Project is a clinical program sponsored by the Uni-

versity of Kansas School of Law. The Project provides student legal services
to indigent prison inmates at the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth

and the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing, Kansas. Launched in 1965
through the efforts of Paul E. Wilson, Kane Professor of Law, the Project has
since been a model for similar clinical undertakings at law schools across
the country.1
While the Project offers assistance to inmates with varying legal difficulties,
many of the cases handled are collateral challenges to the criminal convictions
which brought the inmate-clients to prison. This article is designed as a
manual for students in the Defender Project for use in presenting the postconviction claims of federal and state prison inmates. In addition, since more
and more attorneys are becoming involved in similar litigation, we hope the
practicing bar will find the manual helpful. The writers have had the benefit
2
of the exhaustive treatment of the general topic in the HarvardLaw Review,
and this paper to some extent follows the organizational pattern of that work.
Three years have passed since the Harvard Note was published, and substantial changes in the law have occurred. This manual will examine the
recent cases in an attempt to provide the student or practitioner with a relatively complete overview of current practice. Because the Defender Project's
'The Kansas Defender Project has been described in a number of publications. E.g., Meyer, The
Defender Project, THE KU LAWS (Fall 1973); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
JAILHOUSE LAW STUDENTS:
A REPORT ON LAW-STUDENT-IN-CORRECTION PROGRAMS 6-8 (1973); 4
COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INC., Newsletter No. 13, pp. 5-7, May,
1973; PROCEEDINGS AT THE 1969 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT, 49 F.R.D. 347, 581-82 (1969) (comments of Professor Paul E. Wilson); Wilson,
Legal Assistance Project at Leavenworth, 24 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 254 (1966); see Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 495-96 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
'Developments in the Lau-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038 (1970); also see R.
SoKcoL, FEDEA.L HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1969).
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primary purpose lies in seeking access to the courts for indigent inmates, the
emphasis here is on investigation, research, and the preparation of pro se
petitions in forma pauperis. Less space is devoted to procedure beyond the
pleading stage. Finally, this manual concerns only collateral challenges to
conviction judgments; no attempt is made to deal with the opening field of
prisoners' rights litigation.
II.

REPRESENTING THE PRISON INMATE

A. Two GumING PRINCIPLES
In recent years the incidence of collateral challenges to criminal convictions has increased at an unprecedented rate. In 1960, 1,184 collateral petitions
were filed in federal district courts. By comparison, the 1970 figure was
10,792, representing an increase during the ten-year period of nearly 1,000
percent.' The resulting burden on federal dockets has prompted varying
responses. In 1970, two Harvard graduate students writing in the Kansas
Law Review lamented that prison inmates are usually denied needed legal
services and suggested that satisfying that need is mandated as "a matter of
sound correctional and rehabilitative practice." 4 More recently in the same
law review, the Honorable William H. Becker, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, suggested that
"modern systems of management and operation, ultimately employing electronic data processing" must be devised to enable parajudicial personnel to
deal efficiently with the "imminent crushing impact" of inmate petitions.5
The two approaches differ. One views the system from the inmates' point
of view, concentrating on assuring that legitimate claims are heard and fairly
considered. The other, spurred by the pressing volume of cases, emphasizes
the need to dispose of petitions with the least expenditure of time and effort.
It is against this background that the law school inmate legal assistance
project must assess its position. Student participation in representing prisoners
has won endorsement from the American Bar Association' and, accordingly,
such programs should not hesitate to become involved in litigation. At the
same time, a healthy appreciation for Judge Becker's viewpoint is essential.
In approaching a particular case, the student should keep in mind two
principles. First, considerable care must be given to determining whether
the argument presented is meritorious and likely to be fruitful. It is emphatically not the student's function to add still another frivolous petition
to the courts' burgeoning dockets. Moreover, if there is no substantial argu'119 CONG. REC. 1307 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973) (letter from Attorney General Richard G.
Kleindienst); also see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT

12-15 (1972).

' Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional

Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493, 511 (1970).
'Becker & Stewart, Prisoner Petition Processing in the Federal Courts by Use of Pattern Forms,
ParajudicialPersonnel, and Computers, 20 KAN. L. REv. 579, 580 (1972).

'ABA

STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONvICTION REMEDIES

51 (1968).
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ment to be made, it is in the inmate's interest to discourage litigation that
will bring only frustration and to focus his attention on more profitable pursuits such as job training and early parole. Additionally, the time saved by
avoiding worthless litigation may be devoted to another case which may
produce results. The student should always keep in mind the waiting list
of prisoners who have requested assistance. Buried somewhere in it are
meritorious claims that warrant attention.
A second principle must be balanced against the first. Although the student may decide against going forward with a case, he must recognize that,
in fact if not in law, he is the inmate's lawyer. So long as the claim is arguable and not totally without merit the student, as advocate, bears a responsibility to see that it is presented in the best light. It is not for the student to
deny relief; that judgment is the province of the courts.' The balance to be
struck between the two principles is precarious at best. Nevertheless, the
student offering his services to prison inmates must do the best he can; hard
decisions are inevitable.
B. Ti

INmIAL INTERVIEw 8

1. The Basic Information
The student interviewing a prison inmate must maintain a sense of professional skepticism. A prisoner who has been confined for a substantial
period of time may have difficulty recalling clearly events that took place
long ago. Moreover, the prison experience is such that a long-term prisoner
may become unable to distinguish fact from fancy, particularly when the
circumstances surrounding his conviction are concerned. It is not that the
prisoner consciously misrepresents the facts; rather, in order perhaps to reconcile his criminal conviction with his own self-image, he comes to believe
a version of the case that does not comport with reality. The inmate, then,
must be made to give a full and truthful description of his experiences before,
during, and after trial. It is generally most expedient to allow the prisoner to
tell his own story in his own way, but occasional questions may be necessary
to elicit significant facts and to keep the inmate from straying too far afield.
At the outset, the student should ask whether the inmate is at present
represented by counsel and, if not, whether he is financially able to hire a
lawyer. An affirmative answer to either of these questions will cause the
student to terminate the interview. While a student may help an inmate to
communicate effectively with his lawyer, the Project generally cannot and
should not become involved in a case in which an attorney has been retained
or appointed. The attorney-client relationship must be respected and, in any
'Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (appointed counsel declined to perfect an appeal
he believed to be without merit); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (public defender refused to
order a transcript which would enable an indigent prisoner to appeal).
'See Wexler, Counseling Convicts: The Lawyer's Role in Uncovering Legitimate Claims, 11 ARIz.
L. REv. 629 (1969); Wexler & Silverman, Representing Prison Inmates: A Primer on an Emerging
Dimension of Poverty Law Practice, 11 ARIZ. L. REv. 385 (1969).
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event, prisoners who are not represented must be first on the Project's priority
list. Inmates who are able to procure representation or who have fee-generating claims should be referred to the local bar association.
Next, the student should inquire into the pertinent facts surrounding the
inmate's criminal prosecution and present status. To aid the student, an interview sheet has been prepared; a copy is reprinted in the Appendix. The inmate's answers to the questions on the form will provide the basis for the
student's investigations and possible litigation; consequently, great care should
be taken to insure accuracy. The student should avoid commenting on the
merits of the case and certainly should make the inmate no promises. At the
conclusion of the interview, the inmate will normally be satisfied with a
cautious statement to the effect that the student will research the legal issues
presented, evaluate the facts in light of the law as he finds it, and develop
competent advice for the prisoner's consideration.
2. A Note on the Possibility of Appeal
One fact about which the student must be particularly concerned is the
date of sentencing. It is unlikely but conceivable that the inmate may have
only recently arrived at the institution and may still be entitled to appeal.
If so, counsel may be appointed and the case reviewed on appeal if a notice
is filed in the sentencing court within the time limit set by law. In the case
of a federal prisoner, rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
governs.' The Kansas statute is KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3608 (Supp. 1972)
which reads as follows: "Time for appeal to supreme court. (1) If sentence
is imposed, the defendant may appeal from the judgment of the district
court not later than ten days after the expiration of the district court's power
to modify the sentence. The power to revoke or modify the conditions of
probation shall not be deemed power to modify the sentence." Read in
conjunction with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4603 (Supp. 1972), which allows a
district judge 120 days within which to modify a sentence, section 22-3608
The federal rule provides as follows:
Appeals in Criminal Cases. In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be
filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.

A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, sentence or order but before entry
of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. If a timely

motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial on any ground other than newly discovered

evidence has been made, an appeal from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days

after the entry of an order denying the motion. A motion for a new trial based on the ground
of newly discovered evidence will similarly extend the time for appeal from a judgment of conviction if the motion is made before or within 10 days after entry of the judgment. When an
appeal by the government is authorized by statute, the notice of appeal shall be filed in the
district court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. A judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this subdivision when it is entered in the criminal
docket. Upon a showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the time has
expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a
period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this

subdivision.
See 28 U.S.C. S 1915 (1970) (general forma pauperis statute); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970) (Criminal
Justice Act).
Also note the federal inmate may move, within 120 days, to have his sentence modified. FED. R.
CraM. P. 35.
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requires the notice of appeal to be filed within 130 days after sentencing.
Thus, in the case of a state prisoner interviewed within that time period, the
student can best serve his client by helping him prepare a notice of appeal
immediately. And, one should not forget about the possibility of obtaining
an untimely appeal.
C.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION-THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

Assuming that an appeal can no longer be perfected, the student must
begin investigating the case in an effort to determine whether a collateral
challenge is appropriate. Information may be obtained from the inmate's
defense counsel, the prosecutor's office, and the clerk of the trial court. If the
inmate himself does not have copies of pertinent documents-such as the
indictment, sentencing order, or appellate brief-the student may be able to
get them from these sources. Additionally, the institution caseworker may be
of help. Although the task may be difficult in some cases, a determined
effort should be made to verify the inmate's story to the greatest possible
extent. In any collateral proceeding the inmate will bear the burden of
proving his claim"° and, accordingly, the student should always be conscious
of the evidentiary worth of his information.
In many cases the most valuable source of information is the trial transcript. If a direct appeal was taken a transcript was probably prepared, and
the clerk of the court may loan it to the Project for examination. If the student cannot borrow a transcript or one was not prepared, however, obtaining

a free record may be difficult."
The Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether indigent prison
inmates must be provided free transcripts of their original trials for use in
collateral proceedings.' Nevertheless, various state and federal statutes pro1oSee Part VII(C)

infra.
Transcripts may, of course, be ordered from the official court reporter whose name and address
can be obtained from the clerk. The standard rate for transcript copies, however, is $1.00 per pagefar too much for an indigent prison inmate to pay.
See generally Sokol, The Availability of Transcript; for Federal Prisoners, 2 AMER. CRIM. L.Q. 63
(1964); Comment, The Indigent's Right to a Transcript of Record, 20 KAN. L. Rav. 745 (1972).
"The question was raised but not reached in Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970). There the
petitioner and a codefendant had been convicted of murder in a California state court. Under applicable
California law, the two indigent prisoners were required to share a transcript of trial for use on appeal.
The codefendant received the transcript but refused to allow the petitioner to see it. The petitioner's
appointed counsel was able to borrow a different copy from the State Attorney General and an unsuccessful direct appeal was taken. Five years later the petitioner, desiring to attack his conviction collaterally, again tried unsuccessfully to obtain the transcript from his codefendant. Since the borrowed
copy had been returned to the Attorney General, the petitioner applied to the trial court for a free
transcript of his own. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan speaking for the
Court said:
Petitioner argues that in any event, contrary to the Court of Appeals, the District Court was
correct in holding that because "it may not be possible to pinpoint . . . alleged errors in the
absence of a transcript," petitioner was entitled to a transcript for use in petitioning for habeas
corpus even though he did not specify what errors he claimed in his conviction. To pass on
this contention at this time would necessitate our decision whether there are circumstances in
which the Constitution requires that a State furnish an indigent state prisoner free of cost a
trial transcript to aid him to prepare a petition for collateral relief. This is a question of first
impression which need not be reached at this stage of the case. . . . We think consideration of
that contention should be postponed until it appears that petitioner cannot again borrow a copy
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vide for free transcripts in appropriate cases. Generally, an inmate is entitled
to a trial record of sufficient completeness to permit adequate and effective
review of alleged trial errors cognizable in a collateral proceeding. 3 It follows that the indigent prison inmate must first state his arguments in a
collateral petition. He is then entitled to whatever portion of the trial record
is necessary to allow examination of those errors. A part of the verbatim
transcript or some adequate substitute may suffice in a given case. Significantly, the inmate has no right under present law to demand a copy of the
verbatim trial transcript for use in preparing a collateral challenge to his
criminal conviction. If he can obtain a transcript at all, it will only be after
he has filed his pleadings.
The rule that a collateral challenge must be pending before a transcript
of pertinent trial proceedings will be furnished creates an obvious difficulty
for the Defender Project. Charged with the dual purpose of identifying
meritorious arguments and screening out frivolous claims, the Project is often
unable to function according to plan. Given an opportunity to examine a
transcript, the student may be able to form a judgment as to whether arguable
points are presented. If no arguments can legitimately be raised, the student
can focus the inmate's attention on more profitable pursuits such as job
training and early parole; the result is efficient use of the prisoner's effort
as well as the court's time. On the other hand, if a transcript is not made
available in the preparation stage, the student cannot fairly evaluate the
inmate's case. Lack of access to a transcript thus encourages suits based upon
unverified allegations. If the student decides to assert claims on the mere
hope that they will be supported by the transcript once it is prepared, he
comes dangerously close to defeating his purpose of handling only those
cases with substantial merit. In many instances the transcript will not sustain
the arguments made, and the Defender Project will have increased rather
than reduced the number of burdensome, frivolous collateral motions and
petitions that now clog many court calendars. It should be noted, however,
that if an inmate steadfastly adheres to a story, which if true would entitle
him to relief, and a thorough investigation of available information leaves his
version of the facts untarnished, the only responsible course is to proceed.
After canvassing all pertinent materials, the student may find that he
cannot construct legitimate arguments on the inmate's behalf. In such a
case, the prisoner must be told exactly that. A legal memorandum discussing
the issues and the reasons for the student's negative view should be prepared
and delivered to the inmate. The Project's experience has shown that a
from the state authorities, or successfully apply to the California courts to direct his codefendant,
Pollard, or some other custodian of a copy to make a copy available to him.

Id. at 286. Although the indigent's right to a transcript has been considered since in Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), and Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), the precise question
presented in Wade remains open.
IsSee 28 U.S.C. SS 753(f), 1915, 2250 (1970). The pertinent statutes and cases are examined in
Comment, supra note 11.
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prisoner will accept bad news gracefully so long as he is confident that the
student has dealt with him in a fair and conscientious manner. In short,
prisoners deserve and appreciate straight answers. If, on the other hand, the
student determines that the case presents grounds for collateral relief, he
must turn to the complexities of the law of postconviction remedies. The
balance of this manual is intended as a guide for the student or practitioner
who is preparing a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction. The starting
point is the federal Habeas Corpus Act and the judicial expansion of the scope
of habeas corpus within the very recent past.
III.
A.

HABEAS

CoRnus-THE GRAT WRIT

NATURE OF THE WRIT

Inasmuch as the history of federal habeas corpus has been reviewed and
documented elsewhere,14 the present discussion will be concerned only with
its current use. Habeas corpus has become in modern times a generic term,
encompassing a variety of common law and statutory remedies whose purpose
is to challenge detention in general and invalid criminal convictions in particular. This part of the article first examines the recent development of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners and then discusses the statutory motion procedures that now comprise the bulk of postconviction litigation.
Initially, it must be recognized that by the time the student interviews a
prison inmate the criminal prosecution has usually come to an end and
direct appeal, if attempted, has failed to win a reversal. 5 A collateral challenge to the conviction by way of habeas corpus (or some statutory substitute)
is essentially a separate civil lawsuit to inquire into the legality of the detention.Y The character of the habeas writ as a separate collateral action has
both advantages and disadvantages. Taking the latter first, volumes of cases
have held that habeas is not a substitute for direct appeal.17 Accordingly, the
guilt or innocence of the prisoner is not the subject of the challenge, and mere
trial errors are not cognizable. 8 Rather, habeas is available only to test "proceedings so fundamentally lawless that imprisonment pursuant to them is
not merely erroneous but void."'" Precisely what defects in proceedings are
1 See, e.g., D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM
OF PowER AND LImRTY
(1966); N. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS TE WRIr
OF LIBERTY (1960); Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605; Oaks, Habeas
Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (1965); Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa
-The Emergence of the Modern Writ, 18 CAN. BAR REV. 10 (1940); Cohen, Some Considerations on
the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN. BAR REv. 92 (1938).
'In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court indicated that a criminal
prosecution,
in the sixth amendment sense, ends with sentencing.
16
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963); Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906); Farnsworth
v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 113 (1889).
' 7See, e.g., Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 428 (1912); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335
(1923); Burns v. Crouse, 353 F.2d 489, 490 (10th Cir. 1965); Leonard v. Hudspeth, 112 F.2d 121,
123 (10th Cir. 1940).
'SUnited States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133 (1924); Wagenknecht v. Crouse, 344 F.2d
920, 921 (10th Cir. 1965).
'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963).
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so significant in the criminal process that they will support a collateral challenge will be discussed in some detail in Part I1-C-1, and for now it will
suffice to say that for the most part only major constitutional or federal
statutory violations are cognizable.2"
On the other hand, the collateral remedy in habeas has certain advantages.
First, while a convicted defendant must pursue a direct appeal within a time
limit set by statute, 2' a prisoner may petition the court for habeas corpus relief
long after a notice of appeal would be untimely.22 Second, although an appellate court can review only errors of law made by the trial judge - and
then in most instances only those to which timely objection was raised - the
habeas court may take a fresh look at all stages of the criminal prosecution
and, if necessary, hold a new evidentiary hearing, making its own findings
of fact and conclusions of law as to the alleged violation of federal statutory
or constitutional rights. In sum, the federal court sitting in habeas is not
bound by prior proceedings; there is plenary constitutional and statutory2
power to inquire into the lawfulness of the petitioner's confinement.
B.

BROWN V. ALLEN-THE MODERN GENESIS

Present notions of the scope of federal habeas corpus stem in large part
from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Allen.24 There the
Court, reviewing proceedings on federal habeas involving state prisoners,
examined thoroughly the applicable federal habeas statutes and construed
them to mandate extensive collateral review of criminal convictions. Although
the Court denied relief on the merits in each of the consolidated cases, its
procedural holdings broke substantial new ground.
First, the Court expressly held that all federal constitutional questions
raised by state prisoners are cognizable on federal habeas corpus.25 In so
holding, the Court construed 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970), the section of the
federal Habeas Corpus Act which sets forth the federal courts' power to
grant the writ.2" More specifically, the Court relied on section 2254(a) of
'The grounds for habeas relief are given in general terms by federal statute. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241,
2254 (1970). See Ratley v. Crouse, 365 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1966); Hill v. Crouse, 360 F.2d
603 (10th Cir. 1966); Wagenknecht v. Crouse, 344 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1965).
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3608 (Supp. 1972); Fan. R. Apr. P. 4(b).
So long as the statutory conditions discussed hereinafter are met, there is no time limit on petitions

'a

for the federal writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners. E.g., Hamilton v. Watkins, 436 F.2d 1323
(5th Cir. 1970) (36-year delay not fatal); Carroll v. Beto, 330 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (22-year
delay); see also Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); but see Davis v. United
States, 93 S. Ct. 1577 (1973). The remedy for federal prisoners expressly provides that "[a] motion
for such relief may be made at any time." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
" Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (constitutional interpretation); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243,
2254 (1970) (statutory provisions).
"344 U.S. 443 (1953).
'Id. at 463-64. Of course, even if a constitutional violation is found, relief will still be denied if
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Yarnal v. Brierley, 468 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1972); Favre v. Henderson,
464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1972).
"That section reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective

jurisdictions."
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the same tide which provides: "The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ
of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." The upshot is that the
state prisoner is now assured of a federal forum for the determination of
federal constitutional rights. This is of particular significance in light of the
Warren Court's far-reaching constitutional decisions in criminal cases. In a
great many instances, the habeas petitioner will be able to cite constitutional
underpinnings for his challenge to the state conviction that sent him to prison.
Second, the Brown Court held that the federal court sitting in habeas
corpus is not bound by the state courts' decisions on the federal questions presented, even if the petitioner's federal claims were fully and fairly adjudicated
in the state courts.27 On the other hand, the Court indicated that the federal
habeas court may consider the result reached in the state courts as having a
bearing on the issue. It was said that "the state adjudication carries the weight
that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another
jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues." 2 Thus, while the state courts'
views are relevant, there is no res judicata effect.29
Third, Brown recognized that a federal habeas court may inquire into
issues of fact as well as questions of law.3" The Court held that, if the petitioner received an adequate hearing on his constitutional claim in the state
courts and the findings of fact there were correct, the federal court may well
decline to look further. But there is nevertheless discretionary power to hold
a new hearing when appropriate. Moreover, a majority of the Justices agreed
that a new evidentiary hearing must be held when there are "unusual circumstances,"'" when there was a "vital flaw" 32 in the state fact-finding proceedings, or when the state court record is incomplete or otherwise inadequate
to enable the federal judge to evaluate fairly the result reached."3 Later decisions and a statutory amendment have more clearly described the circumstances in which a federal evidentiary hearing is mandatory. 4
By any standard, the far-reaching decision in Brown strained traditional
' 344 U.S. at 463-64. Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by five Justices, specifically stated
that "no binding weight" is to be given the state court determination, because the federal right may
have been "misconceived." Id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
I'ld. at 458.
ld; see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 441 (1963).
While it is true that the Court in Brown held that "where the state action was based on an adequate
state ground, no further examination [by the federal habeas court] is required," the view that a
procedural forfeiture the petitioner may have incurred under state law deprives the federal courts of
power to grant the writ of habeas corpus was later rejected in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963),
discussed in Part V-B-I infra.
' 344 U.S. at 478, citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) and Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200 (1950).
t 344 U.S. at 463.
id. at 506 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 503.
9
See discussion of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) in Part
VII infra.
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notions of federalism and, according to some, unnecessarily undermined
legitimate state interests in finality in the criminal process."5 There are, however, substantial justifications for Brown. The Harvard Law Review"6 has
suggested that the expanded use of federal habeas corpus reflects the need for
an independent inquiry into any alleged unconstitutionality in state criminal
proceedings. During trial, the state court's attention is fastened upon the
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, with the result that less attention may be given to procedural safeguards. Consequently, a separate collateral proceeding conducted for the sole purpose of reexamining the procedures followed at trial may be essential for adequate protection of the
criminal defendant's federal constitutional rights. Moreover, it may be crucial
for that separate inquiry to be conducted in a federal forum. While a state
judge may tend to subordinate federal procedural rights to the state objective
of obtaining a conviction in an individual case, the federal courts are generally
thought to be more mindful of the importance of constitutional safeguards.
Additionally, inasmuch as there are comparatively few federal district courts
and these are supervised by only eleven circuit courts, federal constitutional
law will be applied more uniformly by them than would be the case if fifty
separate state courts were left to interpret the Constitution on their own.
Certainly the Supreme Court is physically incapable of examining every state
court application of federal principles and, consequently, consistency cannot
be achieved by appellate review. Federal habeas corpus, then, affords an
opportunity for criminal defendants to air their federal claims in a forum
in which uniformity of decision is maximized."
'E.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 684-85 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Friendly,
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970);
Bator, supra note 29.
Developments, supra note 2, at 1057, 1060-62.
8' In response to the rising number of collateral challenges and the criticism from some quarters of
the Supreme Court's decisions which have made those actions possible, the Nixon Administration has
proposed significant amendments to the federal Habeas Corpus Act. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
While the writers consider the proposed legislation unwise in policy and of questionable validity in law,
appropriate reference to the proposed bill will nevertheless be made in this manual where pertinent.
The Administration bill would purport to change the result in Brown by amending S 2254 to substantially preclude the relitigation on federal habeas corpus of federal claims examined in state courts.
The proposed amendment provides as follows:
S 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment
of a State court only on the grounds that either:
(1) (i) he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and
(ii) the claimed constitutional violation presents a substantial question(aa) which was not theretofore raised and determined, and
(bb) which there was no fair and adequate opportunity theretofore to raise and have
determined, and
(cc) which cannot thereafter be raised and determined in the State court, and
(iii) the claimed constitutional violation is of a right which has as its primary purpose
the protection of the reliability of either the factfinding process at the trial or the appellate
process on appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That, insofar as any constitutional claim of incompetency of counsel is based on conduct of the counsel with respect to
constitutional claims barred by the previous language of this subsection, the claim of incompetency of counsel shall to that extent be likewise barred, and
(iv) the petitioner shows a different result would probably have obtained if such constitutional violation had not occurred; or
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CHALLENGES TO STATE CONVICTIONS

1. Issues Cognizable
The federal writ of habeas corpus is available to state prisoners only when
custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States" is alleged."8 Thus a prisoner who has only state substantive or procedural grounds for challenging his conviction is not entitled to the federal
remedy,89 unless the state grounds in cumulative effect amount to a denial
of due process."

On the other hand, the federal habeas courts have plenary

(2) he is in custody in violation of the laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of such court
to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing a factual determination by the State court, shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
The proposal would thus demand that any constitutional violation sought to be raised on federal
habeas corpus be so "substantial" that, if it had not occurred, the petitioner would probably not have
been convicted. That standard is significantly less strict than the normal rule for harmless constitutional
error-that the error must have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). Moreover, even if the constitutional violation was "substantial," it cannot be
examined on federal habeas corpus unless it was not, could not have been, and cannot yet be raised and
determined in state court.
Finally, the proposal incorporates a notion developed in the Supreme Court's decisions concerning
the retrospective application of new principles of constitutional law. In that context the Court has
focused upon the extent to which a newly enunciated rule affects the integrity of the factfinding process.
Generally, if the new rule does not substantially increase the reliability of the criminal trial, it is not
applied retrospectively. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965) (exclusionary rule not applicable
to state criminal trials prior to Mapp). The proposed amendment to § 2254 would apply a similar
standard to the availability of habeas corpus, limiting the cognizable claims to those based upon constitutional principles that apply retrospectively. Of course, a great many collateral petitions are based upon
principles developed since the challenged convictions and therefore depend upon the retrospective application of those principles. The question whether habeas is to be available to persons already convicted
is essentially the issue before the Court when it announces a new rule and considers whether it is to be
retrospectively applied. The proposed amendment to § 2254, however, would go further, precluding
for example a collateral attack based upon a violation of the exclusionary rule occurring since Mapp
was decided.
It seems apparent that the proposed amendment, if constitutional, would have the intended effect.
However, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court would feel bound by a statutory amendment.
While it is true that the Brown case seemed to turn on the language of § 2254 as it now stands, the
extent to which the Court considers its conclusion there to be constitutionally based remains an open
question. It has been suggested that the federal courts' power to issue the writ of habeas corpus does
not depend upon legislative enactments at all, but rather that the suspension clause [U.S. CoNsT. art.
1, S 9] is "direction to all superior courts of record, state as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege
routinely available." Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607. There
is language in the Supreme Court's major habeas corpus opinions to support Professor Paschal's position.
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963). But see
Davis v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1577 (1973). See generally Developments, supra note 2, at 1263-74.
For criticism of the proposed amendment, see Comment, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEo. L.J. 1221 (1973).
w28 U.S.C. SS 2254(a), 22 4 1(c)(3) (1970). See Collins v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir.
1971) (no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing); Ratley v. Crouse, 365 F.2d 320 (10th
Cir. 1966) (no constitutional question involved in construction of state statute); Jacobs v. Crouse, 349
F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1965).
'Walker v. Coiner, 474 F.2d 887, 891 (4th Cir. 1973) (alleged improper argument by the prosecutor
raised only state law issue); Thwing v. South Dakota, 470 F.2d 351, 353 (8th Cir. 1972) (application
of the felony murder rule a state law question); Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1972)
(admissibility of evidence only a state law question); La Brasca v. Misterly, 423 F.2d 708, 709 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 838 (1970); see Bizup v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 284, 285 (10th Cir. 1963).
4Cf. Gephart v. Beto, 441 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 (1971) (admission of
evidence of other convictions held not to violate due process); London v. Oklahoma, 248 F.2d 788
(10th Cir. 1957) (perjury at trial held not to entitle the petitioner to habeas relief absent a showing that
the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony); see Hodges v. Field, 320 F. Supp. 775, 778-79
(C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1970).
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power to grant relief for federal claims.4 For example, the writ may issue
when a state prisoner was denied his right to the assistance of counsel,42
illegally seized evidence was admitted at trial,4" the petitioner was twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense," the petitioner's confession was involuntary,45
the petitioner's plea of guilty was invalid,46 the jury that convicted the petitioner was not impartial,47 or if the petitioner was simply denied a fair
trial within the meaning of the due process clause.4"
2. A Note on the Exhaustion Doctrine49

While section 2254(a) gives the federal courts broad theoretical power to
review state convictions, section 2254(b) limits dramatically the use of that
power:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner.

Subsection (c) adds a measure of specificity to the "exhaustion doctrine":
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented."
The complexities of the exhaustion doctrine will be discussed in Part V,
but a brief note is crucial for understanding here. The doctrine contemplates
that, before the federal courts exercise their enormous habeas corpus power,
the state prisoner should be required to seek relief from the state courts. This
procedural requirement, rooted in the notion of comity between state and
'Although
§§ 2241(c), 2254(a) expressly provide that a state prisoner who alleges that he is in
custody in violation of "laws . . . of the United States" may be entitled to habeas relief, it is difficult
to imagine a situation where his claim will be nonconstitutional. Some lower courts have gone so far
as to hold that, notwithstanding the language in the Act, the habeas remedy will not lie for state prisoners
making nonconstitutional federal claims. Fitzgerald v. Wainwright, 440 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1971).

"See House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
" Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971); Lucas v. Michigan,
420 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970). Recently, however, the argument has increasingly been made that fourth
amendment claims should not be cognizable. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Rodriguez, 467 F.2d 822 (10th Cir.
1972); see also Orricer v. Erickson, 471 F.2d 1204, 1208 (8th Cir. 1973) (Webster, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court "as presently constituted" would not apply the exclusionary rule
in habeas corpus). The state of California has recently made the argument, but the Court found another
ground for denying relief in the case. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2059 n.38 (1973).
It should be noted, however, that four Justices took the view that fourth amendment claims should not
be considered.
"Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); ci. United States ex rel. Brown v. Hendrick, 431 F.2d
436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1970).
"Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
' 6 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); United States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S.

276 T(1959).
' Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
"Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
"For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Part V infra.
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federal courts, is considered necessary to the continued viability of the federal
system.50 The proposition is that "one court should defer action on causes
properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with
concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass on the matter."'" The exhaustion doctrine thus affords state
courts the first opportunity to pass on federal questions that arise in the course
of state criminal prosecutions. However, it is important to note that the exhaustion requirement is not a limitation on the federal courts' power. 2 Notwithstanding the seemingly explicit language in section 2254(b), a federal
court has power in appropriate but rare circumstances, to ignore the petitioner's failure to seek relief first from the state courts.53
The state remedies that must be exhausted prior to an application for
federal relief vary with the nature of the case and requirements of state law.
In some cases, direct appeal to the state supreme court will suffice.54 In a
number of states the common law writ, coram nobis, is available;55 other

states employ a state writ of habeas corpus56 or furnish a collateral remedy by
rule of court.57 Perhaps the most efficient remedy is one provided by statute
expressly for the purpose of affording inmates an effective postconviction
motion procedure. That is the Kansas approach to the problem. In KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (1964) et seq., the Kansas Legislature has set down the
procedure for habeas corpus in this state. While section 1501 grants state

courts power to issue the writ in behalf of untried prisoners5" and inmates
challenging their treatment in confinement,59 section 1507 is addressed
specifically to collateral challenges to criminal convictions. Section 1507 reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
A prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or
laws of the state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may at any time move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1963).
'E.g., United States ex rel. Krenkowitz v. Rundle, 317 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). While the point in the text continues to be valid,
the courts often may reach the same result by holding that available state remedies are ineffective and
for that reason need not be pursued. See Part V-C infra.
"See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
'See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONvicTIoN RsMEDiES 24 (1968).
57
ALAS. R. CRiM. P. 35 (Supp. 1963); Aim. R. CRIM. P. 1 (1965); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1962);
DEL. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1953); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1 (1963); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 (1964); ME. R. CRIM.
P. 35(b) (Supp. 1966); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.26 (1953); N.J. CT. R. 3:10A (Supp. 1965).
'Usually such a case arises where the defendant in a criminal prosecution attacks his bail bond as
excessive.
'Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 265 (1972).
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Section 1507 is virtually identical to the federal remedy for federal prisoners
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), to be discussed in Part III-D. Although
these provisions appear in the Kansas and federal habeas corpus acts and
certainly perform functions traditionally associated with habeas, they should
in the interest of clarity be referred to as statutory motions to vacate sentence.
This will avoid confusion between the generic term, habeas corpus, the
common law writ for attacking "detention simpliciter,"' and the modern
motion remedy which carves out only a portion of that writ's scope-a collateral
challenge to conviction.
3. The Conceptual System
The state prisoner in Kansas must, then, exhaust his Kansas remedies
(direct appeal and section 1507 motion) before he petitions the federal court
for a writ of habeas corpus. Conceptually, the prisoner must follow the
paths represented by the following chart. After conviction in the state trial
court, he should appeal directly to the state supreme court, raising both state
and federal arguments. Appeal is represented by line #1 which extends to
the United States Supreme Court, indicating that appellate review of federal
claims may be available on a writ of certiorari. If unsuccessful on appeal to
the state supreme court, the prisoner may collaterally challenge his conviction
by moving the state trial court to vacate sentence under section 1507. The
state collateral motion is represented by line #2 which, again, extends through
the state supreme court to the Supreme Court of the United States, indicating
that the denial of a section 1507 motion may be appealed. If the prisoner is
still unsuccessful, he has exhausted his available state remedies and may
petition the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). As line #3 indicates, a denial of the writ at the federal
district court level may be appealed to the circuit court and then to the
Supreme Court.
As might be expected, this chart and brief explanation are vastly oversimplified. The intricacies of the exhaustion doctrine, the problems of repetitive claims, and the requisites of proceedings and appeals in forma pauperis
will require a more thorough discussion in Parts V, VIII, and IX. At present,
it is sufficient merely to understand the three paths over which the state
prisoner may travel in order to assert his federal claims."'
'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963).
Act would
0 The Nixon Administration's proposed amendments to the federal Habeas Corpus
establish a system quite different from present law. Under the proposal, a state prisoner would be
unable to pursue a federal remedy after unsuccessfully seeking relief on his federal constitutional claim
in state court. Only if the claim was not, could not have been, and cannot yet be raised and determined
in state court would a state prisoner be entitled to seek the federal writ of habeas corpus. Enactment
of the proposal would effectively deny federal relief to state prisoners rather than withhold it pending
consideration by state courts as does the present § 2254. See S. 567, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
supra note 37.
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CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL CONVICTIONS 2

Up to this point, this manual has dealt only with the availability of federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners. In this part, the remedy for challenging federal convictions will be examined.
As indicated earlier, the federal prisoner who desires to challenge his
federal conviction collaterally is provided with a statutory motion procedure
for doing so. The motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 first came into the
law in 1948 when the Congress amended the Habeas Corpus Act to remedy
practical problems. Because section 2241 appears to require that a prisoner
apply for a writ of habeas corpus in the district in which he is confined,'
those districts where federal penitentiaries are located had been receiving almost all such petitions from federal prisoners. At the same time, district
courts sitting elsewhere rarely heard from a prisoner after sentencing. The
1948 amendment was designed to establish a more efficient division of labor
' For purposes of this section, see Hunter, Post-Conviction Remedies, 50 F.R.D. 153 (1971) (citing
numerous cases); Uelmen, Post-Conviction Relief for Federal Prisoners: A Survey and a Suggestion

Under 28 U.S.C. S 2255, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 277 (1967); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section
2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1964).
°'The Court's opinion in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 93 S. Ct. 1123 (1973), held,
however, that notwithstanding its earlier cases a habeas petition may be directed to a federal court outside the district of confinement. See discussion of Braden in Part IV-D infra.
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among federal courts, so far as prisoner petitions are concerned, by requiring
a federal prisoner to direct his motion for collateral relief to the district court
that sentenced him. Another practical consideration was that federal courts
sitting in the districts of confinement had been inconvenienced by evidentiary
hearings. When the hearings were held near the penitentiary, witnesses were
required to travel in order to appear, and files and records were transported
from the sentencing court. On the other hand, if the sentencing court handles
the claim under section 2255, the hearing may be held in a more convenient
forum.64 Section 2255 now reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.6 5

Immediately after section 2255 was enacted, it came under attack as an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In United States v.
Hayman,"6 the Supreme Court noted that the writ can be suspended only in
time of rebellion or invasion,6 7 and that section 2255 by its terms makes the
writ unavailable to most federal prisoners. Specifically, the section provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion to
the court which sentenced him or that such court has denied him relief unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention. 68

Although in a given situation it may be argued that the section 2255 motion
procedure is "inadequate or ineffective," it is clear that for the vast majority
of cases section 2255 will be the only collateral remedy available to a federal
prisoner." The Court in Hayman had no difficulty with that, concluding that
See Developments, supra note 2, at 1062.
"28 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970).

"342 U.S. 205 (1952).
'aU.S.

CONST.

art. 1,§ 9.

"28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
'A federal prisoner can apply for the habeas writ in order to attack the conditions of his confinement.
The motion remedy under § 2255 speaks only to challenging convictions and does not enter the picture
where the prisoner does not contest that he is lawfully detained, but rather objects to his treatment while
in confinement. In such a case, the writ of habeas corpus-§ 2241-is the traditional and appropriate
remedy.
State prisoners wishing to challenge the treatment they are receiving in prison may also find them2
4
selves applying for federal habeas relief. Thus they may use the same vehicle--§ 25 -to challenge
both their convictions and the conditions of their confinement. Of course, the exhaustion doctrine is
applicable to both situations. Kansas prisoners challenge their treatment by way of institution administrative remedies, Davis v. State, 211 Kan. 257, 505 P.2d 293 (1973), and state habeas corpus-KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1501 (1964). To avoid the exhaustion requirement, state prisoners more often sue their
keepers under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1970) (the Civil Rights Act), which does not require exhaustion.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); but see
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section 2255 is the' statutory equivalent of habeas corpus. That being the case,
federal prisoners continue to benefit from essentially the same remedy as
habeas corpus, while the practical difficulties associated with the old system

are avoided.
It follows from Hayman that a federal prisoner moving under section 2255
is entitled to raise all the constitutional claims going to the validity of his
conviction that would be cognizable in habeas corpus. The Court so held

in Kaufman v. United States.7" There it was argued that, because a federal
prisoner has an opportunity to test his constitutional arguments in a federal
forum at trial and on appeal, he should be foreclosed from doing so later by

way of section 2255. The Court rejected that view on the ground that in many
cases the prisoner's constitutional claim was not considered at earlier stages.
Thus, as in Kaufman, when a federal prisoner failed to present his argument
about the admission of illegally seized evidence to an appellate court, that
claim may be cognizable in a later section 2255 proceeding.'
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973) (state prisoners challenging good-time forfeitures must
proceed under § 2254). A discussion of "conditions suits" is certainly beyond the scope of this paper,
but ample resource materials are available.
'°394 U.S. 217 (1969).
'tKaufman was distinguished in Davis v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1577 (1973), where a § 2255
petitioner challenged the composition of the grand jury that indicted him. Over a strong dissent by Mr.
Justice Marshall, the Court held that by failing to object to the indictment prior to trial the defendant
had waived his right to complain later on appeal or in a collateral proceeding. The Court noted that
the applicable rule expressly states that "[f]ailure to present any such defense or objection [to the
indictment] as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof.
... FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). Failure
to assert on appeal the argument that illegally seized evidence was introduced at trial as in Kaufman,
on the other hand, constitutes a waiver only if it can be shown that the defendant deliberately by-passed
his opportunity by intentionally relinquishing a known right. See discussion of the deliberate by-pass
rule in Part VII-B infra. Cf. Kirtdoll v. State, 209 Kan. 508, 496 P.2d 1396 (1972) (involving a
collateral challenge to the composition of a petit jury).
The Nixon Administration's proposed amendments to the federal Habeas Corpus Act would substantially restrict the availability of a collateral remedy for federal prisoners. The bill would amend
S 2255 to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 2255. Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence if(1) (A) he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and
(B) the claimed constitutional violation presents a substantial question(i) which was not theretofore raised and determined, and
(ii) which there was no fair and adequate opportunity theretofore to raise and have
determined, and
(C) the claimed constitutional violation is of a right which has as its primary purpose the
protection of the reliability of either the factfinding process at trial or the appellate process on
appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That insofar as any constitutional claim of
incompetency of counsel is based on conduct of the counsel with respect to constitutional
claims barred by the previous language of this subsection, the claim of incompetency of counsel
shall to that extent be likewise barred, and
(D) the petitioner shows that a different result would probably have obtained if such
constitutional violation had not occurred; or
(2) he is in custody in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(3) the sentence was imposed in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(4) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; or
(5) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or
(6) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack....
S. 567, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The remaining portion of the proposed amendment is substantially the same as present law, with the exception of the subsection covering appeals to be discussed
below. See note 728 infra.
The proposal would purport to restrict a federal prisoner's use of the motion remedy under § 2255
in much the same way as the proposed amendment to § 2254 would restrict the availability of the
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It should be noted that Kaufman was based upon the possibility that a
federal prisoner may have a legitimate claim that was not considered on appeal. When the argument the prisoner wishes to raise in his collateral motion
was indeed dealt with on appeal, it is probably the law that the issue need
not be relitigated. The principal objective of the separate proceeding permitted by collateral remedies is a second examination of federal issues in a
federal forum. If a federal appellate court has already reviewed the district
court's determination, that objective has been realized. The lower federal
courts have unanimously reached this result."' Accordingly, section 2255
motions that raise issues previously considered on appeal probably must rely on
changes in the law having retroactive application before the federal courts
will reexamine earlier decisions." The only other possible exception is when
the appellate court was unable adequately to consider the issue because it
depends upon facts not in the record. In such a case, the fact-finding procedure available through section 2255 may be necessary to a fair determination. This hypothetical case might arise if facts not known at the time of
trial and appeal come to light later.74
The motion procedure under section 2255 is available to raise issues of
nonconstitutional federal law as well as constitutional claims. 5 Because in
a federal case the original trial was conducted subject to federal law and
rules of procedure, nonconstitutional claims may frequently arise. The principal stumbling block to the use of section 2255 in such a case is Hill v.
United States."6 There the federal trial judge had violated Rule 32(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not allowing the defendant an
opportunity to give mitigating testimony after conviction but prior to
sentencing. The prisoner later challenged the resulting sentence by way of
section 2255. The Supreme Court, however, held that "collateral relief is not
available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal refederal writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner. See note 37 supra. Here again a constitutional claim
sought to be raised in the collateral proceeding must be "substantial" and the prisoner must show that,
if it had not occurred, he probably would have been acquitted. Additionally, the proposed amendment
would make § 2255 unavailable if the claim was or could have been raised and determined during the
criminal prosecution or on direct appeal. Thus the amendment would purport to legislatively overrule
Kaufman. Finally, subsection (C) would limit the cognizable claims to those based upon constitutional
principles having retrospective application. See note 37 supra.
',E.g., Castellana v. United States, 378 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1967); Davis v. United States, 311 F.2d
495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 846 (1963); Lampe v. United States, 288 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 958 (1962); Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
The provision in § 2244(c) which bars a state prisoner from raising again arguments once considered by the Supreme Court of the United States follows from the position taken here. See Part
VIII-D infra.
" Of course, the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply new constitutional decisions retroactively makes
changes in the law affecting prior criminal proceedings rare. See, eg., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
"'See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
"See quotation from S 2255 in the text accompanying note 65 supra. The Court in Kaufman commented that, while it may have in the past indicated that errors of nonconstitutional law are not
cognizable on § 2255 motion, the statute expressly provides the opposite. 394 U.S. at 223.
70368 U.S. 424 (1962).
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quirements of the Rule."77 Thus the Court implied that, if in another case

it appears that substantial rights were violated and that the defendant may
actually have been prejudiced by a failure to comply with federal law or
rule, section 2255 may be a legitimate vehicle for relief.7"
The rule which may be derived from all this is that, while section 2255
is not to be used as a substitute for appeal of mere trial errors 7 - even those
that involve violations of the formal requirements of federal law - nonconstitutional errors that may have substantially affected the prisoner's rights
are cognizable. Perhaps the best example of this distinction is a violation of
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that a district
court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The court must also satisfy itself that there is a factual
basis for the plea. Although compliance with rule 11 has been held not to
be constitutionally mandated, ° the trial court's failure to follow the rule has
enormous potential for prejudice. Accordingly, the lower courts have treated
rule 11 violations as fully cognizable on section 2255 motion."
Although the exhaustion doctrine, tied as it is to considerations of federalism and comity, arises only when a state prisoner seeks a federal writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to section 2254, the federal courts have applied a
similar notion in section 2255 cases. Notwithstanding the clear statutory
language that "[a] motion for such [section 2255] relief may be made at any
time," 2 the cases agree that a section 2255 motion will not be entertained
while an appeal is pending." The reason for this is apparent: to encourage
the proper use of the appellate process and thus to further "the orderly administration of criminal law."8" Of course, the Defender Project will have
no quarrel with this doctrine. If an inmate indicates that an appeal is pending,
in all probability an attorney is involved in the case and the student must
withdraw.
In the interest of clarity, the federal prisoner's motion remedy under
section 2255 is represented in the chart below. Once again direct appeal from
/Id. at 429.
78Developments, supra note 2, at 1068-69. The Fifth Circuit has intimated an even more liberal
approach. In Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1972), it was said:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 the court is not limited to constitutional or statutory violations. Section
2255 "includes the more general phrase 'or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,' the boundaries
of which have not been defined, save, of course, that 'mere error' is not enough." Kyle v. United
States, 1961, 297 F.2d 507, 511. See also Thomas, 360 F.2d at 946.
'DiPiazza v. United States, 471 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1973); Lorraine v. United States, 444 F.2d 1
(10th Cir. 1971).
'MMcCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
'Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521 (7th
Cir. 1971); Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1970); Spradley v. United States, 421 F.2d
1043 (5th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United States, 420 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1970); Berry v. United States,
412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969).
wa28 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
'Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Masters v. Eide, 353 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.
1965).
"Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1939).
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the criminal conviction is represented by line #1. Line #2 shows the collateral
remedy under section 2255-addressed to the sentencing court, just as the
state prisoner in Kansas must address his very similar section 1507 motion to
the state court that sentenced him. Of course, if the federal trial court
denies relief, the federal prisoner may petition for certiorari along line #2
to the Supreme Court.

United

States

Supreme Court

United

States

Circuit

Court

of Appeals

1.

2.1

United States
District Court

1. Appeal

2. § 2255

But there the federal prisoner must stop. Unlike the state prisoner who
may apply for the federal writ of habeas corpus, the federal prisoner has no
other court system from which to seek relief. He has had a first and a second
determination of his claims in federal court, and that is all to which the law
entitles him. Except in the rare case where the section 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective, the federal prisoner cannot petition for the writ of habeas
corpus to challenge his conviction. " Thus, while the state prisoner has three
possible remedial paths (direct appeal, state postconviction procedure, and
federal habeas corpus), the federal prisoner has but two (direct appeal and
federal postconviction procedure under section 2255)."
See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
SThere may be situations where a federal prisoner would use habeas corpus to challenge a state
sentence he has yet to serve. For example, a prisoner serving a present federal sentence at Leavenworth
may be facing a Kansas state sentence to be begun when he is released from federal custody. He might
exhaust his state remedies through S 1507, then apply for federal habeas relief from that state sentence.
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IV.

THE MEANING OF "CUSTODY""

The Habeas Corpus Act expressly provides that a collateral challenge to
a criminal conviction is available only to a person "in custody in violation of
the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States."8" The "in
custody" requirement applies both to state prisoners seeking the federal writ
of habeas corpus and federal prisoners moving the sentencing court to vacate
sentence pursuant to section 2255.89 The Supreme Court decisions that have
dealt with the issue of when a prisoner is "in custody" and thus eligible to
apply for collateral relief will now be examined.
A.

JONES v.

CUNNINGHAM -

PHYSICAL RESTRAINT UNNECESSARY

At one time the Supreme Court held that tangible, physical restraints on
the body of the petitioner were necessary to satisfy the custody requirement."
More recently, however, the Court has held that the conditions placed upon
the liberty of one released on parole before the expiration of his sentence
amount to custody within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act. In Jones
v. Cunningham,"' the Court noted that a parolee's freedom of movement
within and certainly outside his community is restricted; he must obtain
permission before changing residences or operating an automobile, he must
report regularly to his parole officer and, finally, he is threatened with revocation and reincarceration for relatively insignificant breaches of parole conditions. These factors, taken together, convinced the Court that habeas corpus
should be available to a parolee. The Jones rationale has since been extended
to cases involving probation,9 2 a suspended sentence," and release on personal
recognizance. 94 Of course, a federal prisoner on parole is in custody for purposes of proceedings under section 2255." 5
B.

CARAFAS v. LAVALLEE-THE EFFECT OF RELEASE

While Jones expressly held that the limitations placed on the liberty of
a parolee constitute "custody" for habeas corpus purposes, the Court has been
He would not be able to use habeas to attack his federal sentence. In a like manner, a state prisoner
at Lansing might also have a yet-to-be-served federal sentence hanging over his head. There would
seem to be no good reason why he cannot move his federal sentencing court under § 2255 to vacate
his federal sentence.

He would not be able to use S 2255 to attack his state sentence.

See Desmond v.

United States Bd. of Parole, 397 F.2d 386 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968).
All this depends upon the elusive concept of "custody," to be discussed in Part IV infra.
' For purposes of this section, see Developments, supra note 2, at 1072-93.

*'28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1970).
*28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2255 (1970).
'Thus in Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885), the Court held that a naval officer confined to
the city of Washington was not "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus.
371 U.S. 236 (1963); see Baier v. State, 197 Kan. 602, 419 P.2d 865 (1966).
"United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965); see Miller v. State, 200 Kan.
700, 438 P.2d 87 (1968).
"'Walker v. North Carolina, 262 F. Supp. 102 (W.D.N.C. 1966), afl'd, 372 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967).
" Hensley v. Municipal Court, 93 S. Ct. 1571 (1973).
'United States v. DeMario, 246 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
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hesitant to expand the custody notion to reach a case where the petitioner's
sentence has expired. In Caratas v. LaVallee" a state prisoner had applied

for the federal writ of habeas corpus while still incarcerated, but was released
at the expiration of his sentence. The Court held that the case was not moot
because the various disabilities which follow from a criminal conviction sustained his substantial stake in the outcome. 7 But the Court pointedly did
not hold that those disabilities constitute "custody." Rather, Carafas stands
only for the proposition that, once federal jurisdiction attaches because the
petitioner is in custody at the time he files his application, it will not thereafter be lost or the matter rendered moot by his release. Clearly, the Court
might have expanded the concept of custody under the Jones rationale to
reach the case, but, just as clearly, a conscious decision was made not to do so.
Thus Carafas may represent a hesitancy to extend collateral remedies to a
new group of potential applicants.
Subsequent lower court decisions have freely applied Carafas to allow
both habeas corpus and section 2255 relief."8 In addition, there is authority
for the view that habeas may be available to challenge a conviction after the
sentence has been completely served if "the habeas petitioner sustains the
burden of proving that he is under some form of restraint by virtue of the
conviction."" Two instances in which the petitioner may be able to sustain
this burden are (1) where a subsequent sentence now being served was
enhanced pursuant to statute because of the earlier conviction... and (2) where
a subsequent sentence now being served was enhanced at the discretion of
the sentencing judge because of the earlier conviction.'
Of course, in the
examples given, the case would come to the federal habeas court in the
form of an attack on a present sentence. But that challenge would depend
upon the validity of a former sentence already completed. The question
would be whether the applicant remains in the custody of that former
sentence so as to permit a collateral attack on it.
The Supreme Court's failure in Carafas to hold that the disabilities suffered by one who has completed service of his sentence places him in custody
for habeas purposes may be less significant than it seems. In Hensley v.
Municipal Court,' the Court treated Carafas as a "custody" case and cited
'391 U.S. 234 (1968).
* See Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967).
'Cindle v. Page, 452 F.2d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods,
432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971) (habeas corpus); Hupert v. United
States, 448 F.2d 668, 669 n.1 (8th Cir. 1971); Bannister v. United States, 446 F.2d 1250, 1256 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1971); Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1968) (dictum) (S 2255).
'ackson v. Louisiana, 452 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1971); but see Reed v. United States, 471 F.2d
721, 722 (5th Cir. 1973) (indicating in dictum that S 2255 relief is not available to a petitioner who
files his motion after his sentence has expired).
1'E.g., Forbes v. Wainwright, 425 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1970). The Tenth Circuit has permitted a
habeas petitioner to attack prior state convictions used to invoke the Kansas habitual criminal act.
Smith v. Crouse, 413 F.2d 979 (10th Cir. 1969); Browning v. Crouse, 356 F.2d 178 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 973 (1966); see Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
' See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); cf. Gareau v. United States, 474 F.2d 24
(6th Cir. 1973).
' 93 S. Ct. 1571 (1973).
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it as authority for holding that a defendant released on his own recognizance

to await trial is in custody within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act.
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan lumped Carafas with Jones, thus
recognizing that similar considerations prompted both decisions. Although
there were three dissenters in Hensley, no one questioned the majority's
reliance on Carafas.
C. THE DEMISE OF THE PREMATURITY DOCTRINE
As early as 1934 the Supreme Court decided that federal habeas corpus
could not be used to challenge a future sentence if a successful petition would
not entitle the applicant to immediate release. In McNally v. Hill,' the
Court held that a prisoner serving the first of two consecutive sentences could
not challenge the second, yet-to-be-served sentence on federal habeas corpus.
McNally rested on two alternative grounds. First, the Court said that the
prisoner was not yet restrained by (in the custody of) the second sentence,

which therefore could not be examined on habeas corpus. Second, the Court
emphasized that the petitioner would not be entitled to immediate release
even if he could establish that the second sentence was invalid. Accordingly,
consistent with the traditional view that habeas is available only to test present
detention," 4 the petitioner could not be allowed to pursue a remedy which
could not at once open his cell door. The McNally decision thus established
what has been called the "prematurity doctrine," which required a prisoner
to wait until he began serving a second consecutive sentence before challenging his detention under it on federal habeas corpus.
The policy considerations weighing against the McNally prematurity doctrine are apparent. Postponement of the inquiry into the validity of a sentence

runs the substantial risk of prejudice to the petitioner's case due to failing
memories, the death of key witnesses, and other common deficiencies accompanying stale proceedings. Thus in Walker v. Wainwright,"°5 the Court retreated from the sweeping language in McNally to the effect that habeas
corpus is never available to a petitioner who would not be entitled to immediate release if successful. In Walker, the petitioner sought to challenge
the life sentence he was currently serving. The district court summarily dis-

missed his petition because he also had a five-year term to be served after
completion of the life sentence, and a successful challenge to the latter would
not entitle him to release: he would still be detained to serve the consecutive
five-year term. The Supreme Court held that the petition should have been
'03293 U.S. 131 (1934). McNally was followed in Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1958); Smith v. Hunter, 201 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1952); and
Benjamin v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1949). But see discussion of Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54 (1968), in text accompanying note 106 infra. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that McNally is no
longer to be followed. Hudson v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1970).
'' In point of fact, the McNally Court observed that habeas corpus was developed historically as a
remedy for citizens who were detained in derogation of their right to bail. 293 U.S. at 137 n.1. See
note 14 supra.
x®390 U.S. 335 (1968).
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entertained. McNally was unconvincingly distinguished on the ground that
the prematurity doctrine precluded only an attack on a sentence not yet
begun. Walker undoubtedly would also apply to a situation in which a
prisoner seeks to challenge one of two concurrent sentences. Even though
success would not entitle the inmate to immediate release, an attack on a
sentence currently being served is cognizable.
Finally, in Peyton v. Rowe,' the Court expressly overruled McNally
and held that the second of two consecutive sentences is open to habeas corpus
attack. As to whether the petitioner can be considered "in custody" under
the yet-to-be-served sentence, the Peyton Court took the position that a prisoner
serving the first of two consecutive sentences imposed by the same sovereign
is, in a practical sense, in custody under an aggregate term that encompasses
the future as well as the present sentence. That left open the question whether
habeas would be available in a case in which the future sentence was imposed
by a different sovereign. That situation commonly arises when a prisoner
currently confined in one state faces a future sentence, evidenced by a detainer, in another. 7 Is the inmate in such a case in custody under an aggregate term including both sentences?
The question was resolved only recently in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Kentucky.' There an Alabama state prisoner sought to challenge
a detainer warrant filed with the Alabama warden by Kentucky authorities.
The petitioner alleged that by failing to make a diligent, good faith effort
to bring him to trial on the pending charge underlying the detainer, Kentucky had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. While Braden
did not involve an imposed, future sentence to be served in Kentucky, nevertheless the question whether the petitioner was "in custody" was presented
inasmuch as he sought to challenge inaction by Kentucky authorities regarding a pending Kentucky charge. Specifically, he sought habeas corpus relief
from a form of restraint asserted by Kentucky authorities regarding a charge
unrelated to the Alabama sentence he was currently serving. Consequently,
the case demanded a decision on the question not resolved in Peyton. The
Court's answer came in footnote 4 of the opinion:
In this context, as opposed to the situation presented in Peyton, the "future custody" under attack will not be imposed by the same sovereign which holds the
petitioner in his current confinement. Nevertheless, the considerations which
were held in Peyton to warrant a prompt resolution of the claim also apply with
Since the Alabama warden acts here as the agent
full force in this context ....
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky in holding the petitioner pursuant to the
Kentucky detainer, we have no difficulty concluding that petitioner is "in custody"
-' 391 U.S. 54 (1968); see Davis v. State, 202 Kan. 192, 446 P.2d 830 (1968), and the discussion
in the text accompanying notes 325-30 infra.
'° A detainer is a notice of a criminal charge or unserved sentence pending against a prison inmate,
given by law enforcement or prosecuting officials to prison authorities to insure that after completion of
the prisoner's present sentence he will be held until turned over to the notifying authorities for prosecution or recommitment. See Jacob & Sharma, supra note 4, at 579.
10593 S. Ct. 1123 (1973).
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for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). On the facts of this case we need not
decide whether, if no detainer had been issued against him, petitioner would be
sufficiently "in custody" to attack the Kentucky indictment by an action in habeas
109
corpus.

Thus, it appears that the "in custody" requirement was satisfied by a combination of the restraint maintained by Kentucky through its detainer and the
physical restrictions imposed by the Alabama warden who became, for that
purpose, an agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Whether the same
result would have been reached if no detainer had been lodged was a question
left for another day. Hopefully, when that question is squarely presented,
the Court will hold that a detainer is not necessary and that a petitioner is in
custody for purposes of seeking habeas relief from any form of future custody.
An applicant's right to sue for relief should not depend upon whether the
authorities file a detainer as evidence of their intent to assert future control
over the petitioner.
D.

INTERJURISDICTIONAL DETAINERS"'

The Braden case is most significant for its final resolution of the related
statutory construction problem created by the 1948 decision in Ahrens v.
Clark." There the Court construed the language in section 2241(a), the
general section of the Habeas Corpus Act regarding the power of the federal
courts to issue the writ. In the words of the statute, "Writs of habeas corpus
may be granted by the ...

district courts

..

within their respective jurisdic-

tions." Construing that language, Ahrens held that in order to be entitled to
the writ, a petitioner must be confined within the territorial bounds of the
district in which the federal habeas court sits.
With the demise of the McNally prematurity doctrine under Peyton and
prisoners' resulting ability to attack yet-to-be-served sentences, the Ahrens
construction came under steady criticism. It seemed incongruent to say on
the one hand that a prisoner is sufficiently in the custody of the second of
two consecutive sentences to permit habeas corpus examination but that, if
the sentence was imposed in another state, relief is barred because he is not
in custody within the geographic jurisdiction of the federal court sitting in that
state. In many cases, the Ahrens rule left prisoners without access to the
courts from which they hoped to obtain relief. Accordingly, there was doubt
as to the continued vitality of Ahrens.
With the law in an uncertain posture, the Supreme Court in 1970 granted
certiorari in Nelson v. George."' There a California state prisoner had petitioned a federal district court in California for a writ of habeas corpus, chal' Id. at 1126-27 (citations omitted).
OSee Tuttle, Catch 2254: Federal Jurisdiction and Interstate Detainers, 32 U. PITT. L. REV. 489,
502-03 (1971); Wexler & Hershey, Criminal Detainers in a Nutshell, 7 CRIM. L. Buua. 753, 763 (1971);
Schindler, InteriurisdictionalConflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. CiN. L. REv. 179 (1966).
"335 U.S. 188 (1948).
-399 U.S. 224 (1970).
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lenging a North Carolina detainer warrant filed with the California warden.
Although the petitioner clearly hoped for an order vacating the underlying
North Carolina conviction, the Court apparently approved only a challenge
to the present effects being given the detainer. It was alleged, for example,
that California would not consider the petitioner for parole so long as the
detainer was maintained. Although the case was remanded because California
remedies had not been exhausted, the Court suggested that the matter be
retained on the district court's docket pending application for relief in the
courts of California. The implication was that, eventually, the federal court
in California might examine the North Carolina conviction and, upon a
finding that the conviction was invalid, order the California authorities to
disregard the detainer.
Even if Nelson allowed that result, the case presented substantial administrative difficulties. The specter of a federal court in California attempting to
review a North Carolina criminal conviction led the Court to request congressional action to overrule Ahrens legislatively and thus to permit the petitioner
to seek relief from a federal court in North Carolina, a court with personal
jurisdiction of state authorities and witnesses."'
But Congress did not take the advice offered in Nelson and, over time,
the uncertainty grew. Finally, with the circuits sharply split on the issue,""
the inevitable occurred. A state prisoner in Alabama sought relief from a
detainer lodged by Kentucky authorities for a yet-untried charge pending in
that state." 5 He filed his application in a federal district court in Kentucky.
In footnote 5 of the Nelson opinion, id. at 228, the Court said:
In [Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969)] Chief Judge Haynsworth, expressing the views of the majority of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc,
concluded that Ahrens v. Clark was a venue decision, and the physical presence of the petitioner
within the district was not an invariable requirement if rigid adherence to the rule would leave
one in prison without an effective remedy. The legislative history of the 1966 amendments to
28 U.S.C. S 2241(a) (1964 ed., Supp. V) suggests that Congress may have intended to endorse
and preserve the territorial rule of Ahrens to the extent that it was not altered by those amendments. See H.R. Rep. No. 1894, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1966). See also S. Rep. No. 1502,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Those changes were made by Congress, of course, prior to our
decision in Peyton v. Rowe; necessarily Congress could not have had the multistate problem with
which we are now confronted in mind. Whether, in light of the legislative history of S 2241 (a)
and the changed circumstances brought about by Peyton v. Rowe, the rigor of our Ahrens holding
may be reconsidered is an issue upon which we reserve judgment.
However, we note that prisoners under sentence of a federal court are confronted with no
such dilemma since they may bring a challenge at any time in the sentencing court irrespective
of where they may be incarcerated. 28 U.S.C. S 2255. It is anomalous that the federal statutory
scheme does not contemplate affording state prisoners that remedy. The obvious, logical, and
practical solution is an amendment to § 2241 to remedy the shortcoming that has become apparent
following the holding in Peyton v. Rowe. Sound judicial administration calls for such an
amendment.
U, Compare United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970) and Word
v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969) (proper forum is in the demanding state), with
United States ex rel. Van Scoten v. Pennsylvania, 404 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1968) and Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968) (proper forum is in the state of confinement).
U" The case described, it will be seen, is Braden. Although the petitioner there sought to assert his
right to a speedy trial in Kentucky rather than to challenge an existing conviction, the jurisdictional
question is the same. In either case, the issue is whether a federal court sitting in one state can issue a
writ of habeas corpus in favor of a prisoner confined in another. In point of fact, the case involving an
existing conviction would have been more easily decided. As it was, the majority had even more disagreement with the dissenters over the exhaustion question in Braden. Mr. Justice Rehnquist had much
u1
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While the Fifth Circuit, encompassing Alabama, held that a person in the
petitioner's situation should seek relief from a federal habeas court in the demanding state, the Sixth Circuit, encompassing Kentucky, followed Ahrens
and held that jurisdiction existed only in the state of confinement. The prisoner was caught between two courts, each telling him to seek relief from
the other.
The facts are, of course, those of Braden. After determining that the petitioner had exhausted Kentucky remedies, the Court noted the convenience
for all concerned that would result from adjudicating the claim in Kentucky.
All the material events had taken place in Kentucky, and the case records
and witnesses were there; the only expense or danger would be in transporting

the prisoner from Alabama. Next the Court came to the "within their respective jurisdictions" language of section 2241(a) and the Ahrens construction.
The majority... reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus does not act upon
the prisoner himself but rather upon the person who holds him in what is
alleged to be unlawful custody. The language of section 2241(a), read literally,
contemplates that the district court must have personal jurisdiction over the
custodian, not the prisoner. The Court held that, so long as the Kentucky
authorities could be reached by service of process, the district court could
issue a writ of habeas corpus within its jurisdiction and require that the
prisoner be presented for a hearing on his claim. If the petitioner was found
entitled to release, the court could so order, even if the prisoner was physically
confined in Alabama inasmuch as the Alabama warden was held to be
acting as Kentucky's agent." 7 Thus the territorial jurisdiction notion from
Ahrens was replaced by a construction focusing upon the power of the district court in Kentucky to control the actions of the Kentucky authorities."'
In sum, the Braden opinion not only resolved the custody question when
a habeas petitioner seeks to challenge future custody by a different sovereign,
it effectively overruled Ahrens in order to permit a prisoner to seek relief
from a federal court sitting in the demanding state, irrespective of where the
prisoner is confined.
more difficulty permitting habeas relief prior to the state court trial than he had with permitting it in
any particular court. 93 S. Ct. at 1133 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For Tenth Circuit cases prior to Braden, see Bedwell v. Harris, 451 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1971);
Fells v. Kansas, 343 F. Supp. 678 (D. Kan. 1972).
" There were three dissenters: the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Powell.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result but complained that "we have come a long way from the
traditional notions of the Great Writ. The common law scholars of the past hardly would recognize
what the Court has developed . . . and they would, I suspect, conclude that it is not for the better."
93 S. Ct. at 1133 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
' 93 S. Ct. at 1126 n.4.
' Inasmuch as the Court had already held that both the demanding state authorities and the confinement state warden are in such a case custodians, this new construction of S 2241(a) recognized
the concurrent jurisdiction of a federal court in the district of confinement. Cf. Nelson v. George, 399
U.S. 224 (1970); Dillworth v. Barker, 465 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972). The Court acknowledged that
possibility in foomote 15 of the Braden opinion but commented that a petition filed in the district of
confinement may properly be transferred to a more convenient forum.

[Vol. 21

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

V. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE"

9

Once the student or practitioner determines that his inmate-client is "in

custody" for habeas purposes, he must deal with a kaleidoscopic system of
procedural rules known as the exhaustion doctrine. This doctrine requires
a state prisoner petitioning for federal habeas corpus relief to exhaust first
the available and effective remedies still open to him in state courts. 2 ' This
part will discuss the exhaustion problem in some depth, with particular
emphasis upon the state remedies available in Kansas and the view taken of
exhaustion by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas and
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

1. A Codification of Comity Principles
As previously mentioned, the federal Habeas Corpus Act requires a state
prisoner seeking the writ to apply first to the courts of the state involved for
relief. The notion is that the federal courts should avoid upsetting state
criminal convictions before the state courts have had an opportunity to cor-

rect any federal constitutional errors made in prior proceedings. The considerations underlying the doctrine are of two types. Notwithstanding the
view that federal courts generally are more protective of federal rights, state
courts have traditionally played a significant role in the development and
application of federal law. The state criminal process is so heavily influenced
by federal constitutional principles that state courts must necessarily be aware
of and hospitable to federally protected interests. Accordingly, requiring a
habeas corpus petitioner to seek relief first from the courts of the state that
sentenced him preserves the traditional role heretofore assumed by state
courts. A second consideration underlying the exhaustion doctrine is the
desirability of furthering the orderly administration of state criminal justice
systems. The doctrine contemplates that a state defendant will raise his arguments at the state trial level and again before the state appellate court. If the
federal habeas court were to interfere in that process before the state court of
'1 For purposes of this section, see Carter, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus by State Prisoners,
4 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 20 (1965); Cofer, Observations on Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief in
State and Federal Courts, 28 TEx. B.J. 947 (1965); Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus: How
to Make Two Parallel Judicial Lines Meet, 49 A.B.A.J. 1166 (1963); Gold & Emerling, Federal Habeas
Corpus for the State Prisoner-A New Look, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 60 (1964); Leighten, Federal Supremacy
and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 74 (1967); Lorenson, The New Scope of Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 65 W. VA. L. RFv. 253 (1963); Mayers, Federal Review of State Convictions:
The Need for Procedural Reappraisal, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 615 (1966); Meador, The Impact of
Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REv. 286 (1966); Oliver, Post-Conviction
Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge, 39 F.R.D. 281 (1966); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies
-The Aftermath of Darr v. Burford, 25 CONN. B.J. 187 (1951); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies
Before Bringing Federal Habeas Corpus: A Reappraisal of U.S. Code Section 2254, 43 NEB. L. REv. 120
(1963); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 196 (1955); Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies as Condition for Federal Habeas Corpus, 34 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1950).
"' See Part III-C-2 supra.
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last resort has reached its final conclusion, the state system's operation would
be unduly interrupted. 2 '
In light of these considerations of comity, federalism, and efficiency, the
Habeas Corpus Act has codified the exhaustion doctrine in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) (1970):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,

or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner.
Subsection (c) provides that an applicant has not exhausted available state
remedies, within the meaning of section 2254(b), if he can still raise his
claim by some state procedure available at the time he seeks federal relief.
Although the statutory language, read literally, imposes a strict standard,
the Supreme Court has held that the statute merely reflects good judicial
judgment. That is, the exhaustion doctrine is not a limitation on federal
power to issue the writ of habeas corpus; it is only a type of abstention
doctrine.'22 It follows that, in an appropriate case, the writ may issue even
though the petitioner has not sought state relief." In the vast majority of
cases, however, the federal courts employ the exhaustion doctrine automatically, rarely pausing to consider the merits of a petition which fails to
show on its face that the state courts have denied relief. 24 Nevertheless, the
fact that federal habeas courts become involved at any point with prisoners
serving state sentences "is and has always been a controversial and emotionridden subject. . . . There is an affront to state sensibilities when a single
federal judge can order discharge of a prisoner whose conviction has been
affirmed by the highest court of a state. .125
Undoubtedly, the controversial nature of the federal habeas corpus process
has contributed to the often unsettled state of the law concerning exhaustion.
Some federal courts are clearly more hesitant than others to review state convictions and, accordingly, the standards for exhaustion may vary from district
to district. Moreover, while petitions alleging common and unremarkable
Developments, supra note 2, at 1094.
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963); United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463,
467 (2d Cir. 1972).
'uEx parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98 (No. 1862) (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875); Ex parte McCready, 15 F. Cas.
1345 (No. 8732) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874); Terry v. Superintendent, 454 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1972); see,
e.g., United States ex rel. Krenkowitz v. Rundle, 317 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
'Indeed, comment on the merits in such a case would amount to reversible error. See Slayton v.
Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971).
'C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs 217 (2d ed. 1970). The debate on the subject has raged for years,
culminating in a 1954 Judicial Conference proposal to amend § 2254 to virtually do away with habeas
corpus for state prisoners. That proposal was never adopted, of course. See C. WRIGHT, id. at 218;
Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Habeas Corpus lor State Prisoners, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal
Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960); Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956).
The Nixon Administration has stirred the ashes of the Judicial Council proposal with a new
proposed amendment to § 2254. The Nixon bill is discussed in notes 37 and 71 supra.
'

'Fay
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contentions may be held to a rather strict exhaustion requirement, egregious
cases may be heard more readily. The legal realist might say that a judge
tends to find procedural problems only when he does not want to reach the
merits. On the other hand, if the petitioner is obviously entitled to federal
relief, the federal judge may drop the exhaustion hurdle a bit in order to
deal with the case efficiently and fairly." 6 This proposition is related to and
consistent with the rule that, if the delay caused by exhaustion will irreparably
infringe upon the prisoner's federal rights, the requirement may be discarded." 7
2. State Courts and Federal Rights-A Note on Picard v. Connor
Before discussing what the cases have done with the exhaustion doctrine,
it is worthwhile to consider, from the prisoner's standpoint, the efficacy of
state remedies for federal claims. It is true that state courts deal with federal
issues on a regular basis and that state courts do on occasion reverse themselves
and correct mistakes of law and fact. Still, there is a gnawing suspicion
among prisoners and lawyers working in the field that state courts do not,
by and large, provide fertile ground for constitutional litigation. After all,
the federal habeas remedy exists in part because of a feeling in Congress that
federally protected rights cannot safely be left to development and enforcement solely by state courts.'
Petitioners, accordingly, often expect little from state courts and seek
relief from them only half-heartedly. The resulting danger is two-fold. First,
if state courts are not disposed at the outset to grant relief, they certainly are
unlikely to rule favorably on arguments that are poorly presented. Thus
lack of faith in state courts may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Surely state
courts are entitled to a presumption of intellectual integrity; they should be
given a chance. Second, the federal habeas courts require good faith in
satisfying the exhaustion requirement. If it appears that the petitioner merely
went through the motions in the state courts and that his attempt to gain
relief there was a sham, the federal court will probably rule that the exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied.
Perhaps in an effort to foster more conscientious postconviction litigation
in state courts, the Supreme Court made it clear in Picard v. Connor29 that a
habeas petitioner must have presented to the state courts the substance of the
federal claim he wishes to raise in the federal district court. Thus simply
going to the state courts with an ambiguous prayer and presenting them
with an opportunity to apply the law to the facts in the record is not enough.
The state courts must have been apprised with some specificity of the prisoner's
" See Chief Judge Tuttle's opinion in Tolg v. Grimes, 355 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 988 (1966). If the state does not argue that the petitioner failed to exhaust, the court may feel
free to ignore the requirement. Collins v. Estelle, 474 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1973) (exhaustion stipulated).
'Cf. Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 871 (1967); see
Part V-C infra.
's See text accompanying note 36 supra.
'404 U.S. 270 (1971). Also see Turner v. Lloyd, 439 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1971); Caffey v. Swenson,
437 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1971).
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constitutional argument. While the inmate is not required to recite "book
and verse on the Constitution,"'

the essential substance of his claim must

have been apparent. In sum, he cannot save his arguments for federal habeas
corpus. Of course, there is potential danger in Picard: untrained prison in-

mates may be held to a standard of pleading that is unfairly strict. Whether
that unfortunate result will follow remains to be seen.''
B. THE

AVAILABILITY OF THE STATE REMEDY

1. Rejection of the Adequate and Independent State Ground Doctrine
The Supreme Court held in Fay v. Noia82 that the exhaustion requirement of section 2254(b) refers only to state remedies that are still open to
the applicant at the time he files his application for habeas corpus in the
federal courts. In that case, the petitioner had failed to file a timely notice
of appeal and was therefore barred from seeking state relief. Because appeal
to the state appellate court was no longer available to him, he was entitled
to sue for the federal writ of habeas corpus. Thus Noia construed section
2254(c) to speak only of present remedies to which the petitioner may turn.
If there is no such remedy, section 2254(b) is satisfied even though the petitioner failed to present his federal claim to the state courts when they were
prepared to entertain it.
The holding in Noia raised the difficult question whether a state prisoner
will be allowed to petition the federal courts after the state courts have denied
relief on the basis of an adequate and independent state ground. Clearly the
state of New York in Noia had a legitimate interest in seeing that its procedural rules for the processing of criminal cases were followed. New York
could validly deny Noia an appeal because of his procedural default. Yet the
Supreme Court would not allow the power of the federal habeas court to be

limited by anything that occurred in the state proceedings. The Court stated
that the basic principle of habeas corpus is that the constitutionality of a prisoner's conviction is always open to plenary examination by the federal courts.

That being the case, the doctrine that the Supreme Court will not review
state court convictions which rest on adequate and independent state grounds
does not apply in habeas corpus cases.'

2. The Deliberate By-Pass Rule
While the thrust of Noia was clearly toward a broad view of the scope of
1

'°Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958); see Hairston v. Alabama, 465 F.2d
675, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1972) (allegation of misrepresentation by counsel includes allegation of nonrepresentation).
"Happily, the Supreme Court has shown no sign of moving in this direction since Picard. On the
contrary, in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the Court said that pro se petitions should
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accord, Ham v. North
Carolina, 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); Hairston v. Alabama, 465 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1972); Bryant
v. Harris, 465 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1972).
'372 U.S. 391 (1963).
'o ld. Since Noia, the Court has seriously weakened application of the doctrine to direct appeal
cases. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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the federal habeas inquiry, the Court did leave a loophole. In recognition of
the state's interest in the maintenance of its procedural rules, the Court carved
out an exception if the federal habeas court finds that the petitioner has
deliberately by-passed adequate state procedures."" Noting that section 2243
of the Habeas Corpus Act commands the federal court to "dispose of the
matter as law and justice require," the Court held that the district judge may
decline to entertain the petition even if, because of the deliberate by-passing
of the state's procedure, no remedy remains available to the petitioner at the
time he applies for federal relief.'85
What constitutes a deliberate by-pass is, not unexpectedly, a difficult question. Because a waiver of constitutional rights is involved, the Court in Noia
properly turned to the classic language from Johnson v. Zerbst. 80 There a
waiver was defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege."' 87 The Noia Court stated its holding as follows:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his
federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other
reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures,
then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state
courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits .... A choice made by

counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief. 3 8

It has been suggested that the test breaks down into two questions: (1) What
constitutes a knowing and intelligent waiver? and (2) When may counsel
bind the petitioner?' 89
The first question must be answered on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps it
will be significant in a given case that the petitioner is young, inexperienced,
or undereducated. It may be argued that such a person cannot fairly be held
to a harsh waiver rule. 4° The facts in the Noia case suggest another argument.
There the petitioner had purposefully decided not to appeal directly from
his state criminal conviction, because success on appeal might bring about a
death sentence on remand. The Supreme Court held that Noia's "grisly
choice" could not realistically be deemed a tactical maneuver designed to
circumvent orderly state procedure. 4 ' In determining what is a "grisly
choice," which would take the case out of the waiver rule, the Court may
balance the desirability of the petitioner's following the procedures afforded
him by the state against the harm with which he is threatened by compliance.
A recent case has thrown some light on what the Supreme Court expects
1" 372 U.S. at 438-39.

'In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967), the Court made it clear that the deliberate
by-pass rule applies only where the petitioner actually forfeited his state remedies.
15304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id.at 464; see Losieau v. Sigler, 421 F.2d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 1970).
372 U.S. at 439. The deliberate by-pass rule is also applicable to federal petitions under § 2255.
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); see Part VIH-B inira.
10 Developments, supra note 2, at 1106.
"'Old. at 1107.
" 372 U.S. at 440.
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to result from its suggestion that the petitioner may, in some instances, be
bound by the tactical decisions of counsel. The notion that, because of his
expertise and ability to deal efficiently with the criminal process, an attorney
must be allowed to act for his client and bind him is healthy and certainly
necessary to the smooth operation of the system. But in Humphrey v. Cady,'4 2
the Supreme Court made it clear that the default of counsel is to be closely
scrutinized. In that case, the state argued that counsel's failure to file a brief
on appeal in the state courts amounted to a deliberate by-passing of state
remedies. The Humphrey Court emphasized that any waiver "must be the
product of an understanding and knowing decision by the petitioner himself.... ."" The Court elaborated its earlier holding in Noia to say that "[a]n
evidentiary hearing will ordinarily be required before the District Court can
determine whether petitioner made a deliberate strategic waiver of his claim
ina state court."'" The Court said that the hearing must consider the reason
for counsel's default and "the extent of the petitioner's knowledge and participation in that decision."' 45 Finally, there was this telling language: "If
the District Court cannot find persuasive evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver on the part of the petitioner himself, then the Court should
46
proceed to consider petitioner's constitutional claims.'
The effect the Humphrey case will have on the application of the deliberate
by-pass rule may be significant. Arguably, the case virtually held that a petitioner will not be bound by a decision made by his attorney unless he, the
petitioner, actually participated in that decision. Thus the deliberate by-pass
rule may now hinge totally on the petitioner's state of mind. Before the federal habeas corpus court may in its discretion deny relief, it must first find a
knowing and intelligent waiver by the petitioner himself. 47
The evidentiary hearing required by Humphrey seems necessary in all
cases in which the deliberate by-pass rule is relied on by the state. Although
Humphrey dealt with an attorney's default, the hearing focuses on the petitioner's alleged waiver. Furthermore, although one might assume that the
petitioner (who generally has the burden of showing that he has exhausted
state remedies) 14' has the burden of proof, 49 the opposite may actually be the
case. A habeas applicant is entitled to "every reasonable presumption against
"'405 U.S. 504 (1972).
"'Id. at 517.
'"Id.
"'Id.
1"Id.

"' While Humphrey seemed to apply a subjective test to the deliberate by-pass problem, it remains
to be seen whether that view will prevail or whether an objective standard will be developed, holding
a petitioner to what he should have understood.
"'Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 35 (7th Cir. 1971); Burns v. Crouse, 353 F.2d 489 (10th Cir.
1965); Thompson v. Overlade, 216 F.2d 492, 493 (7th Cir. 1954). See also Gardella v. Field, 291
F. Supp. 107, 114 (C.D. Cal. 1968). But see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (Supreme
Court asked to be referred to instances in which the state of Missouri had granted prisoners a hearing in
similar circumstances).
"'See Sandoval v. Tinsley, 338 F.2d 48, 50 (10th Cir. 1964).
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waiver of fundamental rights."' 5 ° Accordingly, a strong argument can be
made that the state must show that the petitioner's alleged waiver was
constitutionally valid.' 5'
In practice the hearing requirement announced in Humphrey may have
the effect of abrogating the deliberate by-pass rule. It is clear from Noia
that a federal habeas court has power to hold a hearing and to grant relief
whether the petitioner has exhausted state remedies or not. Only if the
federal judge finds a valid waiver can he exercise discretion in denying relief."'
And now Humphrey teaches that he must hold a hearing to determine the
fact of waiver. Consequently, it should surprise no one if federal courts disregard the procedural issue of waiver and go immediately into the merits of the
petition. If a hearing of some sort must be held, the court's time can best
be spent dealing with the real issues rather than searching for procedural
grounds for dismissal. 5
3. A Survey of Cases

The Supreme Court has rarely been specific about the requirements of the
exhaustion doctrine. Brown v. Allen.54 held that, when a state prisoner's
claim has been decided adversely to him by the state supreme court on direct
appeal from his criminal conviction, the exhaustion doctrine is satisfied. It is
unnecessary that the petitioner seek relief through the state's postconviction
procedure if he would only be raising the same issues a second time.'55 The
Brown rule is sound, reflecting the view that exhaustion demands no more
than that the petitioner's federal claim be presented fairly to the state courts,
so that they have an opportunity to pass upon the constitutional issues involved.
This was the position taken in Picard v. Connor5 ' and in Wilwording v.

Swenson' in which the Court commented that "[s]ection 2254 does not
erect insuperable or successive barriers to the invocation of federal habeas
corpus. ... Petitioners are not required to file 'repetitious applications' in the
158

state courts."'

'°Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
m Sawicki v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 183, 185 (6th Cir. 1973). But see Davis v. United States, 93 S. Ct.
1577, 1589 n.ll (1973), where Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting said:
It is true of course that waiver will not be presumed from a silent record. . . . But in a
case like this, the record is not silent; it shows that the defendant did not object to the composition of the grand jury. . . . Thus the burden is on him to show that he did not know of his
right to object . . . or that, knowing of his rights, he nonetheless did not exercise them because,
for example, he feared that to do so would generate hostility that would adversely affect his
chances of acquittal.
' Harris v. Brewer, 434 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1970) (stating that where the exhaustion requirement
is satisfied the federal habeas court must entertain the petition); see Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40
(1967); Burns v. Crouse, 353 F.2d 489, 491 (10th Cir. 1965).
" CI. Opie v. Meacham, 419 F.2d 465, 466 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970);
Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
"'344 U.S. 443 (1953).
'Id.

at 447-50.

'404 U.S. 270 (1971).
r 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
"I d. at 250; see United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Friendly, J., suggesting that it is the state remedies and not the prisoner that must be exhausted).
TM
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Lower courts have generally followed Brown and held that, if a federal
claim has once been presented to the highest court of the state, section 2254(b)
is satisfied.' 59 Even if the state court declines to reach the merits of the claim
because of a procedural bar, the petitioner has been held to have exhausted
the state remedy by simply presenting his argument."' An application for a
writ of certiorari addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States is unnecessary.'' The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has emphasized the advantages of state postconviction remedy procedures for correcting mistakes
made the first time around. That court has examined the remedy available
in a state and evaluated its effectiveness to determine constitutional issues
within the context of orderly state procedures. When the remedy has been
found effective and clearly designed to review even those issues considered
by the state supreme court on appeal, exhaustion has been held to require compliance with the state postconviction motion procedure.' 62 The Tenth Circuit
has squared its view with Brown by emphasizing the supplemental fact-finding
power of the state trial court in a postconviction motion hearing. The idea
is that requiring the petitioner to seek at least another hearing in the state
courts will cause a better record to be made, simplifying the task of the federal
habeas court should the petitioner finally apply for federal relief.'
The
argument no longer applies after the petitioner has been denied a hearing in
the state trial court and, accordingly, there is no requirement that an appeal
be taken to the state supreme court to raise the same issues a second time with
nothing new in the record. 4
In cases where the petitioner's federal claim was not dealt with on appeal
in the state courts, the Supreme Court has been less helpful. Generally, it
seems clear that after Noia any effective state remedy available at the time
must be exhausted.'
Going further, the Court held in Anderson v. Nelson 6
that late filing by a state prisoner of his petition for a hearing in the state
supreme court generally does not constitute a deliberate by-pass. The lower
'Taylor v. Minnesota, 450 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1971); Mead v. Meier, 448 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.
1971); Makarewicz v. Scafati, 438 F.2d 474 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 980 (1971); Thomas v.
Decker, 434 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970); Burns v. Wingo, 426 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1970); United States
ex rel. Adams v. Pate, 418 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1969).
'eUnited States ex rel. Ross v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 552, 553-54 (2d Cir. 1971); but see Baskerville
v. Nelson,
455 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1972).
' t Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963); Makarewicz v. Scafati, 438 F.2d 474 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 980 (1971); Denny v. Anderson, 329 F. Supp. 945 (D. Del. 1971); Brown v. Heyd,
277 F.
Supp. 899 (E.D. La. 1967), afl'd, 406 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 818 (1969).
"2 Brown v. Crouse, 395 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1968); see White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42, 63
(W.D. Mo. 1966).
'C3
Eldridge v. Crouse, 400 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
'"Cochran v. Rodriguez, 438 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971); see Wood v. Crouse, 389 F.2d 747 (10th
Cir. 1968). On the other hand, if a new hearing is held, the prisoner will be required to appeal a
second time in order to give the state supreme court an opportunity to review the augmented record.
See 1text accompanying note 413 infra.
6Steed v. Salisbury, 459 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1972); Hachey v. Maine, 453 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1972);
United States ex ret. Huffman v. Commonwealth, 453 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Wainwright, 450 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068 (1972); Tyler v. Swenson, 440 F.2d
621 (8th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Millner v. Pate, 425 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1970); Hudson v.
Crouse, 420 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1970); Thompson v. Peyton, 406 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1968).
le 390 U.S. 523 (1968); see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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courts have followed Anderson.67 and have been particularly quick to hold
that other merely procedural defaults do not constitute a waiver." 8' In some
cases, however, a deliberate by-passing of state remedies has been found and
relief denied accordingly. " ' In tune with Picard v. Connor7 ' most circuits
have agreed that the habeas petitioner may not seek relief from the state
The usual
courts on one ground and from the federal courts on another.'
procedure when the petitioner adds new claims to his federal petition is to
require him to return to the state courts, even if he has already presented
different arguments there.' 72 The point is that a remedy is available so long
as the state courts have not considered the new argument and are willing to
do so."' Of course, if the state courts will not entertain subsequent applications, even on different grounds, the petitioner should be entitled to bring
his argument to federal court.' In such a case, there is no currently available
state remedy and section 2254(b) is satisfied.
One final word on the exhaustion of available state remedies is appropriate
here. The reports are literally filled with cases that turn on whether the
petitioner has complied with section 2254(b). As might be expected, inasmuch as most habeas corpus petitions are presented by uneducated inmates
proceeding pro se, an overwhelming number of the cases say the same thing:
relief will be denied for failure to exhaust state remedies through one of
the means outlined above. But the student or practitioner contemplating a
habeas petition should not be content to rely on general principles governing
when a particular state remedy will be considered available within the meaning of section 2254(b) and Fay v. Noia."' The cases cited in the notes to this
section may provide a starting place for research, but the reader will not be
adequately prepared to go forward until he has familiarized himself with
the peculiar law of the state involved and the views taken by the federal
"W'
Wade v. State, 450 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1971); Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971).
' E.g., Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972) (failure to move to suppress evidence
not a waiver); Smiley v. California, 442 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972)
(failure to object to the admission of a confession no bar to federal habeas); Frazier v. Roberts, 441
F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971) (failure to lay a foundation for a federal claim not a waiver); see Oswald v.
Crouse, 420 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1969).
" United States ex rel. Cruz v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972); Kanan v. Denver Dist. Court, 438 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Meadows v. Beto, 455
F.2d 985 (5th Cit. 1972); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Schaedel v. Follette, 447 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1971); Mize v. Crouse, 399 F.2d 593 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 913 (1969); Watkins v. Crouse, 344 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1965);
Davis v. Kansas, 327 F. Supp. 963 (D. Kan. 1971).
*°404 U.S. 270 (1971).
1
aSmith v. Cupp, 457 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1973); United States
ex rel. Kidd v. Pennsylvania, 453 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1971); Hill v. Dutton, 440 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971); Allen v. Henderson, 434 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1970); Gilday v. Scafati,
428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
7 Blackwell v. Wolff, 454 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1972); Seybold v. Cady, 431 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Mertz v. New Jersey, 423 F.2d 537 (3d Cit. 1970); cf. Hewett v. North Carolina,
415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
'Cf.
Courtney v. Sarver, 440 F.2d 1197, 1198 n.1 (8th Cir. 1971) (state court unwilling to
entertain the claim).
'See Milton v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1970), afl'd, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
'372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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district court to which the petition will be addressed and by the circuit court
to which the district court will look for guidance.
C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

STATE REMEDY

1. A Survey of Cases
Even though the petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies
within the meaning of section 2254(b) as described in the preceding section,
he may still obtain federal relief if he can satisfy the second prong of the
exhaustion test by showing the existence of circumstances rendering available
remedies ineffective. Thus it is common for the courts to say that, while an
available state remedy must ordinarily be pursued, 7 ' exhaustion does not
require a "futile"' or an "idle or useless effort."' 78 The burden of showing
that an available remedy is ineffective rests on the petitioner,"' and he generally must present a persuasive argument. The courts have found state
remedies ineffective when the state supreme court has consistently taken a
position unfavorable to the petitioner in prior cases involving the identical
issue the petitioner now wishes to raise, 8 ' the state court has ignored the
petitioner's requests for relief,"8 ' a co-petitioner has received a negative answer
from the state court on the identical question, " there has been "inordinate
and inexcusable delay" in the processing of the petitioner's postconviction
motion in the state courts,i3 and when the state postconviction remedy has
expressly excluded from its coverage the case the petitioner presents.'
The contention that the state process has been unnecessarily slow is, perhaps, the most common ground in this context. A dictum from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Bartone v. United States' provides some support for the
argument that delays may make state remedies ineffective. The Court said,
"Where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state remedy
against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other choice but
8' 6
to grant relief in the collateral proceeding."'
'"Lewis v. New Mexico, 423 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1970); cf. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639

(1968).
'"United States ex reL. Condon v. Erickson, 459 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1972); Terry v. Wingo, 454
F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Bruce v. Beto, 396 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Lewis v. New Mexico, 423 F.2d 1048, 1049 (10th Cir. 1970).
17Id.
" United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 459 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1972); Perry v. Blackledge,
453 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1971); Peters v. Kiff, 441 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
407 U.S. 493 (1972); Lucas v. Michigan, 420 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
" Courtney v. Sarver, 440 F.2d 1197, 1198 n.1 (8th Cir. 1971).
"'Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214, 216 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 916 (1970); Riley
v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D. Neb. 1970), afl'd, 437 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1971).
"'Tramel v. Idaho, 459 F.2d 57, 58 (10th Cir. 1972); Odsen v. Moore, 445 F.2d 806 (1st Cir.
1971); Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1970); Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1968);
but see Veneri v. Swenson, 453 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1972); Prescher v. Crouse, 431 F.2d 209 (10th Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Long v. Rundle, 331 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Allen v. Leeke, 328
F. Supp. 292 (D.S.C. 1971).
'See McDaniel v. Jones, 456 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1972) (state remedy could not be used to
attack sentence already served).

U.S. 52 (1963).
Id. at 54.
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8 7 where the state trial court had taken
The leading case is Smith v. Kansas"

a full year to act on the petitioner's section 1507 motion.'8 8 The Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of relief for
failure to exhaust state remedies, saying: "[W]e have recognized that inordinate delay in the adjudication of an asserted post-conviction remedy may
very well work a denial of due process cognizable in a federal court."' 89 The
question that comes immediately to mind is whether Smith can be stretched
to argue that a petitioner who seeks state postconviction relief on a state law
ground, and whose petition is unreasonably delayed, then has a federal claim
under the due process clause which is cognizable on federal habeas corpus.
Thus a state might deal so unfairly with questions of its own law that it
creates a federal issue when one did not previously exist. The argument is
Realistically, Smith must be
interesting but not likely to be successful.'
read only as holding that inexcusable delay may make a state remedy ineffective so that it need not be exhausted before a federal habeas court entertains
the claim.
While the courts have found available state remedies ineffective in isolated
cases, it is well to bear in mind that the general rule requires exhaustion.
Far more often than they find a remedy "futile" the courts comment that the
probability of success in the state courts is not a criterion of the remedy's
effectiveness.'' Nevertheless, although this attitude logically leaves no place
for a "futility doctrine" at all, the claim should be made in any case in which
it seems valid. The "futility doctrine" does exist and may be quite helpful in
satisfying the exhaustion requirement. In a given case, the student or practitioner must try to fit the facts of his case into one of the categories examined
above.' 2 As much as is possible, it should be emphasized that the petitioner
either has already made or would be willing to make a good faith effort to
give the state courts an opportunity to pass on his claim. Then, one should
state specific reasons that would support a finding that no reasonable possibility of success exists and that, consequently, the state remedy is ineffective
and the petitioner is entitled to a federal forum.
2. Wilwording v. Swenson-A Shift in the Burden of Proof?
The foregoing discussion assumed that the burden of showing that a state
remedy is ineffective rests with the petitioner. That proposition has been
'356 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 871 (1967).
l For a discussion of the motion procedure under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1964), see Part
V-D infra.
10 356 F.2d at 656.
"The Tenth Circuit seemed to recognize that the argument might be made in Prescher v. Crouse,
431 1F.2d 209, 212 (10th Cir. 1970).
',Daegele v. Crouse, 429 F.2d 503 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1010 (1971); Lucas v.
Michigan, 420 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
'
See text accompanying notes 180-84 supra.
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generally accepted and probably remains valid. 9" However, in light of the
language in the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Wilwording v.Swenson,"0 4
an argument can be made that the state must show the efficacy and fairness
of its procedures. Wilwoeding involved federal habeas corpus petitions by
Missouri state prisoners challenging living conditions and disciplinary procedures at the state institution. The prisoners first petitioned the state courts
for habeas corpus relief, but their petitions were denied without a hearing.
Even so, the district court denied them federal relief on the ground that they
still could seek an "injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a
declaratory judgment in the state courts." 9 ' The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that exhaustion under section 2254(b) does not require repetitious
applications in the state courts. In the course of its discussion of the exhaustion issue, the Court commented as follows:
Whether the State would have heard petitioners' claims in any of the suggested
alternative proceedings is a matter of conjecture; certainly no available procedure
was indicated by the State Supreme Court in earlier cases ....

Furthermore, we

are not referred to a single instance, regardless of the remedy invoked, in which
the Missouri courts have granted a hearing to state prisoners on the conditions of
their confinement.' 9 6

The quoted language arguably supports the inference that the burden of
showing available and effective state remedies rests, after Wilwording, on the
state.
There are, however, substantial reasons why Wilwording is not good authority for the stated proposition. First, the petitioners in Wilwording had
at least once tried their luck in the state courts. Their federal petitions undoubtedly showed that. Accordingly, the Court may only have meant that,
once a petitioner shows that he has in good faith sought and been denied

state relief, the state has the burden of coming forward with evidence that
the petitioner quit too soon and the state courts were not given a fair opportunity to pass on his federal claims. Second, as Judge Becker has since pointed
out, 97 the Court carefully rested its result on two different grounds. Because
the petitioners were challenging alleged violations of their constitutional
rights by prison officials, they were entitled to have their petitions read as
complaints under the Civil Rights Act, which does not require exhaustion.'
Notwithstanding what may be persuasive counterarguments, the contention
that Wilwording shifts the burden of proof on the exhaustion issue in habeas
corpus cases may begin cropping up in future petitions.
'~'See Becker & Stewart, supra note 5, at 586-88 n.18 and cases cited in note 148 supra.
404 U.S. 249 (1971).
Id. at 249-50.
"Old. at 250.
Becker & Stewart, supra note 5, at 586-88 n.18.
See note 69 supra.
'See Becker & Stewart, supra note 5, at 586-88 n.18 and cases cited in note 148 supra.
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9
MOTION '

1. The Nature of the Remedy
Some reference has already been made to the Kansas postconviction motion
procedure pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1507 (1964). This part will

more fully examine the remedy as it is described in the statute and as it has
been treated in the cases.2"' Section 1507 properly appears in the Kansas
habeas corpus act. Like section 1501, which describes the general writ of
habeas corpus, the motion remedy under section 1507 affords a vehicle for
challenging unlawful confinement. But, while section 1501 aims at unlawful
detention of any kind and extends to suits against the Board of Parole2 ' and
the prison warden, 2 the section 1507 motion is limited to collateral attacks
upon criminal convictions.'" Thus section 1507 carves out of the traditional
scope of habeas corpus any challenge to the petitioner's imprisonment that
goes to the legality of his sentence. Arguments about the conditions of his
confinement during the service of a lawful sentence, on the other hand, are
raised by way of section 1501.2"4

It should be noted that subsection (e) of section 1507 expressly makes the
' This part parallels recent published accounts of the experiences of sister states with similar postconviction motion procedures. See Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri-Five Years Under
Amended Rule 27.26, 38 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1973); Comment, Post-Conviction Relief in Arkansas, 24
ARK. L. REV. 57 (1970).
For convenience, the text of KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1507 (1964) is reproduced here in full:
(a) Motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general
jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of the
state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may at any time move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
(b) Hearing and judgment. Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the county attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing. If the court
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not
authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial
or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable
to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
(c) Successive motions. The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or
successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
(d) Appeal. An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from the order entered on the
motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
(e) Exclusiveness of remedy. An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
'For purposes of this section, see the Kansas Judicial Council's comparative analysis of the S 1507
motion and the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CoNvICTION REMEDIES (1972) [hereinafter cited
as COMPARISON]. Generally, it will be seen, the Kansas practice compares favorably with the ABA
recommendations.
'Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 453 P.2d 35 (1969).
'Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 265 (1972).
20
Prescher v. State, 205 Kan. 636, 471 P.2d 349 (1970); Lee v. State, 207 Kan. 220, 483 P.2d
1100 (1971).
'Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 265 (1972).
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section 1507 motion the exclusive state remedy for a prisoner seeking to challenge his conviction. Habeas corpus is, then, unavailable as a collateral

remedy; it has been replaced by a statutory motion which offers the prison
inmate the same opportunity to contend for his release." 5 Indeed, the Kansas
Supreme Court has treated layman-prepared pleadings, captioned as petitions
for the writ of habeas corpus, as though they are section 1507 motions.2" 6

Inasmuch as section 8 of the Kansas Bill of Rights prohibits the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus except in time of invasion or rebellion, the enactment of section 1507 in 1964 as the exclusive collateral remedy for prison
inmates raised a substantial state constitutional question. Did the substitution
of the statutory motion for the writ of habeas corpus effectively suspend the
writ? Surprisingly, the question was answered, not by the Kansas court, but
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewing a Kansas case on federal
habeas corpus. In Kinnell v. Crouse °. the court stated, "This same ground
has been plowed in the numerous decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2255
[the federal postconviction motion] and found wanting for merit. Because
of the similarity between 60-1507 and § 2255 and the constitutional background of both, we deem these federal decisions controlling here."2 Applying a rationale similar to that employed by the Supreme Court in the Hayman 20 9 case, the Tenth Circuit found section 1507 constitutionally valid." 0
In line with the recommendation of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies,2"' the Kansas court has not characterized its postconviction motion as either civil or criminal in nature. While

a court rule specifically states that a section 1507 proceeding is "an independent
"King v. State, 200 Kan. 461, 436 P.2d 855 (1968); Cox v. State, 200 Kan. 198, 434 P.2d 843
(1967).
'Paige v. Gaffney, 207 Kan. 170, 483 P.2d 494 (1971); Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107, 402 P.2d
789 (1965).
2384
F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 999 (1968).
2w 3 8 4 F.2d at 812.
"United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). See discussion in the text accompanying note
66 supra. Oddly enough, Hayman was not cited in Kinnell. Perhaps it is even more surprising that
the federal court felt called upon to decide a state constitutional question. The Supreme Court has
never held that a state must, as a matter of federal constitutional law, provide a postconviction remedy
for its prison inmates. Cf. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
210Of course, whether limiting Kansas prison inmates to the motion remedy under § 1507 effectively
suspends the state writ of habeas corpus in violation of the state constitution depends upon the scope of
state habeas corpus as a collateral remedy before § 1507 was enacted. The Kinnell court assumed that
the Kansas writ had the same scope as the federal writ and that, like the federal § 2255 motion, the
new state motion procedure under § 1507 did not narrow that scope. Rather than making that assumption, the court should have examined prior Kansas law and decided the specific question whether the
new state remedy cut back on what had been available before by way of state habeas corpus. Only if
the court found as to Kansas state law what the Supreme Court had found to be true of federal law
could the state issue be properly decided by citation to federal cases.
Nevertheless, the result in Kinnell would probably have been the same if the court had examined
the Kansas habeas corpus cases decided prior to 1964. The scope of the state habeas writ was bound
up with the notion that a criminal conviction judgment was open to collateral attack only on jurisdictional grounds, and constitutional violations were cognizable only insofar as they caused the criminal
proceeding to be so fundamentally unfair that the court acted beyond its jurisdiction. See Comment,
Habeas Corpus, An Extraordinary Remedy, 3 KAN. L. REv. 130 (1954). Apparently, then, the scope of
state habeas corpus to collaterally challenge a conviction in Kansas before 1964 was, if anything,
narrower than that of § 1507 enacted in that year. See, e.g., Harrison v. Amrine, 155 Kan. 186, 124
P.2d 202 (1942) (arguments that might have been raised on appeal could not be urged in a later
habeas corpus petition).
so See CoMPARIsoN, supra note 200, at XIV-3.
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' the court said in Stahl
civil action which should be separately docketed,"212
1
v. Board of County Commissioners . that "the collateral proceeding [under
section 1507] is, functionally, a part of the total review process, even though
delayed, and should be treated as such in regard both to the right to counsel
'
and to counsel's right to be paid."214
Going further, the court concluded as
follows: "[W]e do not intend to say that the post-conviction remedy contemplated by K.S.A. 60-1507 is a criminal action in every respect. Indeed, procedurally, we believe it is governed by civil rules. In a substantive aspect,
however,.., we deem the proceeding a part of the criminal cause from which
'
the proceeding arose."215
Thus the section 1507 motion is a civil, quasi-habeas
remedy governed by civil rules of procedure but also having characteristics of
the original criminal cause. It is at once a separate action and a continuation
of the criminal process that brought the petitioner to prison. As self-contradictory as this description may seem, the notion that the postconviction motion procedure partakes of the attributes of both civil and criminal proceedings
is essential to the flexibility necessary to assure effectiveness. Accordingly, inasmuch as the section 1507 proceeding is regarded as a subsequent stage of the
criminal review process, the parties remain the same-the individual and the
state 21--proper venue is in the sentencing court,"' and counsel may be appointed for indigents21. and paid from public funds.21 On the other hand,
because the section 1507 motion begins a separate civil action, the original parties are reversed in the caption so that the prisoner is shown as the moving party
or petitioner,122 the rules of civil procedure govern insofar as they are applicable, 2 the petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief
by a preponderance of the evidence, 2 and he has no absolute right to be
present 228 or to be represented by appointed counsel. 224 These aspects will
be examined in more detail in Part V-D-3.
mKAN. Sup. Cr. R. 121(a) (1972). Rule 121 governs practice under S 1507 and will be examined
in Part V-D-3 inlra.
' 198 Kan. 623, 426 P.2d 134 (1967).
I'1d.at 627, 426 P.2d at 137.
Id. at 628, 426 P.2d at 138.
6
"See KAN. STAT. ANN. S§ 0-1507(a) (1964), 22-2104 (Supp. 1972).
M

' KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1507(a) (1964); Williams v. State, 203 Kan. 246, 452 P.2d 856 (1969).
M8
" KAN. SuP. CT. R. 121(i) (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-4506 (Supp. 1972).
= KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-4507 (Supp. 1972); Stahl v. Board of County Comm'rs, 198 Kan.

623, 426 P.2d 134 (1967).
m KAN. SUP. CT. R. 121, Appendix-Form (1972).
SKAN. SuP. CT. R. 121(a) (1972).

'KAN. SuP. CT. R. 121(g) (1972); Metcalf v. State, 199 Kan. 800, 433 P.2d 450 (1967); Brown
v. State, 198 Kan. 527, 426 P.2d 49 (1967); Goodwin v. State, 195 Kan. 414, 407 P.2d 528 (1965).
The Kansas Judicial Council has suggested that, if an affirmative defense is raised, the state bears the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. COMPARISON, supra note 200, at XIV-29.
'KAN.
Sup. CT. R. 121(h) (1972); Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 945, 494 P.2d 1160, 1162
(1972); Perrin v. State, 196 Kan. 228, 233, 410 P.2d 298, 302 (1966).
'KAN. SUP. CT. R. 121(i) (1972); see Kowalec v. State, 208 Kan. 651, 652, 493 P.2d 244, 245
(1972); Weathers v. State, 208 Kan. 653, 657, 493 P.2d 270, 273, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 927 (1972).
The language quoted in the text from Stahl v. Board of County Comm'rs, 198 Kan. 623, 426 P.2d
134 (1967), is literally to the contrary. However, it is quite clear that the court did not mean what it
seemed to say.
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2. Issues Cognizable-A Comparison With the Federal Section 2255 Motion
As has already been noted, the Kansas section 1507 motion is virtually
identical in statutory description to the federal postconviction motion under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). In Kinnell v. Crouse,22 the Tenth Circuit went so
far as to say that section 1507 is an attempt by the Kansas Legislature to
create a state remedy of the same nature as the federal section 2255 motion.
That theme has also run through the Kansas cases. In State v. Richardson2.
and Perrin v. State227 the Kansas court made it clear that section 1507 "follows
the language of [section 2255] and ... it may therefore be said the body of
the federal law which has developed under § 2255 ... should be given great
weight in construing the provisions of 60-1507. ... "228 It would seem, then,

that section 1507 is for a state prisoner challenging a state conviction what
section 2255 is for a federal prisoner challenging a federal conviction. Indeed,
just after the enactment of section 1507 a present commissioner22 of the
Kansas Supreme Court advocated construing the new state remedy as broadly
as the federal courts have construed section 2255. Then Assistant Attorney
General of Kansas J. Richard Foth argued that the promise of section 1507
was great if the Kansas court would permit its use to "anticipate federal

action in a criminal case and to correct any fundamental error at the state
level."2 ' On the other hand, he said that section 1507 would be ineffective
if the court left the correction of constitutional errors to the federal habeas
court.ul
a. The Exceptional Circumstances Rule
Whether Commissioner Foth's hopes have been realized is an open question. The statute expressly states that a prisoner may use section 1507 to
challenge his sentence on five separate grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed
in violation of federal law or the federal constitution; (2) the sentence was
imposed contrary to Kansas law or the state constitution; (3) the sentencing

court lacked jurisdiction to impose sentence; (4) the sentence is in excess of
that allowed by law; or (5) the sentence is "otherwise subject to collateral
attack." Thus, with the exception of the reference to Kansas law, section
1507 mirrors the federal section 2255 remedy. In practice, the issues most
often raised in both proceedings are the same-federal constitutional claims.
Only in the exceptional case will a state prisoner have an argument based
upon federal nonconstitutional law; state law grounds are equally rare.
m384 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1967).
194 Kan. 471, 399 P.2d 799 (1965).
196 Kan. 228, 410 P.2d 298 (1966).
mid. at 234, 410 P.2d at 302.
mA commissioner participates in argument and conferences and writes opinions which must be
approved by the court. He has no vote in the court's decision-making process. KAN. STAT. ANN. SS
20-146 to -150 (Supp. 1972).
m Foth & Palmer, Post-Conviction Motions Under the Kansas Revised Code of Civil Procedure, 12
KAN. L. Rav. 493, 504 (1964).
mId. at 505.
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Soon after Commissioner Foth's law review article appeared, however,
the Kansas Supreme Court promulgated rule 121 to govern proceedings under
section 1507. One pertinent section of the rule may properly be set out here.
Subsection (c) (3) provides:
[A] proceeding under section 60-1507 cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute
for direct appeal involving mere trial errors or a substitute for a second appeal.
Mere trial errors are to be corrected by direct appeal, but trial errors affecting
constitutional rights may be raised even though the error could have been raised
on appeal, provided there were exceptional circumstances excusing the failure

to appeal.
The position taken as to nonconstitutional contentions does not seem to
be at variance with federal practice. According to this rule, trial errors that
do not rise to the level of constitutional violations are never cognizable in the
collateral proceeding, unless the trial court's power to impose sentence is
brought into question 2 or the sentence is not authorized by statute.233 Mere
trial errors must be raised on direct appeal and, if they are not, the prisoner
cannot later rely on them for relief.234 Thus allegations of insufficient evidence
for conviction,"' improper closing argument,"' insufficient indictment or
information,23 7 and improper instructions" are generally not cognizable,
although it might be argued that particularly prejudicial errors constitute a
violation of due process.
But the Kansas rule appears to place limitations on the availability of the
section 1507 remedy that do not apply in federal cases. In the key section
2255 case, Kaufman v. United States," 9 the Supreme Court held that a federal
prisoner may collaterally challenge his federal sentence on a constitutional
ground that he did not argue on direct appeal. Specifically, it said that a
section 2255 petitioner is entitled to relief if he can allege and prove that unconstitutionally seized evidence was improperly received at trial, even though
he might have raised the same issue on appeal. The Court quoted at length
from Townsend v. Sain, 4 ° a case involving federal habeas corpus for a state
prisoner, and thus adopted for section 2255 proceedings the standards of review developed under the Habeas Corpus Act generally.241 Reading section
Tuscano v. State, 206 Kan. 260, 266, 478 P.2d 213, 218 (1970).
'See Veronee v. State, 193 Kan. 681, 396 P.2d 360 (1964).
"'Preston v. State, 208 Kan. 648, 649, 493 P.2d 187, 188 (1972); Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan.
942, 943, 494 P.2d 1160, 1162 (1972); Eaton v. State, 206 Kan. 187, 188, 476 P.2d 694, 695 (1970).
' Cf. Tuscano v. State, 206 Kan. 260, 263, 478 P.2d 213, 216 (1970); see Lorraine v. United States,
444 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1971).
2
'0 Preston v. State, 208 Kan. 648, 493 P.2d 187 (1972); Baker v. State, 204 Kan. 607, 464 P.2d
212 (1970).
' Weathers v. State, 208 Kan. 653, 656, 493 P.2d 270, 272, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 927 (1972);
Carithers
v. State, 207 Kan. 607, 485 P.2d 1368 (1971).
"2 Delano v. State, 209 Kan. 670, 675, 498 P.2d 18, 21-22 (1972); see Woods v. Munns, 347 F.2d
948 (10th Cir. 1965).
2394 U.S. 217 (1969).
°372 U.S. 293 (1963).
2
Specifically, the Kaufman Court relied on the following key passage from Townsend:
The whole history of the writ-its unique development-refutes a construction of the federal
courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of the courts of appellate
review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an original civil proceeding,
2M
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2255 as a remedy "exactly commensurate with that which had previously
been available by habeas corpus . . ."242 the Court explicitly overruled the
numerous federal cases that had dispensed with prisoners' constitutional arguments on the ground that section 2255 "cannot be made the substitute for an
appeal. 24 3
The Kansas rule 121 stops short of that result. Even as to trial errors
affecting constitutional rights, the rule apparently requires the petitioner to
show "exceptional circumstances" excusing failure to raise those contentions
on appeal. Unlike the federal courts considering section 2255 motions from
federal prisoners, the Kansas court, in virtually every section 1507 case it
decides, quotes from rule 121 and states that "a proceeding under K.S.A.
60-1507 cannot be used as a substitute for a second appeal, even though consti'
tutional questions may be involved."244
In view of the treatment given constitutional claims which might have been
made on appeal, it is not surprising that the court has given even shorter
shrift to arguments that were considered and rejected on appeal but are
then raised again in a collateral motion. It was held in Sagebiel v. State245
that, absent "circumstances which would require us to reexamine that question," the petitioner would not be allowed to relitigate his claim that he had
been denied trial by an impartial jury. And, in Eaton v. State,246 the court
would not entertain a second argument that the petitioner's trial counsel had
been ineffective. Perhaps the most significant case is Jones v. State,147 in which
the court declined to reconsider fourth amendment issues that had been dealt
with on appeal.
We have, then, this situation: The federal system has a postconviction
motion procedure by which a petitioner can challenge his federal sentence colaterally. Because the section 2255 motion is considered comindependent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations. . . . The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all make
clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary. Therefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief,
the federal court to which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and try the
facts anew.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
'Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
219 (1952).
24 E.g., Peters v. United States, 312 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1963); see Eisner v. United States, 351
F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1965); Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. Sunal
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947) (involving a nonconstitutional trial error).
'Weathers v. State, 208 Kan. 653, 657, 493 P.2d 270, 273, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 927 (1972);
see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 210 Kan. 498, 502 P.2d 838 (1972); Yurk v. State, 208 Kan. 946, 495 P.2d
87 (1972); Hacker v. State, 207 Kan. 195, 483 P.2d 484 (1971); Hannon v. State, 206 Kan. 518, 479
P.2d 852 (1971); Cantrell v. State, 206 Kan. 323, 478 P.2d 192 (1970); Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan.
304, 477 P.2d 971 (1970); Ingram v. State, 204 Kan. 836, 465 P.2d 925 (1970); Holt v. State, 202
Kan. 759, 451 P.2d 221 (1969); King v. State, 200 Kan. 461, 436 P.2d 855 (1968); Minor v. State,
199 Kan. 189, 428 P.2d 760 (1967); Hanes v. State, 196 Kan. 404, 411 P.2d 643 (1966); Miles v.
State, 195 Kan. 516, 407 P.2d 507 (1965).
'209 Kan. 209, 495 P.2d 530 (1972).
m206 Kan. 187, 476 P.2d 694 (1970).
204 Kan. 839, 466 P.2d 353 (1970). Jones is significant because so many collateral challenges
are based on fourth amendment claims.
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mensurate with habeas corpus, there is no requirement that the petitioner
first raise constitutional issues on direct appeal; the sentencing court's power,
under section 2255, to review constitutional claims is plenary. Kansas has
enacted a similar motion remedy for the state system, and the Kansas court
has expressly stated that it will look to federal section 2255 cases in construing
section 1507. Kansas, too, considers that its postconviction motion provides
a remedy commensurate with habeas corpus,24 but rule 121 applies an "exceptional circumstances" test to cases raising error that might have been considered on appeal. That is, the similarity between the federal section 2255
motion and the Kansas section 1507 motion breaks down under rule 121 (c) (3)
and the "exceptional circumstances" test. A federal petitioner has only one
hurdle to negotiate; he must allege federal law or constitutional violations
which, if true, would entitle him to relief. A Kansas state prisoner proceeding
under section 1507, however, must jump through two hoops; he must (1)
allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show "exceptional circumstances" that excuse his failure to raise his contentions on
appeal.
The question for anyone preparing a section 1507 collateral challenge
becomes: What are exceptional circumstances? No easy answer is possible,
but an examination of the cases reveals four distinct approaches: (1) exceptional circumstances excusing failure to raise an issue on appeal are present
if an intervening change in substantive law has enabled the petitioner to
argue a point heretofore unrecognized; (2) the same applies if the petitioner
was precluded from appeal by a procedural rule that has since been changed;
(3) exceptional circumstances may be found in other situations in order to
reach meritorious claims; (4) when an appeal is barred by statute or when
a particular issue is not ordinarily argued on appeal, the exceptional circumstances test is either inapplicable or largely ignored. These approaches will
be dealt with below.
i. A Change in Substantive Law.-The leading case with respect to this
approach is Barnes v. State. 4 There the petitioner had been convicted of
first degree murder in 1956, but had not perfected a direct appeal. Douglas
v. California," ' the Supreme Court case requiring appointment of counsel
for indigents on appeal, had not yet been decided, and Kansas law did not
provide for the appointment of counsel on appeal in forma pauperis. Then,
in 1964, the Supreme Court decided in Jackson v. Denno25 ' that a collateral
proceeding outside the hearing of the jury is necessary to determine the
voluntariness of a confession. The petitioner in Barnes subsequently filed a
section 1507 motion challenging his conviction on the constitutional grounds
that a confession had been admitted into evidence against him without a
SSee KAN. Sup. CT. R. 121(a) (1972).
"204 Kan. 344, 461 P.2d 782 (1969).
°372 U.S. 353 (1963).
-378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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prior voluntariness hearing as required by Jackson, and that he had been
denied his right to appointed counsel on appeal as required by Douglas. The
case law was clear that both Jackson and Douglas have retroactive application.2"2 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that the petitioner's confession had, in fact, been admitted improperly under the Jackson

standard, but relief was denied on the ground that the right had been waived
by the petitioner's failure to appeal directly. The trial court expressly relied
on rule 121(c)(3), saying that section 1507 is not available to raise even
constitutional claims, absent exceptional circumstances.
A superficially complex case thus boiled down to a relatively simple problem: "The errors with which we are concerned in the instant case affect the
appellant's constitutional rights, and the immediate question posed is whether

there are exceptional circumstances excusing the appellant's failure to appeal. 258
The court began its task by admitting that prior decisions had established
no definite guidelines and that, in the past, the exceptional circumstances test
had been "rather loosely applied." '54 Then, abruptly, the court seemed to
restate the question presented-now saying that the issue was whether the
petitioner's failure to appeal constituted a valid waiver of his constitutional
rights. 255 For an answer, the court turned to the classic definition from Johnson v. Zerbst,56 where the Supreme Court described waiver as "an inten'
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."257
Going further, the Barnes court cited Fay v. Noia 258 and Kaufman v. United
States259 for the proposition that the burden of showing waiver rests on the
state. That burden not having been met, the court held that the case could
not properly be disposed of on the waiver theory."'
The state responded that the constitutional waiver issue was not in point;
the question was whether the petitioner had shown exceptional circumstances
excusing his failure to appeal.2"' Then, in an altogether unclear discussion,
the court apparently held that the change in the law occasioned by Douglas
and Jackson, which intervened between the petitioner's trial and his section
1507 motion, sufficed to permit consideration of his constitutional claims in
the collateral proceeding. The court concluded that "[u]nder all of the facts
and circumstances presented by the record in the instant case exceptional
circumstances are shown to exist which meet the requirement of rule 121(c)
'Jackson was held to have retrospective application in McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575 (1964);
see State v. Milow, 199 Kan. 576, 433 P.2d 538 (1967). Douglas was also given retrospective effect in
Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964).
' 204 Kan. at 351, 461 P.2d at 787.
'Id. See Bush v. State, 203 Kan. 494, 454 P.2d 429 (1969); Peterson v. State, 203 Kan. 959,
457 P.2d 6 (1969).
m204 Kan. at 352, 461 P.2d at 787.
m304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 464.
'372 U.S. 391 (1963).
-394 U.S. 217 (1969).
i204 Kan. at 357, 461 P.2d at 791.
Id. at 354, 461 P.2d at 789.
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(3), and upon review of the constitutional issues presented in this proceeding we hold the appellant is entitled to relief."26 The case was remanded
for a Jackson-type hearing on the voluntariness of the petitioner's confession.
There is language in the Barnes opinion which, taken with the heavy
reliance on federal cases, suggests that the Kansas court may be willing to
find "exceptional circumstances" whenever the state does not show a valid
waiver of constitutional rights.263 Subsequent cases, however, have emphasized
the intervening change in the law present in Barnes. In Jackson v. State,2"4
the court was faced with the argument that the petitioner had not appealed
errors affecting constitutional rights because he had been unable to procure
counsel. The court said:
At the time of his conviction in 1957, the petitioner, being indigent, was not
entitled under Kansas law to the appointment of counsel to assist him in carrying
forth an appeal .... In the absence of any showing he intentionally relinquished
or abandoned his statutory right of appeal .. .for all we know he may have been
dissuaded from appealing because under our then-existing law he would have been
without the aid of an attorney. In our opinion the situation here presents exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of trial errors. 265

One of the cases cited in support of this conclusion was Barnes. In Yurk v.
State2 . the court declined to entertain constitutional arguments in the absence of "unusual or intervening changes in law.... 2 7
The upshot is that, under the Barnes rule, an intervening change in substantive law 2 6S-having retroactive application so as to apply to the petitioner's
criminal prosecution or appeal 2 -is one example of "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of rule 121 (c) (3). Where such a change is
found, the Kansas court will entertain constitutional claims even though they
might have been raised on appeal. The only limitation is that pertaining to
any form of review: even on direct appeal, if a valid waiver can be shown,
review is precluded. That is, once the section 1507 petitioner jumps through
the exceptional circumstances hoop, he is on his way to any relief to which
he can prove he is entitled. If the merits favor the petitioner, the state can
only win if waiver is shown, obviously a remote possibility.27°
ii. A Change in Procedural Law.-The Kansas court has also found exceptional circumstances excusing failure to appeal when a procedural rule of
aId. at 360, 461 P.2d at 793 (emphasis by the court).
"on
the question of the burden of proving a deliberate by-pass or lack thereof, see notes 148-51
supra and accompanying text.
'204 Kan. 841, 466 P.2d 305 (1970).
Id. at 843-44, 466 P.2d at 308.
'208 Kan. 946, 495 P.2d 87 (1972).
lId. at 947, 495 P.2d at 89.
Of course, the changes that occurred in Barnes may be described as "procedural"-the right to
a collateral voluntariness hearing and to the appointment of counsel on appeal. But here they are
described as substantive to distinguish this type of exceptional circumstances from the case where the
procedural rules of court are amended. See Part V-D-2-a-ii infra.
' Cf. Young v. State, 207 Kan. 166, 483 P.2d 1020 (1971).
7
'oSee note 669 infra; but see Baker v. State, 204 Kan. 607, 464 P.2d 212 (1970).
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court that precluded appellate review is subsequently amended. Perhaps the
best illustration is Baker v. State. 7 ' There a section 1507 petitioner contended
that illegally seized evidence and a coerced confession had been improperly
received at trial. Those points had been specified as error on direct appeal,
but the court had not passed on them. The reason given was that, under a
then-existing rule of practice, errors not included in a defendant's motion
for new trial could not be reviewed. The Baker court noted that "ordinarily"
trial errors must be directly appealed but then continued:
Since our decision in the direct appeal, the rule in respect to appellate procedure
in criminal actions has been changed by the adoption of Rule 17 .... Had Rule
No. 17 been in effect when Baker's appeal was here previously, the alleged trial
errors would have been reviewable....
The immediate question posed is whether there are exceptional circumstances
excusing the failure of petitioner to properly present the alleged trial errors in
272
his direct appeal.

The conclusion was: "As a matter of fundamental fairness we believe that
where, as here, a defendant on direct appeal has been precluded from a review of alleged trial errors affecting his constitutional rights because of an
appellate procedural rule which has since been abrogated, exceptional circumstances exist within the purview of Rule No. 121 (c) (3)."273
More recently, an imaginative petitioner in Turner v. State2 74 called attention to the use in Baker of the qualifying term "ordinarily" to state the test
from rule 121(c) (3). Even in the language of the rule itself, trial errors must
"ordinarily" be raised on appeal. The petitioner argued that his constitutional claims had not been fully considered on direct appeal and that the
exception suggested by the term "ordinarily" should be applied in his case.
Predictably, the court rejected that construction of the rule and held that
"[t]he exception, which gives rise to the use of the term 'ordinarily', refers
to circumstances of a particular case where new principles of law affecting
the court's original opinion have been declared after the case was considered
on direct appeal."27 Because the Turner petitioner could not show any such
intervening change in the law, the court declined to review the point it had
previously rejected.
The teaching of the Baker case is, then, that an intervening change in
rules of practice may constitute exceptional circumstances allowing review
of trial errors affecting constitutional rights in a section 1507 collateral proceeding. Essentially, the petitioner must show that the old rule precluded
2
appellate review, while the new rule will permit it. 1
2 0 4 Kan. 607, 464 P.2d 212 (1970).
tId.at 609-610, 464 P.2d at 216.
"Id. at 610-611, 464 P.2d at 216. See Davis v. State, 204 Kan. 816, 466 P.2d 311 (1970); Holt v.
State, 197 Kan. 468, 419 P.2d 834 (1966).
4208 Kan. 865, 494 P.2d 1130 (1972).
Id. at 866, 494 P.2d at 1132.
'"Two other cases, Holt v. State, 197 Kan. 468, 419 P.2d 834 (1966), and Davis v. State, 204 Kan.
816, 466 P.2d 311 (1970), illustrate the application of the same rule in different contexts.
i
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iii. Tuscano v. State-An Open Category?-While it may be argued that
the Kansas court has expressly found exceptional circumstances only in cases
in which there has been an intervening change in substantive or procedural
law, it is not at all clear that collateral review of trial errors affecting constitutional rights will not be permitted in other, different situations. That is,
there may be other circumstances that the court is willing to classify as exceptional. The opinion in Tuscano v. State... is difficult to explain in any
other way.
In Tuscano the petitioner's section 1507 motion raised three issues: ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and
improper application of the habitual criminal act. All three arguments might
have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal from the criminal conviction.27 The court went directly to the merits of the first claim, finding
against the petitioner on that argument. Then, in the middle of the third
page of the opinion, it mentioned that "the present appeal is simply an appeal
from the decision entered in the present postconviction proceedings, in which
type of action trial errors are not ordinarily taken into account. It is only
where constitutional rights have been impaired that trial errors may be considered in a 60-1507 action, and then only where exceptional circumstances
are found to exist."2 ' Thus the court recognized the general rule.
Nevertheless, without so much as a further word about "exceptional circumstances," the court proceeded to the merits of the petitioner's claim that
insufficient evidence had been presented at trial-at best only an arguable
constitutional claim, at worst a mere trial error not cognizable under section
1507 in any circumstances. More importantly, the court not only considered
the petitioner's nonconstitutional argument concerning the invocation of the
habitual criminal act, but found that he was entitled to relief on that ground.
Over the dissent of three of its members, the court held that the record showed
that the state had not properly proved the prior felony conviction upon which
the petitioner's sentence had been lengthened.28 °
In part, the Tuscano opinion can be explained on the ground that the
case relied on for the result-remand on the habitual criminal act issue-was
not decided until 1967.281 The Tuscano petitioner's trial having been held in
1964, the court may have intended to review that argument on the theory
that an intervening change in the law constituted exceptional circumstances.
That explanation is less than satisfying, however, inasmuch as it is unclear
what the law was before 1967.2 Furthermore, it leaves unexplained the
m206 Kan. 260, 478 P.2d 213 (1970).
This was apparently true, although the opinion does not make it clear.
206 Kan. at 263, 478 P.2d at 216.
Alternatively, it may be argued that the court considered proper proof of prior convictions a
constitutional issue. The opinion, however, does not so state and, in any event, the validity of such a
position would be questionable.
State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 424 P.2d 612 (1967).
n"In point of fact, since State v. Taylor, id., interpreted the hearsay rule to hold that the state had
not properly proven prior convictions, it seems clear that the case did not mark a change in the law.
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court's consideration of this nonconstitutional claim at all-even in exceptional circumstances. While section 1507 clearly makes the collateral remedy
available to challenge a sentence imposed in violation of the "laws of Kansas,"
rule 121(c)(3) just as clearly states that errors other than those affecting
constitutional rights must be raised on direct appeal. Nor can it be said that
the court was attempting to rest its decision on alternative grounds, saying
in essence, "Procedurally, we do not reach these issues, but if we were to
consider them we would not hold for the petitioner." On the contrary, the
court did hold for the petitioner. Finally, the change-in-the-law theory does
not explain why the court felt called upon to consider the petitioner's other
claims. They might well have been argued on appeal, but were not. That
being the case, a literal reading of rule 121 (c) (3) should have precluded their
consideration in a section 1507 collateral proceeding.
The conclusion that must be reached after Tuscano is that rule 121(c) (3)
cannot be read literally. That is, the Kansas court apparently uses the exceptional circumstances test when it seems appropriate, but in a case that raises
issues with which the court wants to deal, rule 121 (c) (3) will not be a
procedural bar."s Granted, this view owes a good deal to legal realism,
focusing upon what the court does rather than what it says it does. But no
other explanation is intellectually satisfying.
In short, the rule 121 (c) (3) exceptional circumstances test is open-ended,
permitting the court to reach those issues it wants to reach. Thus, in a given
case, the court may not mention "exceptional circumstances," going immediately to the merits. For example, in Delano v. State2 4 the court found no
difficulty in examining a constitutional issue-the right to counsel at preliminary hearing--even though there was no showing of exceptional circumstances excusing failure to raise the question on appeal. More often, the court
will cite rule 121(c)(3) to indicate that no decision is necessary, and then
deal with the merits anyway so as to ground its opinion on alternative bases
and, perhaps, to give guidance to trial courts receiving subsequent applications." 5
But perhaps the most telling indication of the flexible view taken by the
'There is at least one other possible explanation for the seeming flexibility of rule 121 (c) (3)-that
the court recognizes exceptional circumstances it has not yet articulated. That reading of the cases seems
of doubtful validity. If the court has concrete reasons for what it is doing, the opinions would reflect that.
Additionally, it might be argued that the court views a challenge to the invocation of the habitual
criminal act as falling outside the pale of rule 121 (c) (3). That seems unlikely in light of the obvious
fact that error in applying that statute is clearly something which can be dealt with on appeal. Still, in
Tuscano and more recently in Paige v. Gaffney, 207 Kan. 170, 483 P.2d 1096 (1971), the court reached
the issue on S 1507 motion.
"'209 Kan. 670, 498 P.2d 18 (1972).
'Recent examples of this practice are found in Yurk v. State, 208 Kan. 946, 495 P.2d 87 (1972);
Preston v. State, 208 Kan. 648, 493 P.2d 187 (1972); and Turner v. State, 208 Kan. 867, 494 P.2d
1130 (1972).
Turner is a peculiar opinion. The court refused to reconsider those errors that had actually been
raised on appeal, but seemed to examine on the merits those that might have been raised. However, a
close reading has convinced the writers that the court finally relied on rule 121(c)(3) at least in
part in reference to all issues but the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel. That latter argument generally is
dealt with on the merits in the Kansas court. Part V-D-2-a-iv infra. The reader is invited to read
Turner for himself and to come to his own conclusion.
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court is found in Davis v. State.2"' There a section 1507 petitioner contended
principally that his criminal conviction was the result of his being twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense. The state responded that double jeopardy
is an affirmative defense that must be raised at trial or on direct appeal and
that rule 121 (c) (3) precludes consideration on a section 1507 motion except
in exceptional circumstances.287 The court's answer was cryptic: "Despite the
merit of this contention we will treat the matter on its substantive rather than
procedural aspect." '88 Each of the petitioner's numerous claims was then reviewed and rejected.
While one may wonder what the result would have been in Davis if merit
had been found in one of the petitioner's claims, it seems fair to assume that
the court would not have felt bound by rule 121(c) (3) to deny relief. 89
The tenor of the opinion suggests an attitude that the exceptional circumstances test need not be adhered to in all cases, and that the court has power,
notwithstanding rule 121(c) (3), to reach substantive issues whenever it
deems appropriate.
iv. The Special Treatment Given Challenges to Guilty Pleas and the
Eflectiveness of Counsel.-Rule 121(c)(3) precludes collateral attack on trial
errors only if they were or might have been raised on direct appeal. A collateral motion under section 1507 challenging a plea of guilty would, accordingly, seem not to be affected by the rule. If a guilty plea was entered, there
was no trial and Kansas law does not permit appeal. 9 ° The court apparently
has taken this view and has permitted pleas of guilty to be attacked collaterally
as involuntary, unintelligent or otherwise invalid."
2 10 Kan. 709, 504 P.2d 617 (1972).
Cj. Miller v. State, 210 Kan. 542, 502 P.2d 833 (1972).
S20 Kan. at 711, 504 P.2d at 621.
Alternatively, it may be argued that Davis is yet another example of the court's deciding § 1507
cases on alternative grounds. The writers, however, read the decision as standing only on the substantive ground and not relying on a finding of lack of exceptional circumstances.
'KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-3601 (Supp. 1972); State v. Mitchell, 210 Kan. 470, 502 P.2d 850 (1972).
mE.g., Sanders v. State, 209 Kan. 505, 496 P.2d 1394 (1972); Johnson v. State, 208 Kan. 862,
494 P.2d 1078 (1972); Floyd v. State, 208 Kan. 874, 495 P.2d 92 (1972); see Coverly v. State, 208
Kan. 670, 493 P.2d 261 (1972) (double jeopardy issue considered); Weigel v. State, 207 Kan. 614,
485 P.2d 1347 (1971) (plea bargaining discussed); see also State v. Caldwell, 208 Kan. 674, 493 P.2d
235 (1972) (direct appeal case adopting the ABA standards). A petitioner who entered a plea of
guilty might also use § 1507 to challenge a sentence imposed contrary to statute. Veronee v. State,
193 Kan. 681, 396 P.2d 360 (1964).
The willingness of the Kansas court to entertain guilty plea challenges takes on special meaning
inasmuch as Kansas has adopted the stringent standards for arraignment proceedings set down in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); see text accompanying notes 80-81 supra. In Widener
v. State, 210 Kan. 234, 499 P.2d 1123 (1972), the Kansas court expressly held that Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969), fastened the rule in McCarthy on the states. Although that construction of Boykin
is questionable [see Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972)] the Kansas court has said that
McCarthy is the law in this state, and counter-argument by the government on that ground would now
seem to be fruitless. Cf. Wasson v. State, 210 Kan. 205, 499 P.2d 1128 (1972). Moreover, construing
Boykin to require that McCarthy be followed in Kansas may only have been another way of saying that
Kansas will construe its guilty plea statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210 (Supp. 1972), in the same
manner that the Supreme Court interprets the federal rule 11. The two provisions are almost identical.
With § 3210 on the books and Widener in the reports, S 1507 petitioners should be able to demand
fair and careful arraignment proceedings for the acceptance of guilty pleas. It must be remembered,
however, that § 3210 became effective only on July 1, 1970, and that the standard from McCarthyWidener does not have retrospective application. Wasson v. State, 210 Kan. 205, 499 P.2d 1128 (1972).
Nor is Boykin retroactive. Moss v. Craven, 427 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1970). Accordingly, in cases where
'r
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A second situation in which the court has not found collateral review
barred by the exceptional circumstances rule is the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the issue is in a sense a trial error and can be
raised on appeal, 9 ' the court apparently views ineffective representation as
a point not likely to be raised until later. Perhaps the court believes that,
often as not, the same attorney who represented the petitioner at trial is appointed to conduct the appeal. If that is the case, it would be unfair to the
petitioner to hold him responsible for failing to urge that ineffective assistance be raised.293 Whatever its reason, the Kansas court has consistently
permitted review on the merits when ineffective assistance of counsel is
alleged in a section 1507 motion. "
the plea was accepted earlier than April 2, 1969-the effective date of McCarthy-the petitioner may not
rely on the statutory violation but must show that his plea was not voluntarily or intelligently entered.
That is, older pleas of guilty must be challenged solely on pre-McCarthy constitutional grounds.
'E.g., State v. Brown, 204 Kan. 430, 464 P.2d 161 (1970); State v. Eaton, 199 Kan. 192, 428
P.2d 847 (1967).
" Another possible explanation is that the court is unwilling to grant relief on this ground anyway,
and it makes no difference why a case is dismissed. But see Johnson v. State, 210 Kan. 498, 502 P.2d
838 (1972).
'While
a collateral challenge to a plea of guilty may have a marginal chance for success, the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is, in a practical sense, doomed to failure on the merits from the
outset. In the recent case of Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 502 P.2d 733 (1972), the court cited with
approval the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Defense Function, then went on to
state the law in Kansas as follows:
The adequacy and effectiveness of an attorney's services on behalf of an accused in a criminal
action must be gauged by the actual representation afforded the accused in its totality. To be
a denial of an accused's constitutional rights it must clearly appear that the representation of the
accused was wholly ineffective and inadequate. . . The burden is on the petitioner to show the
representation by his attorney was so incompetent and inadequate that the total effect was that
of a complete absence of counsel.
In other cases, the court has said that effective assistance of counsel cannot be equated with success
in the mind of the accused. Cipolla v. State, 207 Kan. 822, 823, 486 P.2d 1391, 1392 (1971). The
petitioner must show that he received "token representation which renders a trial a sham, the total
effect of which amounts to a complete absence of counsel." Baker v. State, 204 Kan. 607, 614, 464
P.2d 212, 219 (1970). Applying this stringent rule, the Kansas court has denied relief where the petitioner alleged a conflict of interest, Miller v. State, 210 Kan. 542, 502 P.2d 833 (1972), the attorney failed
to offer particular testimony, Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 502 P.2d 733 (1972), the attorney failed
to object to incompetent evidence, Tuscano v. State, 206 Kan. 260, 478 P.2d 213 (1970), and even
where the attorney failed to perfect an appeal, leaving the accused with only collateral review, Bruffett
v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 494 P.2d 1160 (1972).
In sum, it seems clear that, when the court says that the constitution does not guarantee a defendant
the assistance of the most brilliant counsel, Tuscano v. State, supra, that is exactly what is meant.
Particularly if the record shows that counsel was retained rather than appointed, see Winter v. State,
supra, or if he conducted reasonable cross-examination of adverse witnesses, Tuscano v. State, supra,
ineffective assistance simply will not be found. As the court said in Winter, "Whenever the court in
good faith appoints or accepts the appearance of a member of the bar in good standing to represent
a defendant, the presumption is that such counsel is competent." 210 Kan. at 604, 502 P.2d at 739.
The petitioner's burden of rebutting that presumption is heavy--so heavy that the writers have discovered
no Kansas case expressly finding ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court in Winter also set forth its understanding of the federal courts' position on the counsel
issue. An examination of the cases reveals that the federal courts apply similar standards. The reader
is referred to Lorraine v. United States, 444 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1971) (hindsight not the measure);
Brady v. United States, 433 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970) (flawless representation not required); Ellis v.
Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971)
(success not the
measure); Basker v. Crouse, 426 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1970) (trial must have been a sham); Opie v.
Meacham, 419 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (failure to obtain expert
testimony not ineffective assistance); Linebarger v. Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969) (research and tactical failings not ineffective assistance); Johnson v. United
States, 380 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967) (poor judgment not ineffective assistance); Kienlen v. United
States, 379 F.2d 20, 29 (10th Cir. 1969) (erroneous advice not ineffective assistance).

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

b. A Note on the Kansas Contemporaneous Objection Rule
Thoroughness demands a comment on the contemporaneous objection
rule as it is applied in Kansas. The rule stems from the nature of the appellate
court's function to review only those issues dealt with below. Hence, timely
objection must be made to the introduction of incompetent evidence or review
of that issue on appeal is precluded.
It has already been said that in Baker v. State.. the petitioner's constitutional errors were held cognizable in a section 1507 collateral proceeding because he had been precluded from raising them on appeal by a procedural
rule that had since been changed."' One of the claims made was that illegally
seized evidence had been improperly admitted into evidence at trial. Although
the exceptional circumstances test was satisfied, the court still declined to
reach the merits of the issue on the ground that no timely objection had been
raised at trial:
The contemporaneous objection rule long adhered to in this state requires
timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence in order for the question
of admissibility to be considered on appeal .... The rule is a salutary procedural
tool serving a legitimate state purpose .... By making use of the rule, counsel gives
the trial court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using tainted evidence,
and thus avoid possible reversal and a new trial. Furthermore, the rule is prac29 7
tically one of necessity if litigation is ever to be brought to an end.

The court then spoke of the "anomaly of denying review on appeal ...
and then permitting review by the more circuitous route under a K.S.A.
60-1507 proceeding." 28 Accordingly, the contemporaneous objection rule is
applied to collateral proceedings as well as on direct appeal, so that a failure
to object to the admission of evidence in a Kansas criminal trial bars review
in any form by the Kansas courts. 9
The Baker court recognized that the contemporaneous objection rule will
not foreclose review on federal habeas corpus unless the petitioner is found
to have deliberately by-passed the state procedure for strategic or tactical reasons."°° Nevertheless, the court in Baker held fast to the position that a
failure to object precludes section 1507 review. While the court indicated
its view that the petitioner had, in fact, deliberately by-passed his opportunity
to object as a part of defense strategy, that clearly was not the ground upon
' 204 Kan. 607, 464 P.2d 212 (1970).
See Part V-D-2-a-ii supra.
'a204 Kan. at 611, 464 P.2d at 217 (citations omitted). The contemporaneous objection rule is

codified in KAN.

STAT. ANN. § 60-404 (1964).
'204 Kan. at 611, 464 P.2d at 217; see Mize v. State, 199 Kan. 666, 433 P.2d 397 (1967).
'There is a rare exception. The petitioner in Baker also contended that a confession had been
improperly admitted at trial. Although no objection had been made to this evidence either, the court
did not hold the petitioner strictly to the contemporaneous objection rule. Since the time of trial,
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), had been decided and been given retroactive effect. Because
the petitioner could not be held responsible for anticipating Jackson, the court permitted him to raise
his claim in the collateral proceeding even though he had not objected to evidence he had no reason to
believe was being improperly introduced. Effectively, the court found exceptional circumstances-an
intervening change in the law-excusing failure to make a contemporaneous objection.
'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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which the decision rested. After Baker, the contemporaneous objection rule
is still another limitation on the availability of an effective collateral remedy
for Kansas prison inmates.
c. Summary
This section of the manual began with the question whether Commissioner
Foth's hopes for the Kansas section 1507 motion, as expressed in his 1964 law
review article, have been realized. Only a qualified answer is possible. While
Commissioner Foth hoped that Kansas would view its postconviction motion
remedy as commensurate with habeas corpus and thus would follow the lead
of the federal section 2255 courts in reviewing constitutional claims, the
Kansas court has linked collateral review with appellate practice. Instead of
permitting a plenary examination of substantial questions, the court has
afforded section 1507 review only of issues that, due to exceptional circumstances, were not reviewed on direct appeal. The same test has been applied
in cases in which the petitioner seeks to relitigate issues that were considered
and decided adversely to him on appeal. Exceptional circumstances have
been found in varying instances, and it appears that the test is flexible. Nevertheless, quite clearly the court has interposed a significant barrier between a
Kansas inmate and the relief he seeks. While a federal section 2255 petitioner
need only show facts constituting a constitutional violation, the Kansas section 1507 petitioner must jump through two hoops. He must show constitutional error and exceptional circumstances excusing failure to raise his claim
on appeal. This second hoop, it has been seen, will preclude relief in most
cases. Finally, the Kansas court has held the contemporaneous objection
rule applicable in section 1507 cases, thus erecting still another obstacle in
the way of an effective remedy.
Commissioner Foth should, then, be partially satisfied. The Kansas court
apparently considers section 1507 a safety valve that affords a means by
which serious errors in prior proceedings may be corrected. Flexibility in approach has been emphasized, sometimes at the expense of predictability. The
court is willing to entertain section 1507 challenges to pleas of guilty and the
effectiveness of counsel without a special showing and will review constitutional trial error if an intervening change in substantive or procedural law
operates to excuse the failure to appeal. And, in a few cases, it has indicated
that the merits of a substantial contention may be reached, a literal reading
of rule 121 (c) (3) notwithstanding. Accordingly, whenever the exceptional
circumstances test is satisfied or inapplicable, Kansas prisoners have an effective remedy in the section 1507 motion. On the other hand, to the extent that
rule 121(c)(3) is used as a procedural excuse for not reaching otherwise
cognizable claims, the Kansas court has emasculated the remedy and presumably disappointed Commissioner Foth.
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3. Procedure
a. A Separate Civil Action
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 121,8"1 promulgated to govern procedure under section 1507, repeats much of the language of the statute itself and then
builds upon it to flesh out a rational procedural scheme. This part will discuss the provisions of rule 121 so as to provide in the end an overview of the
system's mechanics. Rule 121 (a) reads as follows:
Section 60-1507 is intended to provide in a sentencing court a remedy exactly
commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in

district courts in whose jurisdiction the prisoner was confined. A motion challenging the validity of a sentence is an independent civil action which should be
separately docketed, and the procedure before the trial court and on appeal to the

Supreme Court is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as applicable.
No cost deposit shall be required. When the motion is received and filed by the

clerk, he shall forthwith deliver a copy thereof to the county attorney and make
an entry of such fact in the appearance docket.
The first point to be noted is that the section 1507 motion is addressed to
the sentencing court rather than to the court in the district of confinement as
would be the case in a habeas corpus action." 2 Although the rule does not
expressly so provide, it is reasonable to assume that ordinary principles concerning change of venue are applicable.3 8
It has already been said that the section 1507 motion, while it is viewed
functionally as a part of the total review process, is nevertheless a new and
separate civil action. 4 It has been suggested that "[t]he motion should be
given a separate docket number and captioned in a manner which will
describe the new case and not cause confusion with the previous criminal
case. Following federal practice the caption should read: 'John Prisoner,
Petitioner, vs. State of Kansas, Respondent.' "305 It should be noted that the
parties are the same as in the criminal action, 0' and the rule contemplates
that the prosecutor's office that handled the original prosecution will represent the state in the collateral proceeding. 0 7 The inmate is shown as the
plaintiff or petitioner because he, and not the state, initiates the action.
Consistent with the view that the section 1507 motion is civil in nature,
rule 121 (a) provides that the rules of civil procedure govern proceedings in
the trial court and on appeal.3 0 ' This, it has been argued, makes it possible
209 Kan. xxxix (1972).
aWilliams v. State, 203 Kan. 246, 452 P.2d 856 (1969); ci. In re Jewett, 69 Kan. 830, 77 P.
567 (1904).
'See KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-609 (1964); CoMPAsusoN, supra note 200, at XIV-6.
Stahl v.Board of County Comm'rs., 198 Kan. 623, 426 P.2d 134 (1967).
Foth & Palmer, supra note 230, at 495.

See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2104 (Supp. 1972).
WT
COMPARISON, supra note 200, at XIV-4-XIV-5. If the case is appealed, the attorney
general will

represent the state
in the Supreme Court. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-702 (1964). The court has held that
there is no absolute requirement that the state file a responsive pleading. Tipton v. State, 194 Kan.
705, 402 P.2d 310 (1965).
'More precisely, rule 121(a) provides that the civil
rules govern insofar as they are applicable.
Thus the court has left itself free to decline to follow strictly the rules in § 1507 matters.
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for the trial court to use its discretion in permitting discovery for the purpose
of getting at the facts of the case most efficiently."' 9 Accordingly, the court
may allow interrogatories and requests for admissions. Perhaps most importantly, the taking of depositions may clarify the issues so that very little
of the court's valuable time will be consumed by section 1507 hearings. Use
of these discovery devices
is governed by the rules applicable to general civil
3 10
practice in this state.
Rule 121(a) expressly provides that no cost deposit is required in section
1507 cases. This probably reflects the reality that most convicted persons are
indigent and must proceed in forma pauperis in any event. The rule thus
dispenses with the administrative work a filing fee would create. As will be
seen below, the standard form that must be completed by section 1507 petitioners contains a forma pauperis affidavit.
The rule requires the clerk to furnish a copy of the section 1507 motion
to the appropriate county attorney as soon as it is received. This allows the
prosecutor to begin evaluation of the motion early in light of the file in the
criminal case. In all probability the prosecutor will be asked by the court
to respond for the state to the allegations and arguments made by the petitioner. Accordingly, the prosecutor is given an opportunity to examine the
motion immediately. Then, too, the requirement that the prosecutor be
notified "forthwith" is consistent with the notion that section 1507 performs
the function of habeas corpus, traditionally treated speedily by American
courts.3 1 '

b. Exclusiveness of the Remedy
Section (b) of rule 121 states: "The remedy afforded by section 60-1507
dealing with motions to vacate, set aside or correct sentences is exclusive, if
adequate and effective, and a prisoner cannot maintain habeas corpus proceedings before or after a motion for relief under the section." The court has
held on numerous occasions that, with the advent of section 1507, Kansas
prison inmates may no longer use habeas corpus3 12 to challenge the validity
of criminal convictions.3 1 However, pleadings styled as habeas corpus petitions may properly be treated as section 1507 motions. 14 As mentioned
above, 15 the Tenth Circuit held in Kinnell v. Crouse"'6 that making section
1507 the exclusive collateral remedy in Kansas does not constitute an uncon'Seaton, Reducing Postconviction Litigation, 36 J.B.A.K. 99 (1967).
'See Seaton, supra note 309, at 101-02; see also discussion of Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969),
in Part VI-D infra. Of course, the court might apply rule 121(a) to the effect that the civil rules
govern only insofar as they are applicable. See note 308 supra.
'eBut see Prescher v. Crouse, 431 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1970), where the Tenth Circuit noted that
the average § 1507 appeal in Kansas requires twelve to fifteen months.
12
" KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (1964).
"SE.g., King v. State, 200 Kan. 461, 436 P.2d 855 (1968); Cox v. State, 200 Kan. 198, 434 P.2d
494 (1967).
"'Paige v. Gaffney, 207 Kan. 170, 483 P.2d 494 (1971); Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107, 402 P.2d
789 (1965).
' See text accompanying notes 207-08 supra.
30384 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 999 (1968).
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stitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Of course, habeas remains
available to challenge parole board action' 17 or the conditions of a prisoner's
confinement under a lawful sentence. 18 The only exception recognized by
rule 121(b) is when section 1507 is shown to be inadequate or ineffective.
Undoubtedly, the Kansas court will follow the federal cases holding that a
postconviction motion is adequate or effective even though it is unsuccessful. 1
And, quite possibly, the only situation in which a petitioner will be entitled
to habeas is where he contends that he has already served his sentence and is
entitled, not to a new trial, but to immediate release. 2°
c. When the Remedy May Be Invoked
Section (c) of rule 121 governs the stage at which the section 1507 remedy
may be invoked: "(1) The provisions of section 60-1507 may be invoked
only by one in custody claiming the right to be released, (2) a motion to
vacate, set aside or correct a sentence cannot be maintained while an appeal
from the conviction and sentence is pending or during the time within which
an appeal may be perfected .. .."21 Taking subsection (1) first, the Kansas

court has followed Jones v. Cunningham.2 and held that a prisoner who
initiates a section 1507 proceeding, and is released on parole while an appeal
from a denial of his motion is pending, is still "in custody" within the meaning
of the statute. 23 Similarly, a probationer whose freedom of movement is substantially restricted by the conditions of his probation is also "in custody" and
entitled to use section 1507 to seek relief. 24
Kansas has also taken account of the demise of McNally v. Hill 2 . and held
that section 1507 is available to challenge an invalid sentence, even if success
will not entitle the petitioner to immediate release. In King v. State32 the
court, relying on McNally, had held that a prisoner is not entitled to challenge
the validity of one sentence if, despite an adjudication finding that sentence
invalid, he would still be lawfully confined under a different sentence. Subsequent to King, however, the Supreme Court decided Walker v. Wainwright827 and Peyton v. Rowe,3 28 the latter expressly overruling McNally.
t Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 453 P.2d 35, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); ci. Stewart v.
State, 206 Kan. 147, 476 P.2d 652 (1970); Prescher v. State, 205 Kan. 636, 471 P.2d 349 (1970);
Foor.v. State, 196 Kan. 618, 413 P.2d 719 (1966).
" Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 265 (1972).
'McDowell v. Willingham, 354 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1965); Wallace v. Willingham, 351 F.2d 299
(10th Cir. 1965); Carte v. Taylor, 347 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1965).
'See Miller v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 873, 874 (10th Cir. 1968) (federal prisoner who has served
long enough to be released if his attack on his sentence is successful is entitled to use habeas corpus
rather than S 2255).
Subsection (3) sets forth the "exceptional circumstances" rule, discussed in Part V-D-2-a supra.
"-371 U.S. 236 (1963); see text accompanying note 91 supra.
' Baier v. State, 197 Kan. 602, 419 P.2d 865 (1966).
'Miller v. State, 200 Kan. 700, 438 P.2d 87 (1968). The same rule should apply to a parolee,
even if he does not begin his action while still in prison. Cf. Johnson v. State, 200 Kan. 708, 438 P.2d
96 (1968) (inmate confined for safekeeping at state security hospital not entitled to challenge his
custody under S 1507).
"293 U.S. 131 (1934); see Part IV-C supra.
195 Kan. 736, 408 P.2d 599 (1965).
mr390 U.S. 335 (1968).
8391 U.S. 54 (1968).
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In response, the Kansas court amended rule 121 (c) to read as it now does

and held in Davis v. State329 that the present provision permits a section 1507
petitioner to attack an invalid sentence even though success will not bring
immediate release.38 0
Subsection (2) provides that a section 1507 motion is premature while a
direct appeal from the criminal conviction is pending or during the time
within which an appeal may be perfected.3 8' This is, in a strict sense, a dewhich states that a section 1507 motion
parture from the statutory language
''
may be made "at any time."

However, federal section 2255 courts have

consistently taken the same view-that a postconviction motion must await
the conclusion of the appellate process.3"
According to subsection (2), a section 1507 motion is premature as long
as direct appeal is still available. The statute governing criminal appeals states
that a notice of appeal must be filed "not later than ten days after the expiration of the district court's power to modify the sentence." '34 Inasmuch as the
trial judge has 120 days within which to reduce the sentence if he so desires, 3 '
the notice of appeal must be filed within 130 days of sentencing. Therefore,
a section 1507 motion may not be submitted until after that time. 36
d. Successive Motions
The next section of rule 121 deals with successive section 1507 motions
and reads:
The sentencing court shall not entertain a second or successive motion for relief
on behalf of the same prisoner, where (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice
would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.

This part of the rule is taken substantially verbatim from the syllabus of
the Supreme Court's decision in Sanders v. United States.3 7 In that case, a
'n

202

Kan. 192, 446 P.2d 830 (1968).

'o The amended provision, read literally, appears not to follow Peyton at all but instead to contradict

that case. The Kansas court thus gave a strained reading to its own rule in order to make state § 1507
procedure consistent with federal habeas corpus.
See State v. Hamrick, 206 Kan. 543, 479 P.2d 854 (1971).
'aKAN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 60-1507(a) (1964).

See cases cited in note 83 supra.
KAN. STAT. ANN.
KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 22-3608(1) (Supp. 1972).
§ 21-4603(1) (Supp. 1972).

'Although early cases held that a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional, so that a late notice
will deprive the court of power to entertain the matter, a more recent opinion apparently has liberalized
Kansas law, In Brizendine v. State, 210 Kan. 241, 499 P.2d 525 (1972), the court approved the practice of permitting an out-of-time appeal, where counsel's carelessness leads to the failure to proceed in
a timely manner. A prisoner whose case fits that description should probably seek an out-of-time appeal
instead of moving to vacate sentence under § 1507. Preceding sections have discussed the relative value
of reaching the Kansas court on direct appeal rather than in a collateral proceeding. If the case does
not conform to the Brizendine model, however, resort to § 1507 will be necessary.
There will undoubtedly continue to be cases where timely appeal is not perfected in light of the
court's refusal to require, on a constitutional ground, that the defendant be told of his statutory right
of appeal. See Collins v. State, 210 Kan. 577, 502 P.2d 851 (1972); Wasson v. State, 210 Kan. 205,
499 P.2d 1128 (1972).
=373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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federal section 2255 petitioner had moved his sentencing court a second
time to set aside his conviction based on a plea of guilty. In his first motion,
the petitioner had alleged principally that the plea had been coerced; in the
second motion he alleged mental incompetence. The district court dismissed
the second motion without reaching the merits on the ground that the petitioner should have raised all his arguments in the first motion. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that no matter how many prior applications for
relief under section 2255 a prisoner has made, controlling weight may not
be given to denial of prior applications if they were not adjudicated on the
merits or if a different ground is presented by the new application. In such
circumstances, consideration of the merits of the new application can be
avoided only if there has been an abuse of the remedy."s
Sanders will be discussed at greater length in Part VIII, and it will suffice
here to say that, while purporting to adopt the holding of that case in rule
121(d), the Kansas court has in practice applied a more stringent test. Two
distinct hypothetical cases emerge: (1) The petitioner wishes to raise issues
that were considered on the merits and rejected in a prior section 1.507 proceeding; (2) The petitioner wishes to raise new arguments that he failed to
present in a prior application.
Regarding the first hypothetical, the Kansas court has declined to require
relitigation of issues already considered on the merits. The recent case of
Robinson v. State33 is a good example. There the petitioner sought in a second
section 1507 motion to raise points rejected earlier, and the court responded,
"The trial court was not required in this case to entertain the petitioner's
second motion. . . .""" That statement is significant in light of the mandatory

language in rule 121 (d)-"the district court shall not entertain a second ...
motion for relief. . . ." Does Robinson suggest that the court will not consider

it error if the trial judge entertains a second motion even though it involves
the relitigation of claims already rejected? That result can easily be reached
by finding in each such case that, in the language of subsection (3) of rule
121(d), the "ends of justice" would be served by entertaining the new section
1507 motion. The Supreme Court in Sanders permitted the trial court discretion in handling successive petitions. Thus a federal district court is not
required to hear a second application making the same tired arguments, but
if the court in its discretion chooses to reexamine an issue, there is no bar.
Hopefully, the Kansas court will take the same view.34'
With the second hypothetical case Kansas law breaks cleanly from the
Sanders analysis. Soon after the Kansas court began demanding that section
1507 motions be filed on standard forms, the court held in Smith v. State 4 '
"RId. at 17.
209 Kan. 667, 498 P.2d 35 (1972).
Id. at 668, 498 P.2d at 36.
/4
..There is reason to doubt. The court went so far in Robinson as to say that the successive motions
filed by the petitioner constituted an abuse of the remedy. 209 Kan. at 669, 498 P.2d at 36.
U2 195 Kan. 745, 408 P.2d 647 (1965).
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that "when, in answer to question No. 10 of the prescribed form of motion
a petitioner sets out a ground or grounds for relief-he is presumed to have
listed all of the grounds upon which he is relying."34 Going further, the
court has held, in more recent cases, that "where a contention could have been
presented on a prior petition but was withheld so as to preserve it for a subsequent application," the court may exercise discretion in dismissing for
abuse of the remedy. 44
Thus the Kansas court has seized upon the third prong of the test from
Sanders as it is repeated in rule 121(d). The sentencing court is not required
to reach the merits of a second application under section 1507 if the ends of
justice would not be served. And, by reading into the petitioner's first motion
a conclusive presumption that he has raised all his arguments, the court arrives at the conclusion in many cases that the ends of justice would not be
served by reviewing contentions previously overlooked. This result would
not be particularly unfortunate if the rule were limited to cases such as
Cox v. State.4 where the petitioner knew of other possible claims and
consciously chose to withhold them until a later date. Nor would it be unfair
to deny relief on this ground when the petitioner, by repetitious and frivolous
"writ-writing," has clearly wasted the energies of the system. That apparently was the case in Kinnell u. State. 4 What is objectionable about the rule
is that its application is not limited to extreme cases. On the contrary, the
court seems to find an abuse of the remedy whenever a section 1507 petitioner
seeks relief on a ground he might have raised in a prior proceeding. Recent
examples of this technique may be found in Hacker v. State.47 and Cantrell
v. State. 4 ' The effect in many cases may well be to bar consideration of valid
claims because untrained prison inmates are held to an unrealistic standardthey must examine their own cases, sift the materials, and identify all legitimate
claims for presentation together. 4
There is a limited exception to the harshness of the Smith presumption.
The court has borrowed the "exceptional circumstances" test from subsection
(c) (3) and applied it here to avoid unreasonable results. Thus "unusual
circumstances or intervening change in the law ... might justify further use
of the remedy." '
Jackson v. State35 may be the only case in which the
"'Id.at 747, 408 P.2d at 649. The court held in Call v. State, 195 Kan. 688, 408 P.2d 668 (1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966), that grounds raised in a motion to set aside a conviction but not
argued on appeal are considered abandoned.
'Cox v. State, 200 Kan. 198, 201, 434 P.2d 843, 845 (1967). While this specific language from
Cox appears to limit the Smith presumption to grounds consciously withheld from a prior motion, more
recent cases have applied the presumption to all arguments that might have been raised. See cases cited
in and text accompanying notes 347-49 infra.
30Id.
" 210 Kan. 785, 504 P.2d 161 (1972).
'207 Kan. 195, 483 P.2d 484 (1971).
" 210 Kan. 528, 502 P.2d 840 (1972).
'See Lee v. State, 207 Kan. 220, 483 P.2d 1100 (1971) (petitioner barred from making an argument of which he was not aware at the time he filed an earlier petition).
'Cox v. State, 200 Kan. 198, 200, 434 P.2d 843, 845 (1967).
202 Kan. 194, 448 P.2d 18 (1968).
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court has expressly applied the exceptional circumstances rule to a successive
motion problem. There the petitioner's first section 1507 motion had raised
a claim which would not have entitled him to release even if successful and,
under the then-applicable doctrine of McNally v. Hill,52 the motion had
been dismissed. After McNally was overruled the court permitted consideration of the same issue in a new section 1507 proceeding. Of course, the situation in Jackson was somewhat different from that in Smith; the Jackson
petitioner had included all his arguments in his first motion. Nevertheless,
Jackson illustrates the application of the "exceptional circumstances" test in
the successive motion context.
e. Form of the Motion
Section (e) of rule 121 provides that a section 1507 motion must be submitted on a form "substantially in compliance" with an appended form and
that the trial court must furnish a prisoner with the form on request. The
form is designed to require the inmate proceeding pro se to furnish the court
with all pertinent information needed to assure fair and effective consideration. It should be emphasized that, even though a student or practitioner may
be able to present the court with a clear and concise pleading without using
the form, the rule requires that the form be used nonetheless. 53
The directions on the face of the form require that the original and one
copy be sent to the clerk. Presumably, the copy will be forwarded to the
appropriate county attorney under rule 121(a)."' Accordingly, there is no
requirement that the state be served. All Defender Project clients will fill
out the forma pauperis affidavit provided at the end of the form. The Kansas
statute governing indigency criteria should be used as a guide in completing
the affidavit.855
Although the form itself does not contain a request for the appointment
of counsel, rule 121(i) clearly contemplates that counsel may be provided. 5 '
Nevertheless, it is good practice to attach a special request to the section 1507
form. Additionally, the student should attach a memorandum of points and
- 2 9 3 U.S. 131 (1934); see Part IV-C supra.
' Cf. Jamerson v. State, 210 Kan. 751, 504 P.2d 147 (1972). Because all district courts in Kansas
must use the same standard form, the Defender Project keeps a supply on hand for use by students.
Standard procedure is to complete the form in long-hand and then to have an original neatly typed
for submission. Of course, the inmate and not the student will sign the completed document.
See Part V-D-3-a supra.
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-4504 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
When any defendant who is entitled to have the assistance of counsel, under the provisions
of section 3 [22-4503] of this act, claims that he is financially unable to employ counsel, the
judge may, in his discretion, require that the defendant file an affidavit stating (1) his name,
home address, occupation and place of employment; (2) if married, the name, home address,
occupation and place of employment of his spouse; (3) a complete statement of his assets,
liabilities, current income and the persons legally dependent on him for support; (4) a complete
statement of all property transferred by him between the date of the alleged offense and the
date of such affidavit which shall include: (a) A specific description of such property; (b) the
name and address of the person to whom transferred; (c) the date of such transfer; (d) the
consideration received by the defendant for such transfer.
'See also KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-4506 (Supp. 1972).
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authorities in support of the allegations and arguments made in the section
1507 motion.
The inmate and not the student must sign these documents. The directions on the form clearly state that the false statement on the form of any
material fact may serve as the basis for perjury prosecution. Accordingly,
the student should not put himself in the position of swearing to the truth
of the inmate's factual allegations. Moreover, the student's signature on the
pleadings might be taken as an attempt to practice law, i.e. to assume full
responsibility for the inmate's representation. Even if that were lawful,857
the Project has consistently taken the position that students are only to assist
inmates in preparing pro se petitions. Thereafter, it is hoped that the court
will appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. In order to clarify the
Project's function and the extent of the student's participation in the preparation stage, an explanatory cover letter should be attached to the legal documents. The student may properly sign the cover letter.
In sum, the student will prepare and send to the court an original and
one copy of the following documents: (1) A completed section 1507 form
motion with its affidavit of poverty, both properly signed and notarized;
(2) A motion requesting the appointment of counsel; (3) A memorandum
of points and authorities supporting the petitioner's case; (4) A cover letter
explaining the participation of the Defender Project.
f. The Evidentiary Hearing
Section (f) of rule 121 provides the guidelines the student or practitioner
must follow to obtain a hearing for his inmate-client: "Unless the motion
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is
entitled to no relief, the court shall notify the county attorney and grant a
prompt hearing. 'Prompt' means as soon as reasonably possible considering
other urgent business of the court. All proceedings on the motion shall be
recorded by the official court reporter." It cannot be overemphasized that the
essence of the task is to gain access to the court for the client. Assuming no
clear error appears from the record, the goal is effectively defined as obtaining
an evidentiary hearing on the prisoner's legitimate claims. Once a hearing
is granted, counsel will be appointed and the inmate will be assured of a fair
opportunity to present his arguments.""' Hence, the importance of section (f)
governing hearings becomes clear.
That section requires a hearing in all cases that do not come within the
single exception: where the record conclusively shows that the prisoner is
not entitled to relief. The object, then, is to allege facts not in the record
which, if true, would constitute grounds for granting the section 1507 motion.
The value of this tactic is illustrated by Floyd v. State. 59 There a section 1507
' In order to practice law in the state of Kansas one must pass the bar examination and be
formally admitted to the bar. KAN. SuP. CT. R. 210, 209 Kan. lxi (1972).
See Part V-D-3-i infra.
'208 Kan. 874, 495 P.2d 92 (1972).
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petitioner had alleged that defense counsel had "badgered, cajoled [and]
persistently persuaded him to enter a plea of guilty. ' 36 Further, he alleged
that his appointed counsel had threatened not to help him at trial. The
petitioner claimed that his sister, whose name and address appeared in the
motion, could support his factual allegations. The district court summarily
dismissed, but the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's allegations."'
There are several lessons to be learned from Floyd. First, assuming the
file does not clearly show that the petitioner is entitled to relief, if the
nature of the claim permits, an effort should be made to allege facts outside
the record. The record in Floyd did not show the alleged misconduct of the
defense attorney, so a hearing was necessary to get at the truth. In another
case, the facts surrounding an illegal search and seizure, for example, might
not be reflected in the record, and a hearing might be ordered. 62 While
realizing that untrue statements may lead to prosecution for perjury, the
student or practitioner should understand that a hearing will not be granted
if the allegations in the motion can be disproved simply by looking at the
case file. 6 ' The cases in which the court has found that the files and records
conclusively showed that no relief could be granted are legion."
Of course, it may be that the basis of the section 1507 motion is not factual
but legal. That is, the argument may be that a mistake of law was made
in prior proceedings or that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of some
intervening change in the law. The court held in Sanders v. State 65 that a
hearing is not required if the only question is one of law. Nevertheless, it
should be urged that the petitioner is entitled to an opportunity for oral
argument on his motion."'
A second lesson to be learned from Floyd is that, if at all possible, the
petitioner's factual allegations should be corroborated. The Floyd court seemed
to attach significance to the offer of proof from a third party-in that case
a sister. While a former version of rule 121(g) stated that uncorroborated
statements by the petitioner would not be sufficient to sustain his burden of
proof, 67 the present rule does not expressly require corroboration.36 8 Never' Id.at 875, 495 P.2d at 94.
..Id. at 878, 495 P.2d at 96.
mSee Kowalec v. State, 208 Kan. 651, 493 P.2d 244 (1972) (fourth amendment issue fully examined
prior to trial); Jones v. State, 204 Kan. 839, 466 P.2d 353 (1970).
m
' See Hayes v. State, 210 Kan. 231, 499 P.2d 515 (1972).
mE.g., Griffin v. State, 211 Kan. 514, 507 P.2d 363 (1973); Reedy v. State, 210 Kan. 793, 504
P.2d 146 (1972); Jamerson v. State, 210 Kan. 751, 504 P.2d 147 (1972); Collins v. State, 210 Kan.
577, 502 P.2d 851 (1972); Greathouse v. State, 207 Kan. 216, 483 P.2d 486 (1971).
'209
Kan. 505, 507, 496 P.2d 1394, 1396 (1972); see Lee v. State, 207 Kan. 185, 186-87, 483
P.2d 482, 483 (1971).
'Cf. Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 494 P.2d 1160 (1972).
MKAN.SuP. CT.R. 121(g), 194 Kan. xxviii (1964) (now amended).
sThere is older authority, resting upon the former rule, to the effect that a trial court is not
obligated to grant a hearing solely on the basis of an inmate's uncorroborated statements. E.g., Brown
v. State, 198 Kan. 527, 426 P.2d 49 (1967); Robinson v. State, 198 Kan. 543, 545, 426 P.2d 95, 97
(1967). Moreover, in Lee v. State, 204 Kan. 361, 461 P.2d 743 (1969), the court stated that a § 1507 petitioner's failure to list the names of witnesses in his motion gives rise to a presumption that he intends
to rely solely on his own testimony.
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theless, it is good practice to list potential witnesses so as to make the case
for a hearing as strong as possible. If possible, affidavits, abstracts from the
record, and materials not in the file should also be attached.3
A third significant point suggested by Floyd relates to the specificity of
the petitioner's allegations. The court has often stated that "[m]ere conclusionary contentions of a petitioner for which no evidentiary basis is stated
or appears are not sufficient basis for relief from conviction. ' 37 ° The petitioner
inFloyd, on the other hand, nailed down his contentions with clear allegations of specific facts. Obviously, the best approach is to avoid conclusions
in the nature of "My guilty plea was involuntarily entered," and instead to
state the underlying facts that made the plea involuntary.
Once the court decides that the record is not conclusive on the merits of
the petitioner's claim, the rule mandates a prompt hearing. But the term
"prompt" has been construed to mean, in effect, that a section 1507 motion
need not be considered until it has worked its way to the top of the docket
sheet. 37 ' Accordingly, a section 1507 petitioner will have a substantial wait
after his motion is filed.
The court reporter must, under the rule, keep a verbatim account of the
testimony at a section 1507 hearing. If an indigent petitioner is unsuccessful
at the trial court level and desires to appeal, he is entitled under Kansas law
to a free transcript of the hearing "or so much thereof as . .. [appointed]
counsel determines to be necessary ....-3"2 The availability of transcripts will
be more fully discussed below in connection with section (1) of rule 121.
g. Burden of Proof
Consistent with the view that a section 1507 motion begins a separate,
civil proceeding, section (g) of rule 121 provides that "[t]he movant has the
burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. 37 3 The court held in Brown v. State 74 that, once a hearing is
granted, the petitioner must be given an opportunity to present evidence, and
it is error to hear only the state's defense. Still, the burden of proof is heavy,
and few petitioners are able to prove that they are entitled to relief.37
'See Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 943, 494 P.2d 1160, 1161 (1972); cf. Rogers v. State, 197
Kan. 622, 419 P.2d 828 (1966); see also Ware v. State, 198 Kan. 523, 426 P.2d 78 (1967); Huston
v. State, 195 Kan. 140, 403 P.2d 122 (1965); Call v. State, 195 Kan. 688, 408 P.2d 668 (1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966).
'Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 604, 502 P.2d 733, 739 (1972); see Hacker v. State, 207 Kan.
195, 196, 483 P.2d 484, 485 (1971).
'Rule 121(f) itself defines "prompt" to be "as soon as reasonably possible considering other urgent
business of the court." It has been the Defender Project's experience that most district courts read the
rule to permit dealing with § 1507 matters in the usual course of court business.
'KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4506 (Supp. 1972).
"aSee Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 502 P.2d 733 (1972); Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 494
P.2d 1160 (1972); Yurk v. State, 208 Kan. 946, 949, 495 P.2d 87, 89 (1972); Jackson v. State, 204
Kan. 823, 828, 465 P.2d 927, 931 (1970).
' 196 Kan. 236, 409 P.2d 772 (1966).
'E.g., Metcalf v. State, 199 Kan. 800, 433 P.2d 450 (1967); Brown v. State, 198 Kan. 527, 426
P.2d 49 (1967); Goodwin v. State, 195 Kan. 414, 407 P.2d 528 (1965).
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h. Presence of the Petitioner
Inasmuch as a section 1507 petitioner must ordinarily rely on his own
testimony to sustain his burden of proof, his presence at the evidentiary hearing is crucial. The applicable provision in rule 121 is section (h): "The
prisoner should be produced at the hearing on a motion attacking a sentence
where there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which he participated.
The sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing and requiring the prisoner
to be present."
While the Kansas court has held that there is no absolute constitutional
right to be present at a section 1507 collateral proceeding,3 7 it commented in
King v. State3 7" that "[w]henever the trial court considers it advisable to hear
evidence relating to a motion filed under K.S.A. 60-1507, we deem it by far
the best practice for the court to require that the prisoner be present, even
though his presence may not be essential to the regularity of the proceedings
under every set of circumstances." 8 ' Even so, the court concluded in King
that the trial court had not erred in receiving evidence in the petitioner's
absence, because the claim asserted was not substantial within the meaning
of section (h). The court concluded that the asserted error-erroneous advice
of counsel-was harmless because the petitioner did not plead guilty but
went to trial. Accordingly, the trial court might have declined even to hold
a hearing. A fortiori the petitioner had no right to be present. The upshot
from the quoted language, however, is an apparent inconsistency between
section (f), which requires that an evidentiary hearing be held if the record
does not conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, and
section (h) which requires his presence only when the issue is substantial.
Can a claim be, at once, significant enough to prompt a hearing and so insubstantial as not to require the petitioner's presence? Perhaps there is a class
of claims that, if supported by a preponderance of the evidence, would entitle
a section 1507 petitioner to relief but does not necessitate the prisoner's personal testimony. Remote as that possibility may seem, it appears to be the exception described in section (h), giving the trial court discretion to determine
the substantiality of a claim before the petitioner is brought to the courtroom.
Of course, if the petitioner's factual allegations involve events in which he
37 9
participated, a section 1507 petitioner's presence at the hearing is mandatory
The court has consistently taken this position, particularly when the petitioner
alleges misconduct of counsel and the supporting facts are peculiarly within
'Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 494 P.2d 1160 (1972). Neither is there a right to be present
when the trial court grants collateral relief and corrects an invalid sentence. Daegele v. State, 211 Kan.
612, 506 P.2d 1134 (1973).
' 200 Kan. 461, 436 P.2d 855 (1968).
m1d. at 463, 436 P.2d at 857; cf. Washington v.State, 197 Kan. 636, 419 P.2d 639 (1966); Call v.
State, 195 Kan. 688, 408 P.2d 668 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966); Blacksmith v. State, 195
Kan. 523, 407 P.2d 486 (1965).
"Brown v. State, 196 Kan. 236, 240-41, 409 P.2d 772, 776 (1966); cf. Webb v. State, 195 Kan.
728, 408 P.2d 662 (1965).
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his knowledge.3 " However, the court has just as consistently rejected the
contention that the prisoner is entitled to be present in cases where it has
approved summary dismissal without a hearing. 81 Generally, the best approach in making the argument that the prisoner must be present for the
hearing is to cite the Kansas authority mentioned above and to contend that
the case presents substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner
participated." 2
i. Right to Counsel

Just as the petitioner has no absolute right to be present at a section 1507

evidentiary hearing,8 3 he has no constitutional right to appointed counsel to

assist him in establishing his case.3 4 However, in recognition of the value of
professional representation, section (i) of Rule 121 provides: "If a motion
presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact the court shall
appoint counsel to assist the movant if he is an indigent person." ' Of course,
all prisoners receiving the Defender Project's assistance are indigent, so the
sole issue here is whether the case presents substantial questions of law or fact.3 6
Recently, in Kowalec v. State,.. 7 the court was presented with the novel
question whether a trial court may appoint counsel but fail to hold an evidentiary hearing. Predictably, it was held that "the appointment of counsel
is not forbidden where substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact
are absent, it is only required when they are present." ' Actually, the trial
court in Kowalec was probably doing its best to deal fairly with the inmate's
crudely drawn petition. Counsel no doubt was appointed in an effort to insure that justiciable issues were not buried in the layman's obscure pleading.
The other side of the coin from Kowalec is the case in which the trial court
decides that a hearing is necessary. In that event, the rule seems to require
appointment of counsel. If a hearing is to be held, surely there must be substantial issues of law or fact, demanding the participation of a lawyer to
present fairly the petitioner's case. In a practical sense, no one will doubt
that a trial judge would want any person appearing before him to be represented by competent counsel.
The section of rule 121 that governs the appointment of counsel at the
mRay v. State, 202 Kan. 144, 446 P.2d 762 (1968).
'See cases cited in note 364 supra; see also Bruffett v. State, 208 Kan. 942, 494 P.2d 1160 (1972);
Kowalec v. State, 208 Kan. 651, 493 P.2d 244 (1972); Weathers v. State, 208 Kan. 653, 657, 493 P.2d
270, 273, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 927 (1972); cf. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
'The student or practitioner might also refer to the federal courts' handling of the same question
in § 2255 cases. See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1952).
'Webb v. State, 195 Kan. 728, 408 P.2d 662 (1965); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
222-23 (1952).
'Preston v. State, 208 Kan. 648, 649-50, 493 P.2d 187, 188 (1972).
' There is a similar provision in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4506 (Supp. 1972).
mSee Preston v. State, 208 Kan. 648, 493 P.2d 187 (1972); Weigel v. State, 207 Kan. 614, 485
P.2d 1347 (1971); Robertson v. State, 206 Kan. 320, 478 P.2d 196 (1970); King v. State, 200 Kan.
461, 436 P.2d 855 (1968); Baier v. State, 197 Kan. 602, 419 P.2d 865 (1966).
Ml208 Kan. 651, 493 P.2d 244 (1972).
mid. at 652, 493 P.2d at 245 (emphasis by the court).
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trial court level must be read in connection with section (m) of the rule
which concerns the right to counsel on appeal from the denial of a section
1507 motion. Section (m) provides:
If a movant desires to appeal and contends he is without means to employ
counsel to perfect the appeal, the district court shall, if satisfied that the movant
is an indigent person, appoint competent counsel to conduct such appeal. If for
good cause shown appointed counsel is permitted to withdraw while the case is
pending in either the district court or the supreme court, the district court shall
appoint new counsel in his stead.a89

The careful reader will observe that section (m) purports to make the
appointment of appellate counsel mandatory if the petitioner desires to appeal
and proves his inability to hire a lawyer. Thus the rule governing appeals
apparently requires appointment of counsel irrespective of the merits of the
petitioner's assigned errors. In contrast to section (m), section (i) provides
that the trial court will not be required to appoint counsel unless it finds that
a substantial question of law or issue of fact is presented by the petition.
The reason for this seeming inconsistency is unclear. An indigent prison
inmate is in the greatest need for professional counsel when he is preparing
his petition and attempting to convince the trial court that he is entitled to
relief. Clearly, it is at the initial stages that counsel can be most effective in
advising his client and delineating the issues for the trial court's consideration.
Moreover, if counsel participates at the outset, he may uncover all the possible
arguments that can legitimately be made in the inmate's behalf, thus assuring
a full and fair hearing on the issues and, if necessary, an adequate record
for appeal. Yet the appointment of counsel at the earlier stages is conditioned
upon the trial court's determination that substantial issues of law or fact are
presented. On the other hand, an unsuccessful petitioner who desires to
appeal appears to have an absolute right to counsel. Even if the trial court
determines from the files and records that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief, appellate counsel must be appointed to go through the fruitless motions
of taking the case to the Kansas Supreme Court. As a matter of policy that
conclusion is unfortunate, but the cases indicate that the district courts in
Kansas so read rule 121 (m).89
The more salutary rule would be to provide counsel to indigent inmates
as a matter of course at all stages. Then, if there are substantial issues, they
can be clearly presented to the district court for determination. Counsel should
also be available to perfect appeals and to delineate the issues for the Kansas
Supreme Court so as to permit swift but fair review. The end result would
be vastly more efficient than the present system which refuses counsel in the
preparation stage and which, accordingly, wastes the trial court's time unraveling crudely drawn petitions and fills the Supreme Court's docket with

'

Here again there is a similar provision in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4506 (Supp. 1972).
'See cases cited in note 364 supra.
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frivolous appeals. In a real sense, the present practice brings the attorney into
a case too late to do anything but pick up the pieces of an inmate's
shattered hopes.
j. The Trial Court's Findings

Section (j) of rule 121 states that the trial court must make findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The reason for that requirement is, of course,
to assure that an adequate record is prepared for review on appeal. Thus,
even if the trial court determines that the files and records in the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, it must still set down
its conclusions in an orderly fashion."' Particularly when evidence presented
at a hearing is conflicting, the Kansas court will require a good and reviewable record."'
k. Appeal in Forma Pauperis
Finally, sections (k) and (1) of rule 121 together provide that an unsuccessful section 1507 petitioner is entitled to appeal as in a civil case and to do
so without cost if he is an indigent. 3 In addition, the trial court must furnish
the indigent petitioner such portions of the transcript of the hearing on the
39 4
motion as are necessary for adequate review.
4. Exhaustion of Kansas Remedies
a. A Survey of Cases
This part will examine the decisions of the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as they
relate to the question of exhaustion of Kansas state remedies. An attempt will
be made to identify the factors considered by those federal courts in arriving
at the threshold decision whether to entertain a habeas corpus petition in
behalf of a Kansas prisoner. Thus the issue here is: What are the requirements in the way of state court proceedings that a Kansas state prisoner must
follow in order to establish that he has exhausted all available and effective
lId.
'See, e.g., Baker v. State, 207 Kan. 214, 483 P.2d 1039 (1971).
"The principal difference between civil and criminal appeals lies in the statutory time limits for
filing a notice of appeal. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2103 (1964) (thirty days from judgment in
civil cases) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3603 (Supp. 1972) (ten days after expiration of modification
period in criminal cases).
' KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4506 (Supp. 1972) expands on the transcript requirement as follows:
"If the petition or motion in such case raises questions shown by the trial record, the court shall order
that the petitioner or movant be supplied with a transcript of the trial proceedings, or so much thereof
as may be necessary to present the issue, without cost to him." And KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4509 (Supp.
1972) provides:
Whenever it is determined that a transcript of all or some part of a trial or other proceeding
is necessary to enable a person who is entitled to appeal, or to pursue another post-conviction
remedy, to present his cause adequately and it is further determined that the appellant or petitioner or movant is financially unable to pay for the preparation of such transcript, the district
judge shall order that the transcript be supplied to the appellant or petitioner or movant by the
official reporter of the district court.
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state remedies, and that, consequently, he is entitled to petition for the
federal writ of habeas corpus."'
The present inquiry is appropriately begun with the following general
statement: "It is not the function of this court [the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas] when presented with petitions for the writ
of habeas corpus to act as a super-appellate reviewer of the decisions of the
courts of the state of Kansas." ' 6 Thus the guiding principle running through
the opinions is that the processing of criminal cases is essentially a state function with which the federal courts will interfere only when the courts of
the state have not sufficiently protected federal rights. In order to assure that
this low profile is maintained, the federal courts apply a strict exhaustion
standard.
Another preliminary point that must be kept in mind is that exhaustion
turns on the state courts' fair opportunity to pass on a particular issue. That
is, a state prisoner who presented one claim diligently by all available and
adequate means in the state courts has done nothing in the way of exhaustion
regarding a different claim not so presented. The Supreme Court's recent
opinion in Picard v. Connor.9 7 established that a state prisoner cannot save
an issue for federal habeas corpus; he must have raised in the state courts
any claim he wishes to pursue in the federal forum. Accordingly, the exhaustion doctrine is linked to individual claims, and the federal habeas court will
ask as to each argument raised whether the courts of the state have fairly considered and rejected it. With this background, the leading Tenth Circuit
cases setting out the requirements of exhaustion in varying contexts will now
be discussed.
The first remedy available to a Kansas state prisoner is direct appeal from
his criminal conviction to the Kansas Supreme Court. 8 ' If for some reason
an appeal was not perfected, the Tenth Circuit has consistently required the
prisoner to move the state sentencing court to vacate sentence under section
1507..9 and, if the motion is denied, to appeal.4"' The basic notion is that, at
some point, the Kansas Supreme Court must be given an opportunity to pass
on the petitioner's claims. If there was no such opportunity on direct appeal,
then the petitioner is required to present his arguments on appeal in a section
1507 collateral proceeding.4 '
Even if the claim the petitioner wishes to raise on federal habeas corpus
was dealt with by the Kansas Supreme Court on direct appeal from the
-28 U.S.C. S 2254(b) (1970).
'Goetz v. Hand, 195 F. Supp. 194, 196 (D. Kan.), afl'd, 291 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1961).
'404 U.S. 270 (1971).
' See Part 11-B-2 supra.
Blair v.Crouse, 360 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1966).
'Carroll
v. Crouse, 361 F.2d 903 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966); Daegele v.
denied, 384 U.S. 954 (1966).
Crouse, 351 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
".See Finan v. Crouse, 352 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1965); Leigh v. Gaffney, 318 F. Supp. 85 (D.
Kan.), afl'd, 432 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1970); cf. Nelson v. Warden, 436 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1971).
The usual case is where the petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge and no appeal was taken. See Davis
v. Crouse, 363 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1966); Gordon v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1966).

1973]

COLLATERAL CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

criminal conviction, the Tenth Circuit has generally required that a section
1507 motion be submitted to the state sentencing court. In the leading case
of Brown v. Crouse,40 2 a Kansas state prisoner had appealed his criminal conviction directly to the Kansas Supreme Court, then applied to the federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court noted that the
petitioner had presented the same arguments-principally the admission of
illegally-seized evidence and a coerced confession-to the Kansas court on
direct appeal but had not moved the state trial court to vacate sentence pursuant to section 1507. The petition was summarily dismissed for failure to

exhaust state remedies, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The Brown opinion emphasized the power of a Kansas state trial court to
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine factual matters. Specifically, the
court said:
Under the Kansas statute and rules, the post-conviction court is empowered
to hold an evidentiary hearing and to otherwise develop the facts as they relate
directly to the constitutional issues there raised. Thus a record may be made and
it may include facts not theretofore detailed. The record, as compared to the initial
trial record, may be enlarged and the hearing directed specifically to the issues at
hand. The state court thus has broad powers to direct the hearing in a manner
and direction which will provide a complete factual background for the constitutional issues.403

The petitioner responded, citing Miles v. State, °4 that under the "exceptional circumstances" rule 5 it is not error for a Kansas trial court to dismiss
a section 1507 motion raising issues that were considered and rejected on appeal. Thus the petitioner contended that it would have been fruitless to apply
for state relief under section 1507, that the state remedy was ineffective and
that, accordingly, the exhaustion doctrine had been satisfied. In rejecting that
argument, the Tenth Circuit said simply:
Thus under the circumstances here present we should examine the exhaustion
of state remedy issue on the basis of what procedures and possibilities are open to
the Kansas post-conviction court and not on a negative basis, that is, what it need
not do or what is not error if it does not do.
...If we hold appellant need not seek such relief, we are assuming that the
'395 F.2d 755 (10th Cit. 1968).
Going further, the Brown court said:
A post-conviction hearing is often of great consequence to the parties for several reasons.
One reason is that much of consequence may have happened during the time which has elapsed
between the trial and the post-conviction hearing, no matter how long this may have been in
months and years. Certain facts may have been overlooked before and other facts may have become much more significant by reason of new decisions on points of constitutional law. These
and other reasons are the basis for affording the remedy of collateral attack on judgments. If
there is no real possibility in the remedy that a hearing can be shown to be worthwhile to develop the issues or the record further, then there is little or no substance to the remedy as a
collateral one. The Kansas statute is intended to afford a real remedy of this nature.
395 F.2d at 756; see Hudson v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1970); Sanders v. Crouse, 313 F.
Supp. 1031 (D. Kan. 1969), afl'd, 429 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1970).
195 Kan. 516, 407 P.2d 507 (1965).
See Part V-D-2-a supra.
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Kansas remedy of Motion to Vacate has become one which is not in fact
406
collateral.

The upshot from Brown is that, if the issue presented in the petitioner's
federal application is factual and can be developed in a hearing, the petitioner
will be required to request such a hearing in the state trial court before seeking
relief on federal habeas. This is true even though the same issues were presented and rejected by the Kansas Supreme Court on direct appeal. Brown
held that, while the state trial court may apply the "exceptional circumstances" test and decline to entertain the section 1507 petition, it nevertheless
has power to hold a plenary hearing in order to take a fresh look at the matter.
The state court must be given an opportunity to exercise that power."°'
While the Brown analysis is open to question,'" that case quite clearly encourages the courts of the state of Kansas to use their statutory authority to
evaluate substantial federal claims. It challenges the Kansas Supreme Court
to open up section 1507 proceedings to take cognizance of substantial claims,
irrespective of the presence or absence of "exceptional circumstances." In so
doing, the court would only make the scope of section 1507 equal to that
given the federal section 2255 motion. Unfortunately, as has already been
seen, 40 9 the Kansas court has been slow to respond. The state prisoner has
been left to the futility of wasteful litigation in Kansas courts, looking toward
consideration of his claim on the merits only after reaching a federal forum.
Furthermore, once the case gets to federal court, there may be no adequate
record upon which to base summary dismissal, with the result that the federal
habeas court is often required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing. 410 On
the other hand, if the petitioner's claims were fully litigated in the state court,
411
frivolous arguments would not waste the time of busy federal district judges.
As it is, the federal court is, in the final analysis, put in exactly the position
it would like to avoid: that of a "super-appellate reviewer" of state court
action.412

While the court in Brown required the state prisoner to seek a state collateral hearing on his factual claim before applying for federal relief, that
"395 F.2d at 756; see Omo v. Crouse, 395 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1968); Kinnell v. Crouse, 384 F.2d
811 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 999 (1968).
'Thus, to some extent, the Tenth Circuit does not follow Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953),
which expressly held that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner took his claim to the
state's highest court on direct appeal from the criminal conviction.
. The Kansas cases do not clearly indicate that a district court has power to entertain a § 1507
motion absent "exceptional circumstances." See Part V-D-2-a supra. Rule 121(c) itself is ambiguous,
providing that § 1507 cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute for appeal but that errors affecting
constitutional rights may be examined if there are exceptional circumstances.
I See Part V-D-2-a supra.
"Caindle v. Page, 424 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1970); see Basker v. Crouse, 426 F.2d 531 (10th Cir.
1970); Hall v. Crouse, 339 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); Hickock v.
Grouse, 334 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1964); Hasty v. Grouse, 308 F. Supp. 590 (D. Kan. 1968), afl'd, 420
F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1970).
'Jolly v. Crouse, 411 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1969); Moore v. Crouse, 393 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1968);
Johnson v. Grouse, 332 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1964); see Wagenknecht v. Grouse, 344 F.2d 920 (10th
Cir. 1965).
"' See text accompanying note 396 supra.
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case established no requirement that, after the state court hearing, the prisoner
must appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court. Yet some language in the opinion,
and certainly the rationale, lead to the conclusion that an appeal will be required. Even if the facts developed in the hearing are insufficient to convince
the trial court that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the now-expanded record
may cause the state appellate court to reexamine its earlier holding."'
On the other hand, if the Kansas Supreme Court considered and rejected
the petitioner's claims on direct appeal and, subsequently, the trial court dismisses a section 1507 motion raising the same issues without a hearing, there
would seem to be no good reason for requiring a second appeal. The record
is the same, not having been embellished by a new hearing, and there is no
reason to believe that the case will be decided differently the second time
around. Apparently accepting this view, the Tenth Circuit held in Wood v.
Grouse4. that an appeal is not required in such a case. More recently in
Cochran v. Rodriguez,4 15 a case arising from New Mexico, the court said:
Of course, had there been no resort to State post-conviction remedies at all,
the controlling cases would be Brown v. Grouse. . . . In such a case the state
courts should be given the opportunity to hold a hearing and make a record. If, as
here, the sentencing court declines to do so, and the questions presented are exactly
the same as those presented in the original appeal . . . then the considerations
giving rise to the exhaustion requirement are satisfied. 416

Generally, then, a Kansas state prisoner will in most cases be required to
seek section 1507 relief in the state trial court, although he may not be required
to appeal an adverse ruling. There are, however, three identifiable exceptions
to the rule that state collateral relief must be sought.
First, if the issue the petitioner wishes to present on federal habeas corpus
is purely legal and one that an evidentiary, fact-finding hearing will not
clarify, the Tenth Circuit has held that section 1507 relief need not be sought.
In Sandoval v. Rodriguez41 7 the petitioner contended that an instruction concerning his failure to testify in his own behalf violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The New Mexico federal district court
dismissed the petition on exhaustion grounds, but the Tenth Circuit reversed,
saying:
In the instant case, on the direct appeal the issue as to whether Sandoval's Fifth
Amendment rights had been violated . . . was "fairly presented" and the New
Mexico Supreme Court . . . held that there was no such violation. To require
Sandoval to relitigate the same issue through the New Mexico state courts a second
time would be a completely useless requirement. It is to be emphasized that this
"' Cf. Cox v. Gaffney, 459 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1973); Perry v.
Grouse, 429 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1970).
'389 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 399 U.S. 520 (1970).
'6 438 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971).
"I 1d. at 927; Eldridge v. Grouse, 400 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968); Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 968 (1968); see Oswald v. Crouse, 420 F.2d 373 (10th Cir.
1969).
7 461 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1972).
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is not the type of an issue where an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction proceeding could conceivably develop the facts more fully. On the contrary, there
are no facts to be developed and the issue is purely one of law, i.e., does the instruc41
tion violate rights guaranteed Sandoval by the United States Constitution ? 8

It should be noted that the petitioner in Sandoval had raised his claim
before the state supreme court on direct appeal from the criminal conviction.
The holding that he would not be required to relitigate that purely legal
claim hinged on that point. If the state supreme court had not once passed
on the claim, the petitioner would have been required to pursue the available
state collateral remedy in order to give the New Mexico court a fair opportunity to entertain the claim.41" The result in Sandoval, then, turned not on
the unavailability of a state collateral remedy but on its ineffectiveness.42 °
Even if the claim the petitioner seeks to raise in federal court rests on a
factual basis, resort to the section 1507 procedure will not be demanded if
the petitioner can show that the facts were fully developed in proceedings
leading to the criminal conviction. This second exception to the general rule
requiring use of the section 1507 motion is illustrated by Bell v. Kansas.42 '
There the petitioner had raised at trial the issue of illegally seized evidence.
Thereupon, a full and fair fact-finding hearing had been conducted, resulting
in a denial of his motion to suppress. The Kansas Supreme Court had reviewed the question on direct appeal and decided it adversely to the petitioner.
Without seeking relief from the state courts under section 1507, the petitioner
went directly to federal court with an application for habeas relief. In
response to the state's argument that the exhaustion requirement had not
been met, the district court said:
The exhaustion of state remedies required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is a matter
of comity and not of jurisdiction .... In view of the fact that the certain constitutional issues have been presented to the state courts on a full and complete record,
and have been considered by the sentencing court and the Supreme Court of
Kansas, this Court believes there is merit in the petitioner's claim that to require
him to again submit these questions to the state courts would require repetition,
would be time-consuming and would, in fact, not deprive the state courts from
[sic] an opportunity to consider the questions involved which have been fully
briefed and presented to them by way of motion for a new trial, and later ,by
and an extensive motion for rehearing preway of appeal from the conviction,
422
sented to the Supreme Court.

The Tenth Circuit approved that statement of the law, agreeing that it would
have been futile for the petitioner to seek collateral relief in the Kansas courts.
A third situation in which a state prisoner will not be required
to seek collateral relief from the state courts is illustrated by the Tenth
Id. at 1099; see Chavez v. Baker, 399 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950 (1969).
...
See text accompanying note 401 supra.
'0See

Part V-C supra.

452 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1971).
lid. at 787.

1973]

COLLATERAL CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

Circuit's opinion in Alverez v. Turner."' There sixty-nine Utah state prisoners challenged the procedure followed in their parole revocation hearings.
Of the sixty-nine, only one had taken the constitutional issue to the state
courts of Utah prior to applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the Utah Supreme Court's adverse decision in
that one case operated to foreclose state relief to the other prisoners who
raised identical claims.424 The rule to be extracted from Alverez apparently
is that, when a similarly situated prisoner has recently and unsuccessfully
presented the state supreme court with the identical question sought to be
raised on federal habeas by the present petitioner, the exhaustion doctrine has

been satisfied."
b. Summary
The Tenth Circuit cases regarding exhaustion may be summarized as
follows:
1) In every case, the precise issue the petitioner wishes to raise on federal
habeas corpus must have at some point been fairly presented to the Kansas
Supreme Court.42
2) It follows that, if a direct appeal from the criminal conviction was
for some reason not perfected, the petitioner must seek section 1507 collateral
relief from the state trial court and, if unsuccessful, appeal to the Kansas
Supreme Court." 7
3) Even though the claim the petitioner wishes to raise was considered
and rejected by the Kansas Supreme Court on direct appeal, if the claim is
based upon factual allegations which might be developed in a hearing, the
petitioner must seek
such a hearing by a section 1507 collateral motion in
4 28
the state trial court.
4) By implication, if the state trial court grants an evidentiary hearing
and the record is expanded as a result, the petitioner must again appeal to
the Kansas Supreme Court in order to permit a reexamination of its prior
decision."'
5) Again assuming the issue was once examined on direct appeal from
the criminal conviction, if the state trial court declines to grant a hearing on
"422

F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970).
at 216 n.3. Of course, the Kansas remedy for contesting parole board action is KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1501 (1964) and not § 1507. See Prescher v. State, 205 Kan. 636, 471 P.2d 349 (1970).
'It should be noted that the petitioners' claims in Alverez were essentially legal. Perhaps only
issues turning upon legal grounds can be "identical" to those raised by other prisoners. Claims resting
on factual allegations may always require exhaustion by the particular prisoner involved on the theory
that factual circumstances are never alike. See Williams v. Nelson, 431 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1970).
Additionally, it is unclear from Alverez whether the "identical" ground must arise from the same fact
situation or whether an "identical" issue arising out of different historical facts will suffice. Generally,
however, the Alverez case suggests that the Tenth Circuit may be willing to embrace the even more
liberal exhaustion policies followed by other circuits. See cases cited in and text accompanying notes
177-84 supra.
'Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
" See cases cited in and text accompanying notes 399-400 supra.
'See cases cited in and text accompanying notes 402-12 supra.
'See cases cited in and text accompanying note 413 supra.
"'Id.
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the petitioner's section 1507 motion, an appeal to the state supreme court is
not required and the petitioner may proceed immediately to federal court."'
6)
sought
(a)
to the

Exceptions to the general rule that a section 1507 hearing must be
fall into three general categories:
If the petitioner once unsuccessfully presented a purely legal question
Kansas Supreme Court and later wishes to raise the same issue on

federal habeas corpus, and there are no facts that could be developed in a
section 1507 evidentiary hearing, the petitioner will not be required to seek
collateral relief from the state trial court.4 '
(b) Even if the claim the petitioner wishes to raise on federal habeas
corpus depends upon factual allegations, resort to the section 1507 procedure
will not be demanded if the petitioner can show that the pertinent facts were
fully developed in state court proceedings leading to the criminal conviction.43 2
(c) If a similarly situated prisoner recently presented the Kansas Supreme
Court with the identical question sought to be adjudicated on federal habeas
corpus by the present petitioner, the exhaustion doctrine will be held to have
been satisfied.433
VI.

PLEADING AND PRELIMINARY PROCEDURE.

4

Once the student or practitioner determines that his case presents a legitimate claim cognizable in a collateral proceeding and that the prisoner

is "in custody" and has, in the case of a state prisoner, exhausted all available
and effective state remedies, the task of preparing an appropriate federal
pleading must begin. This part will examine the provisions of the federal

Habeas Corpus Act which set out the procedure to be followed in petitioning
for collateral relief. Inasmuch as the procedure required of federal prisoners
moving to vacate sentence pursuant to section 2255 is in most instances

similar to that demanded of state prisoners proceeding under section 2254,
this part will deal with the two forms of action together. Of course, those
instances in which section 2255 procedure departs from that of section 2254
will be noted.43"
cases cited in and text accompanying notes 414-16 supra.
cases cited in and text accompanying notes 417-20 supra.
cases cited in and text accompanying notes 421-22 supra.
'm
cases cited in and text accompanying notes 423-25 supra.
'a'
'The
writers are indebted to the Honorable Robert H. Miller, United States Magistrate, for his
helpful comments on the matters examined in this part. Much of the information herein regarding the
practices of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas was obtained in an interview
with Magistrate Miller on August 5, 1973.
'" At the present time there is circulating a preliminary draft of proposed rules governing habeas
corpus (§§ 2241-54) and § 2255 proceedings prepared by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The proposed rules have not yet been considered by the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and, of course, have not been submitted to the Judicial
Conference or adopted in any way by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to include in
the notes to the present and succeeding sections of this manual due mention of pertinent provisions of
the proposed rules. Generally, the rules do not purport to alter drastically present practice but rather
to streamline and make uniform the procedure for dealing with collateral petitions nationwide. The
purpose, then, is to flesh out the statutory provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act in order to provide
more guidance for litigants. The writers believe that the proposed rules go a long way toward that
'

See
See
See
See
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A. PRoPER FORUM
In perhaps a majority of cases, the problem of choosing a proper forum
will not arise. The common case involves a state prisoner seeking to challenge
the state sentence he is currently serving. The only federal court that can
be involved is the district court in the district where he is confined, and the
habeas corpus petition is properly addressed to that court.3 Other cases,
however, present a choice of forum problem. For example, a state or federal
prisoner may wish to challenge a state conviction in another state underlying
a detainer lodged against his release. In such a case, it is clear from section
2241(a) and the Supreme Court's construction of it that a habeas petition
may be filed in the district of confinement or the district where the conviction under attack was had. 37 The prisoner may want to petition the court
in the district of confinement. He may distrust a federal court that is associated even geographically with the state in which, at least in his mind, he
was wrongly convicted. Moreover, he may believe that his petition will receive more prompt attention locally. While these points should be considered,
the student should ordinarily advise that the petition be filed in the district
where the conviction was had. That is the more convenient forum in most
cases, because the records of the criminal case are there as are the witnesses
who may be called to testify at any necessary hearing on the petition.
In addition, the relief available in the state of conviction is outright release
from custody or a new trial. The district court in the district of confinement,
on the other hand, has personal jurisdiction over only the local warden as
an agent of the demanding state. Accordingly, the maximum relief can only
be an order directing the warden to hold the detainer for naught, thus
leaving the underlying conviction intact.
In such a case, the demanding
state authorities may feel compelled to afford the petitioner a new trial, but
arguably they need not act until the federal district court with personal
jurisdiction over them accepts the conclusion of the district court in the district
of confinement. To avoid that result and to promote convenience, the petition
should be submitted to the court sitting in the state of conviction. In point
of fact, if the petition is filed locally it may be transferred to the district of
conviction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 39
Section 2241 (a) does not make clear whether the petition should be submitted to a judge personally or to the clerk. The section simply provides
goal and therefore should, with some exceptions noted below, be adopted. In anticipation of that event,
the proposed rules will be mentioned often in the notes following and will be cited as PROPOSED RULES
GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS and PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS.
'" In a state that contains two or more federal judicial districts, the petition may be filed in either
the district within which the prisoner is confined or the district where the criminal trial was held.
Provision is made for transferring petitions among districts within the same state in the interest of
justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1970).
"Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 1123 (1973), discussed in Part
IV-D supra.

Cf. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970).
' See note 118 supra.
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that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge. ...." Appellate judges
can and generally do decline to entertain original petitions and transfer them
to the appropriate district court. But still there is confusion as to who should
receive petitions at the district court level.44° The best practice, and that required by local rule in the District of Kansas,441 is to submit the petition to
the clerk rather than a particular judge." 2 Service of process in the ordinary
sense is not required in habeas proceedings; the court will give notice to the
respondent by way of a show cause order. 43
The question of where a motion to vacate sentence under section 2255 is
to be filed is answered in the statute. Any such motion must be addressed to
"the court which imposed the [challenged] sentence. . . ."" Thus a federal
prisoner must address his motion to the court in which he was convicted,
and only in the rare case is that the district of confinement. The same rule
applies, of course, to a state prisoner wishing to challenge his future custody
pursuant to a federal sentence underlying a detainer lodged against his release
by federal authorities. His section 2255 motion must be addressed to the
federal sentencing court, and not the district court in the district where he
is confined.445 Just as a habeas corpus petition in behalf of a state prisoner
should be submitted to the clerk of the appropriate federal district court, a
section 2255 motion challenging a federal sentence should be addressed to
the clerk of the sentencing court.44
B.

FORM OF THE PETITION

The form of an application for habeas corpus relief is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 2242 (1970) which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified

by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.
It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant's commitment or detention,
the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or
authority, if known.
It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.

In Kansas and in most other districts a habeas corpus petition must be submitted on a form provided by the court.447 The form requires the petitioner
"0 See PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS

'Local Rule 25 (a) (7).
' This is also the suggestion of the proposed rules.

3,

NOTE.

PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CoRPus

PROCEEDINGS 3(a).

See Part VI-C infra.
"28 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970); United States v. Williamson, 469 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1972).
' See Desmond v. United States Bd. of Parole, 397 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919
(1968); Paolino v. United States, 3f4 F. Supp. 875 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
"Local Rule 25(a)(7); PRoPosED RULES GOVERNING S 2255 PROCEEDINGS 3(a).
"'Local Rule 25(a)(1). The form used by the court is similar to that developed by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, discussed in Committee on Habeas Corpus, Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in the United States, 33
F.R.D. 367, 382-84 (1963). See PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 2(c). The
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to give information regarding his criminal conviction and to describe the

procedural history of his case, including any earlier collateral petitions, since
conviction. The questions on the form ask such things as names, dates, and
places so as to provide the court with a complete record of what has occurred.
Further, the petitioner must answer stock questions about his representation
by counsel, the trial, and any appeal. Finally, he must set out a clear and
concise statement of the facts and legal arguments upon which he relies.
Completion of the form is mandatory, and the clerk is authorized to return
any petition not submitted on the form. 4 " Inasmuch as the clerk makes forms
freely available to prisoners, the requirement that prisoners use them is not
unduly burdensome.4 49

In accordance with section 2242, the form petition provides a place for
naming the custodian as respondent. In most cases the warden of the institution where the prisoner is confined is the proper respondent and is to be
named personally in the petition.45° There is also a space for notarization of
the petition to comply with the requirement that the petitioner's signature
be verified.451 Of course, the student must not sign pleadings. The Defender
Project can legitimately assist the prisoner in the preparation of his petition
but cannot represent him as a member of the bar. The student will apprise
the court of his participation by a cover letter attached to the prisoner's
pro se petition. 5
The form petition also includes a forma pauperis affidavit. Since all
prisoners assisted by the Defender Project are indigent, it will be necessary
in all cases to see that the prisoner completes the affidavit. The affidavit, of
course, must also be verified. 455 Oddly enough, the form petition does not
proposed rule lists common grounds for relief so as to facilitate the inmate's task. While some commentators have criticized this practice on the ground that it may encourage perjury, the writers find
the list a welcome addition to the standard form.

'8 Local Rule 25(a)(7). A similar provision appears in PRoPosED

RULES GOVERNING

HABEAS CORPUS

PROCEEDINGS 2(e). Both the Kansas local rule and the proposed rule provide that a petition may be
returned if the form is not properly completed. The proposed rule takes account of the prisoner's possible confusion and requires the clerk to furnish a statement of the reason for returning the petition.
The Kansas local rule requires only that the clerk enclose a copy of Local Rule 25.
' But see Note, Legal Services or Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 514, 522.
'WWilliams v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 463 F.2d 993 (8th Cir. 1972) (naming an entire
department does not comply with S 2242); Chambers v. Moseley, 306 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Kan.), afl'd,
419 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1969) (district court inserted the name of the Leavenworth warden on its
own motion).
'See
McDonald et a!. v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940).
' The cover letter explains the functions of the Kansas Defender Project so as to make the court
aware of the extent to which the inmate has received student assistance during the preparation stage.
This should satisfy a court that questions the propriety of counsel filing a civil action without affixing
his name to the pleading as required by FFD. R. Civ. P. 11. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325 (1st
Cir. 1971).
' The form petition suggested by the proposed rules contains a certificate showing the amount of
money the prisoner has in his institution account. The certificate is to be signed by institution authorities. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 3(a). The purpose of the certificate
is, of course, to provide a check on the reliability of the inmate's affidavit. The writers doubt the
utility of the requirement and question the need for it. Moreover, completion of the certificate may
require time, leading to delay in the preparation stage. Perhaps most importantly, the certificate involves
prison authorities in a process in which inmates feel they have no place. Institutional control over any
aspect of the inmate's contact with the court should be avoided. This is particularly true inasmuch as
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include a request for the assignment of counsel. Apparently, the prevailing
view is that, since there is no absolute right to counsel in a collateral proceeding,4 54 the question whether the court should in its discretion furnish
representation can be handled at the appropriate time by the court on its
own motion.4 55 Nevertheless, the best practice is to attach to the form petition
a motion requesting the assignment of counsel.45
The last document to be completed and filed with the petition is a supporting memorandum of points of law and authorities. It should begin with

a brief recitation of the procedural history of the case in order to make clear
to the judge the posture in which the petition reaches him. Next, there
should be a clear and detailed statement of the facts upon which the petitioner relies. This is the crux of the matter, the basis of the claim. A petition
that slights the facts in favor of involved legal argument is unlikely to be
successful.45 7 What is needed is a carefully prepared description of events.
Although pleadings prepared by laymen are not held to the standard applied
to documents drafted by lawyers,455 "[i]n a collateral attack on a criminal
judgment the prisoner must state some factual basis for the relief sought."45
Following the statement of facts, the memorandum should set out in
bold type the legal claims that the factual allegations support. At this point,
extensive argument is inappropriate. Rather, the student should focus upon
the essence of the case, what it is he wants the court to consider. Then, the
memorandum should affirmatively plead exhaustion of all available and effective state remedies." 0 This will entail a description of the state procedures
that have been utilized and specific reasons for not going further in the
state courts. Of course, it will be necessary to show that the precise facts and
legal issues just listed were submitted to the state appellate court.46 ' If the
the statutory filing fee, which the petitioner in forma pauperis is seeking to avoid, is only five dollars.
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1970). The Kansas Defender Project, of course, verifies an inmate's poverty
before offering student assistance.
'Hull v. Swenson, 431 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1970); Ratley v. Crouse, 365 F.2d 320 (10th Cir.
1966); see Note, Prisoner Assistance on Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 19 STAN. L. REv. 887, 889
(1967); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
'A
federal district court has power to request counsel to assist indigent habeas corpus petitioners.
28 U.S.C. 5 1915(d) (1970). And counsel may be compensated under an amended provision of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964. 18 U.S.C. S 3006A(g) (1970). See Part VII-D infra.
For an exhaustive examination of the problems presented in the processing of pro se petitions
in forma pauperis, see Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in
the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 157 (1972). The authors served as pro se law clerks for the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and in that capacity became well-acquainted
with the difficulties of the pro se litigant. Among other suggestions presented in their article, the
authors urged the expanded use of the courts' power to furnish counsel for indigents.
' See, e.g., Buchannon v. Wainwright, 474 F.2d 1006, 1007 (5th Cir. 1973) (habeas petitioner must
allege facts rather than conclusions); Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1972) (conclusional allegations insufficient to state a claim); Willard v. Harris, 336 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Kan.), afl'd, 454 F.2d
738 (10th Cir. 1971) (conclusional allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to require a hearing).
'Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Ham v. North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hairston v. Alabama, 465 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1972); Bryant v. Harris, 465 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1972);
Miller v. Crouse, 346 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1965).
'WAtkins v. Kansas, 386 F.2d 819, 820 (10th Cir. 1967).
'°Moore v. Frazier, 316 F. Supp. 318 (D. Neb. 1970) (exhaustion must be alleged in the petition).
"tPicard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Ferrari v. Henderson, 474 F.2d 510, 513-14 (2d Cir.
1973); McDonald v. Wainwright, 466 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1972); Ferguson v. Cox, 464 F.2d 461 (4th
Cir. 1972).
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prisoner was given a hearing on his claims in the state courts, it must be

argued that, for one or more of the reasons discussed below,462 the hearing
was insufficient and a new one must be granted. If the prisoner has filed
previous petitions in federal court, reasons must be given for not dismissing
the present pleading as successive.4 63 Next, the memorandum should contain an argument section that develops the case in light of pertinent authorities. This portion of the memorandum should be, above all, brief and
to the point. The longer the argument, the less likely it is that it will be

read carefully. Finally, the memorandum should conclude with a separate
section that makes a claim for relief. If the prisoner is challenging the sentence he is currently serving, he will seek release from custody.464 However,
if he is challenging a sentence to be served in the future, the appropriate relief

is a declaration that the judgment under attack is invalid. 6 5 In either case
the petition should pray in the alternative for an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the merits of the case.46

The form of the petition in section 2255 cases is basically the same as that
in habeas corpus cases. Most federal district courts provide that a motion
to vacate sentence pursuant to section 2255 must also be submitted on a
standard form similar to that provided for habeas applicants.4 6 Here again,
completion of the form is mandatory, and the clerk is authorized to return
any pleading that is not submitted thereon.468 The standard form provides
a place for naming the United States as respondent, ' a place for verification
See Part VII-A infra.
'a See Part VIII infra.
'Generally,
the court may order the petitioner's immediate

release from custody or release at a
certain date if a new trial is not held. United States ex rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735 (3d
Cir. 1973). The Tenth Circuit has held, however, that outright release is an abuse of discretion and that
the state must be given a reasonable time in which to correct its error. Ridge v. Turner, 444 F.2d
3, 5 (10th Cir. 1971). See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961).
'See
PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 2 (b), NOTE.
'WOf course, the memorandum described in the text necessarily will repeat some information contained in the form petition. Nevertheless, the student or practitioner should include all that is necessary
for a cohesive, persuasive presentation.
2
'The
United States District Court for the District of Kansas so provides in Local Rule 5(a)(1);
see PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 2(b).
'Local
Rule 25(a)(7); PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 2(d); see Fernandez v.
Meier, 432 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).
'The
§ 2255 form suggested by the proposed rules is captioned in the manner of the original
criminal cause. Thus there is no respondent; the United States appears as plaintiff and the prisoner as
defendant. The suggested form reflects the Advisory Committee's view that Congress intended the motion
remedy under § 2255 to be "a further step in the movant's criminal case and not a separate civil
action ..
" PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 1, NOTE. The writers take exception.
While the issue is not free from doubt, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed § 2255 not as an
extension of the criminal case but as habeas corpus for federal prisoners in the sentencing court. Hill
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962). Thus in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952),
the Court devoted the substantial part of its opinion dealing with the legislative history of § 2255 to
an examination of the history of habeas corpus. Nothing was said about a further stage in the criminal
case. On the contrary, in its discussion of the need for the prisoner's presence at the § 2255 hearing
ordered in the case, the Court referred to § 2255 as "an independent and collateral inquiry into the
validity of the conviction." 342 U.S. at 222 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, if a § 2255 hearing were
considered a stage of the criminal prosecution, the procedural safeguards mandated by the sixth
amendment, including the right to be present and to be represented by counsel, would seem to attach.
Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). The Court's opinion in Hayman makes it clear that the
sixth amendment does not apply. 342 U.S. at 222-23.
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of the prisoner's signature and a forma pauperis affidavit.47° The form does
not include a request for the assignment of counsel, and the student should
prepare such a motion for attachment. Similarly, a memorandum of supporting points and authorities should be prepared and affixed to the form
section 2255 motion. This memorandum should be organized in the manner
described above for habeas corpus applicants,47 ' with the exception that no
exhaustion of other remedies, save direct appeal,472 need be pleaded.
C.

ACTION REQUIRED OF THE RESPONDENT

The required response to the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970)."' s While the statute makes it clear that
habeas corpus matters should receive speedy attention, in practice the processing
of an application for relief requires substantially more time than section
2243 permits.474 When the clerk receives the petition, he examines it to
The real danger in treating S 2255 as a further stage in the criminal process lies in a potential
tendency toward narrowing the scope of the remedy. The Committee disclaims any such intention, but
the threat remains. If S 2255 is tied to earlier proceedings, the collateral challenge loses its independence,
its vital link with traditional habeas corpus, the remedy Holmes said comes in from the outside, "not
in subordination to the proceedings ..
" Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, tying S 2255 to prior proceedings arguably leads back to the argument that
2255 relief should not be available, except in exceptional circumstances, in a case wliere the prisoner
did not raise his issue at trial or on direct appeal. Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 824 (1966).
The Supreme Court rejected that contention with regard to fourth amendment claims in Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). See the criticism of the same argument arising in the analogous
Kansas practice under KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1507 (1964) in Part V-D-2 supra.
' The court's acceptance of the affidavit will exempt the indigent prisoner from the statutory filing
fee of $15. 28 U.S.C. S 1914(a) (1970); see McCune v. United States, 406 F.2d 417, 419 (6th Cir.
1969); Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961).
Consistent with the Committee's view that a S 2255 motion is part of the criminal case, the proposed
rules would eliminate the filing fee. PROPosED RuL.s GovaRNsNo § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 3, NOTE. The
writers agree that the fee should not be charged, but for the reasons given in note 453 supra.
See text accompanying notes 457-66 supra.
'See Jacobs v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1973). Exhaustion of the direct appeal remedy must
be pleaded in order to make clear that the time for an appeal has run out and the S 2255 motion is
not premature. Furthermore, failure to appeal may raise serious questions as to the existence of a
deliberate by-pass.
41 Section 2243 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith
award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not
be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not
entitled thereto.
The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.
The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause
of the detention.
When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days
after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.
Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to
whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person
detained.
The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the
return or allege any other material facts.
The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or
after being filed.
The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law
and justice require.
'An attempt has been made to extend somewhat the time limits by rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2).
For a discussion of the practice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, see Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 169-219. Also see quotation of S 2243 in note 473
supra.
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determine whether the form has been completed in compliance with the local
rule. If the clerk is satisfied that the petition is in good order, he will

promptly refer it to one of the district judges. 75 Although the judge may
summarily dismiss the petition if he finds that the action is frivolous or
malicious,47 the normal procedure is to permit the petition to be filed without payment of the docket fee if the petitioner is indigent. 4" The judge may
then himself examine the petition to determine whether to issue an order
directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted.
More often he will delegate that responsibility to his law clerk or a federal
magistrate."" By statute, a magistrate is authorized to review applications
for post-trial relief and to make recommendations to the judge on the merits
of the petition.479

If the judge determines that the petition has merit on its face, he must,
under section 2243, issue a show cause order directing the respondent to

answer the prisoner's allegations. That section requires a return within three
days unless additional time, not exceeding 20 days, is allowed. However, in
practice the respondent must be and is given more time in which to prepare
his pleading. For example, in Kansas s° and in the Southern District of
New York, 481 the respondent is initially given 20 days and may make an
ex parte motion for a further extension of time. The return must set out
the cause of the prisoner's detention and may deny the factual allegations in

the petition or allege other material facts.4" Under section 2243, the return
may be amended later by leave of court. If the return contradicts the allegations in the petition or alleges other facts not included therein, the petitioner
must file a reply or traverse, challenging any misstatements of fact in the
' 3 Local Rule 25(a)(7). The proposed rules would permit the clerk to file the petition immediately
and to enter it on the docket in his office. He is also to serve a copy of the petition on the attorney
general of the state involved in order to facilitate the preparation of a response should the judge decide
that one is necessary. PROPOSED RULES GovERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 3(b) and accompanying
NOTE.

'7628 U.S.C. S 1915(d) (1970).
' 5 Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964); Ragan
v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962); see Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 196.
,' Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 196-97.
-28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(3) (1970). The magistrate's advisory function is to be emphasized. He is
not an Article III judge and cannot sign the final order in a case; the district judge must independently
come to a decision but may adopt the magistrate's point of view. United States ex rel. Henderson v.
Brierley, 468 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1972).
's Interview with Magistrate Miller, supra note 434.
' Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 198-99.
'The proposed rules would permit the respondent to submit a motion for a more definite statement within 15 days after receipt of notice of the filing of the petition. See note 475 supra. Additionally, also within the 15-day period, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss, supported by
exhibits showing that an answer to the petition is unnecessary. See note 492 infra; PRoPosED RULES
GovERNING HABEAs CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 4(b).

If, notwithstanding the respondent's preliminary

mo-

tions, the court requires a return or answer (in the language of the proposed rules) a detailed document
is necessary. The proposed rules require that the answer must not only respond to the allegations in
the petition but it must state whether the prisoner has exhausted the state remedies available to him,
whether he was afforded a hearing on his claims in the state courts, and whether a record of the proceedings in the state courts is available. If a record is available, it must be attached to the answer.
PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 5.
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return and thus joining the factual issues.4 If no traverse is submitted, the
statements of fact in the return will be taken as true, except to the extent that

the court finds otherwise in a hearing." 4
When the traverse is received, all the records in the case are turned over
to a judge for a decision on the need for a hearing. Here again a magistrate
or law clerk may be asked to make recommendations.4 85 The rather complex
considerations that go into that decision, particularly if the state courts afforded the petitioner a hearing, will be dealt with in Part VII. But generally
it has been held that no hearing is necessary if the facts are undisputed4 86 or
the questions are legal rather than factual.48 7 If a hearing is deemed necessary, section 2243 provides that "the court shall summarily hear and determine
the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." There is
limited authority for the view that, notwithstanding the literal language of
the statute, the court may appoint a magistrate to conduct the hearing as a
special master.488 Here again, however, the final decision must come from
the judge. The magistrate's report may be adopted by the court, but it may
not stand as binding in itself.48
The procedure followed in dealing with motions to vacate sentence pur-

suant to section 2255 is similar to that just described. Section 2255 itself does
not prescribe time limits as does section 2243, but the system does not and
probably cannot operate so speedily in any event.49 ° Nor does section 2255
set out a procedure for requiring a response from the respondent, although
there is provision for notification of the United States Attorney by the clerk.
Procedure similar to that followed in habeas corpus cases has therefore been
generally adopted.4"' Thus the clerk will first see that the section 2255 motion
"SThe proposed rules do not contemplate that a traverse will be filed. This is consistent with the
modern movement away from the view that allegations in a return are deemed true until they are impeached. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 5, NorE; but see 28 U.S.C. § 2248
(1970) (codifying the traditional position).
28 U.S.C. § 2248 (1970). The strict rule has been held not to apply where the petition and the
return clearly frame an issue of fact and any traverse can only be a pro forma refutation of the return.
Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339, 342 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see United States ex rel. Kendzierski
v. Brantley, 447 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971) (giving a limited construction to § 2248).
' See note 479 supra.

Thomas v. Craven, 473 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1973).
Noorlander v. United States Attorney General, 465 F.2d 1106, 1108 (8th Cit. 1972).
'Royce v. Moore, 469 F.2d 808 (1st Cir. 1972); Parnell v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 735 (5th Cir.
1972); see United States ex rel. Henderson v. Brierley, 468 F.2d 1193, 1195 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972) (indicating that the question is open in the Third Circuit); see Comment, Proposed Reformation of Federal
Habeas Corpus Procedure: Use of Federal Magistrates, 54 IA. L. REV. 1147 (1969). The proposed rules
would permit magistrates to perform virtually any function regarding habeas matters, including conducting hearings. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 11.

"Dye v. Cowan, 472 F.2d 1206, 1206-07 n.1 (6th Cir. 1972).
'A study of cases in the Southern District of New York revealed that prisoner petitions usually
require four months from filing to disposition. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 199-200. The
apparent reason for the delay is that, faced with a deluge of petitions, most district courts no longer
consider habeas corpus or § 2255 petitions to be extraordinary remedies. Pope, Suggestions for Lessening
the Burden of Frivolous Applications, 33 F.R.D. 409 (1962); Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section
2255 Cases Under Title 28 United States Code, 32 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
"' The United States District Court for the District of Kansas treats the two actions together in a
single rule. See Local Rule 25. The proposed rules are in accord but go further to require the government's answer to respond specifically to the petitioner's allegations and to state whether the petitioner has
used other federal remedies available to him, including prior motions under § 2255. Of course, in a
§ 2255 case, the record of the criminal trial is in the court's file. Any documents not appearing in the
file may be demanded from the government. The anticipated case is where there was no direct appeal
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is in the proper form and then will refer it to a member of the court who,

with the aid of a law clerk or magistrate, will decide whether to docket the
case without requiring the prisoner to pay the statutory filing fee.492 Next
the court may require the United States Attorney to respond to the prisoner's
allegations in an answer which corresponds to the return required in habeas

cases."9 ' Significantly, however, nothing in section 2255 indicates that untraversed allegations in the government's answer are to be deemed true.
Indeed, a number of cases have held that an untraversed answer is not conclusive against the section 2255 petitioner.4"4 Once the issues are joined and
it appears that the facts alleged by the petitioner, if true, would entitle him
to relief, a hearing must be held.4"5
Perhaps the major difference at this stage between section 2255 and habeas
corpus procedure is that, in the former, the petition is generally referred to
a judge who is already acquainted with the case. While a habeas corpus petition challenges a state criminal conviction and is the federal district court's
first contact with the case, a section 2255 motion is filed in the court where
the conviction under attack was had. The majority rule is that the member
of that court who is most familiar with the events under consideration should
entertain the new action.4"' The trial judge normally handles the section
2255 motion if he is available. The reason that is usually given for this practice is that the judge who tried the case and can remember the trial and
surrounding circumstances is not likely to be misled by false allegations as
to what occurred.4"7 On the other hand, it has been argued that the trial
judge may feel threatened by what he sees as a challenge to his handling
of the case and may find it difficult to examine the facts objectively a second
time.49 If the judge appears to be prejudiced, the only apparent answer is
an attempt to disqualify him as biased.499
and therefore no transcript was prepared. In such a case, if the court determines that a transcript is
needed, the government may be ordered to purchase one from the reporter. PRoPosED RULES GOVERNING
S 2255 PROCEEDINGS 5.
' The proposed rules would require the clerk to serve a copy of the § 2255 motion on the United
States Attorney so that he may prepare a motion to dismiss, supported by exhibits showing that an
answer is unnecessary. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 3(b), 4(c); see note 482
supra (similar provision for habeas corpus cases).
"' See PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 5, NOTE.
'E.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494, 495 (1962); Brown v. United States,
462 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1972); Del Piano v. United States, 362 F.2d 931, 932, 933 (3d Cir. 1966);
accord, PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 5, NOTE.
Specifically, § 2255 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Unless the motion and the files and
records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon the United States Attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine
the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." See Brown v. United
States, 462 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1972); but see Mixen v. United States, 469 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1972)
(no hearing necessary where facts are not in dispute).
'E.g., Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1949); Panico v. United States, 291
F. Supp. 728, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd, 412 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921
(1970); accord, Local Rule 25(a)(7); PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 4(a).
'Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1949).
'Developments, supra note 2, at 1206-08 (pointing out that neither the statute nor its legislative
history indicates that Congress intended the trial judge to preside at the § 2255 hearing); see Halliday
v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (Ist Cir. 1967) (holding that a judge other than the sentencing judge
should rule on a § 2255 motion).
' See, e.g., Webster v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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D. DiscovERY
After the return and traverse are filed, the court must decide to what
extent discovery should be permitted. The question whether discovery devices
are ever appropriate in habeas cases is an unsettled issue. The Habeas Corpus
Act itself provides little guidance. Section 2246 states only that evidence may
be taken orally or by deposition or, in the court's discretion, by affidavit. If
affidavits are permitted, either party has the right to propound interrogatories
00
to the affiants or to file other affidavits in response.
Since habeas corpus is viewed generally as civil in nature, it has been
argued that the rules of procedure governing discovery applicable to civil
litigation in the federal courts should be controlling. Rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure declares that "[t]hese rules govern the procedure
in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature

. . .

with the

exceptions stated in Rule 81." Rule 81 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"These rules are applicable to proceedings for

. . .

habeas corpus . . . to the

extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the
United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions."5 °1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in Harris v. Nelson °2 that the discovery provisions of the rules are inapplicable to habeas cases. In that case a
state prisoner filed an application for habeas corpus relief in federal court
and, after receiving the return, served a series of interrogatories on the respondent. He relied on the authority of rule 33 which governs the use of
interrogatories generally. The questions related to the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a search warrant and sought evidence that would
support the petitioner's allegation that the warrant had been issued solely
on the basis of the sworn statement of an informant who had not been shown
to be reliable. The district court ordered the respondent to answer the questions, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court reasoned that, while it
is true that habeas corpus is considered a civil proceeding, the action is essentially unique and habeas practice in the federal courts has conformed with
general civil practice "only in a general sense."5 ° Thus the draftsmen of
rule 81 did not intend to make available in habeas corpus proceedings the
broad discovery provisions included in the rules.
Having held that a habeas corpus petitioner is not automatically entitled
to employ discovery devices, the Court went on to say that, in an appropriate
case, a district court sitting in habeas nevertheless has power in its discretion
to permit discovery of information in order to "dispose of the matter as law
and justice require."5 4 Under .the authority of the All Writs Act,5"5 federal
courts have plenary power to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
- 28 U.S.C. S 2246 (1970).
'i FED. R. Ctv. P. 81(a)(2).
'394 U.S. 286 (1969).
Id. at 294.
W428 U.S.C. S 2243 (1970).
i
2 8 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
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of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
the law."' ° Accordingly, Harris left the district courts to decide on a caseby-case basis the extent to which discovery techniques should be available to
the parties in a habeas corpus proceeding."° '
In order to make this determination in a given case, a district court must
consider the advantages and disadvantages of discovery. The availability of
discovery may have substantial advantages for the petitioner. He has the
burden of showing that he is entitled to relief and often may need information
known only to the respondent to sustain that burden. For example, if the
petitioner is relying upon an allegation of perjury at trial, he may need to
question the police and prosecutors to establish that inconsistent statements
were given by key witnesses outside the courtroom." °' Additionally, discovery
may be needed to trace "fruits of the poisonous tree" from their illegitimate
source to their use as evidence in the criminal prosecution."9
Discovery also has advantages for the respondent and the court. If the
respondent is permitted to take the petitioner's deposition, all his possible
claims will likely be brought to the fore prior to the decision to grant a
hearing. 1 ' The respondent then has an opportunity to reply squarely to all
the petitioner's allegations and thus perhaps to show that a hearing is unnecessary. Furthermore, even-if the court determines that a hearing is required,
early identification of the issues should lead to efficiency in the hearing so that
review of subsequent petitions will be unnecessary. The result is economical
use of the respondent's time and the court's processes as well as a fair consideration of the petitioner's contentions. 11
On the other hand, there are valid objections to the broad use of discovery
in habeas corpus cases. The principal argument is that the scope of discovery
in criminal cases is substantially more narrow than that available in civil
cases, and a habeas applicant seeking to challenge his conviction collaterally
Id. Thus a petitioner apparently is not entitled to discovery before he begins his action. See
United States ex rel. Nunes v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).
hIn dissent Mr. Justice Harlan argued that discovery in habeas should be governed by clearly
defined rules developed through the exercise of the Court's rule-making power. 394 U.S. at 305. The
majority, while adopting the case-by-case approach discussed in the text, noted their agreement that
special rules should be developed. Id. at 300-01 n.7. The rules that have now been proposed make no
attempt to specifically set out what discovery devices should be available but rather adopt the Harris
approach. Under the rules, discovery would be available only by leave of court, and the need for discovery would be considered independently in each case. Additionally, the rules would permit the appointment of counsel to assist in discovery and would specifically recognize the respondent's right to
depose the petitioner. PROPosED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 6. After the district
courts have gained experience with discovery in habeas, the draftsmen envisage further consideration
of the need for specific codification. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 6, No'rE.
Note, Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 1296, 1304-05 (1967).
"'o Inasmuch as habeas corpus is a civil action wherein the petitioner's guilt or innocence is not at
issue, there is less chance that the problem of self-incrimination will arise. Nor is there a jury present
which might draw improper inferences from the petitioner's failure to answer questions. Accordingly,
it is generally agreed that the petitioner can be called upon to give a deposition, subject to his fifth
amendment privilege to refuse to answer particular questions that ask for inculpating admissions.
Developments, supra note 2, at 1183-84; accord, PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING

CEEDINGs 6(c).
'See Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1969) (a S 2255 case).
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should be entitled to no more discovery than would have been available before or during trial.512 The rationale is that a defendant in a criminal case
should not be permitted to avoid the restrictions on criminal discovery simply
by waiting until the prosecution has drawn to a close and a collateral challenge is begun. Perhaps the best response to this argument is that the trend
is toward a broadening of discovery even in criminal proceedings and, that
being the case, the limited discovery rules traditionally applicable to criminal
cases should not be extended into a new area.51 In any event, discovery in
habeas should be at least as broad as the most liberal criminal discovery rules.
Another objection to the use of discovery in habeas corpus is the potential
difficulty arising from the petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination.
The habeas petitioner may be able to abuse the discovery process by obtaining
information from the respondent while refusing to divulge relevant information within his own knowledge. This, of course, is the one-way street argument often used to support limited discovery in criminal cases. 14 The best
response is two-fold. First, the petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime
charged is irrelevant in a habeas proceeding and it is unlikely that questions
that call for the invocation of the privilege will be asked. Second, if the petitioner chooses not to answer legitimate questions, the court may draw appropriate inferences."
A third common argument is that federal discovery rules are often more
liberal than those followed in the state where the petitioner was convicted.
In a given case, a prisoner who has been denied access to information during
his criminal trial on the basis of restrictive state rules may then be able to demand that same information later in the course of a federal habeas proceeding.5"' The counter-argument is that the overriding federal interest in
assuring that the prisoner is not held in custody in violation of his constitutional rights is sufficient to justify any concomitant intrusion upon competing
state interests. It seems altogether desirable to permit the gathering of any
additional evidence that may lead to the vindication of a petitioner's right to
liberty." 7
Finally, there is the practical difficulty created by the widespread use of
discovery in the numerous prisoner cases facing federal district courts.
' Compare FEn. R. CRIM. P. 16 with Fan. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
" Developments, supra note 2, at 1181-83 (suggesting that the policies underlying limited discovery in criminal cases do not apply with equal force in habeas proceedings); Note, supra note 508, at

1307-09.
Event or
Rev. 940
"See

For criticism of limited discovery generally, see Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting
Quest for Truth, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 279; Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAuv. L.
(1961).
Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962) (Peters, J., concurring and

dissenting).

"' Note, supra note 508, at 1310. Drawing such an inference would not be unconstitutional in the
civil setting. A more drastic sanction would be to dismiss the action if the petitioner persists in denying
to the respondent information needed for his defense. Note, Sell-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52
VA. L. RE,. 322, 333 n.l1l (1966). That would seem to be extreme and likely to put the petitioner
in the difficult position of choosing between pursuing the writ or protecting himself from prejudice in
a future criminal prosecution, perhaps a retrial in the case under attack.

"Developments, supra note 2, at 1184-85.
malId.
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Undoubtedly, a great many such petitions are frivolous and unworthy of the
time and effort necessary for prehearing discovery,"' It may be argued that
state authorities charged with defending against collateral challenges may be
swamped with a rush of interrogatories and requests for depositions."1 Moreover, some prisoners may take unfair advantage of the discovery process to
harass their keepers. Indeed, the Supreme Court said in Harris that permitting discovery in habeas corpus as a matter of right might become
"vexatious" for the respondent and the court."' Thus, for practical reasons,
it may be necessary for the court to limit discovery to what it considers necessary. Hopefully, however, the discretion left to the district court by the
decision in Harris will not be used to bar discovery in habeas on the basis
of the potential for abuse. Rather, the habeas court should encourage the
legitimate use of discovery devices and deny only those applications that
clearly show an attempt to harass the respondent. 2 ' The interests of all concerned are served by the application in habeas corpus of the procedural rules
governing federal proceedings generally."'
The same arguments for and against discovery in habeas corpus apply
with equal force to motions to vacate sentence pursuant to section 2255.28
Although Harris was a habeas corpus case, the Court quite clearly intended

its holding to apply to section 2255 proceedings as well." 4 Accordingly, discovery is not available to the section 2255 petitioner as a matter of right but
may be permitted in the court's discretion."25

VII. THE RIGHT TO A HEARING
A.

CHALLENGES TO STATE CONVICTIONS

At this point the federal district judge has before him all the information
concerning the petitioner's claim that can be obtained without an evidentiary
hearing. There is the petition itself which, together with the supporting
memorandum, constitutes the basis of the case. 2 ' Additionally, there is the
respondent's return to the show cause order and whatever further evidence
has been obtained through discovery.527 Finally, if the respondent has not
' See Becker & Stewart, supra note 5, at 579.
OSee Developments, supra note 2, at 1184-85.
• 394 U.S. at 297.
' This is the view taken by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas.
Interview
with Magistrate Miller, supra note 434.
'See Procella v. Beto, 319 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (local federal rules of evidence applicable to habeas corpus hearings); Phillips v. Smith, 300 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (federal rules
of procedure govern depositions in habeas).
a Cf. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 6, NOTE.
r'394 U.S. at 300-01 n.7. For an argument that discovery should be encouraged in § 2255 proceedings, see Carter, supra note 490.
' Consistent with the Committee's view that a § 2255 motion is a further stage in the criminal
prosecution, the proposed rules would allow the court to permit the prisoner's use of the discovery
devices applicable to criminal as well as civil cases. And, as in habeas corpus, the rules would permit
appointment of counsel to assist in the discovery process. Finally, the respondent's right to depose the
petitioner is again recognized. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGs 6.
m See Part VI-B supra.
See Parts VI-C, D supra.
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voluntarily furnished relevant state court records for use in the habeas proceeding, the court has power to compel the production of such records, including a transcript of testimony at trial or some adequate substitute, the
pleadings in prior state proceedings, and court opinions or other pertinent
documents. 28 The remaining task is a judicial decision whether a hearing
must or, in the alternative; should be granted. The considerations relevant
to that all-important decision are controlled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Townsend v. Sain 29 Inasmuch as the theoretical underpinnings of
Townsend have been treated elsewhere,s' this part will only summarize the
body of law that has developed surrounding that case with a view toward
formulating a collateral petition that is likely to gain a federal hearing.
1. Mandatory Hearings
The appropriate starting place is Townsend itself. The case arose from
Cook County, Illinois where the petitioner had been convicted of murder in
a state court. After exhausting state remedies, he petitioned a federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that a confession admitted into
evidence at trial had been obtained from him while he was under the influence of drugs administered by a police physician. Although there was
conflicting evidence as to the probable effects of the drugs and the withholding
of relevant information from the state court hearing on the petitioner's motion to suppress, the district court dismissed the petition without a hearing.
The court expressly relied on the decision of the state court that the confession
had been given voluntarily.
In the Supreme Court the first issue was framed as whether the petitioner's
allegations, if true, would entitle him to the writ. " ' After concluding that
the petition stated a violation of constitutional rights, the Court turned to
'Smith v. Beto, 467 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1972). If the records are incomplete or ambiguous, they
may not be relied upon. United States ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1973).
m372 U.S. 293 (1963). There is language in some court opinions referring to 28 U.S.C. S 2254
(d) (1970) as a codification of Townsend. E.g., Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 451 n.6 (1971);
United States ex rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735,. 738 (3d Cir. 1973); see PROPOSED RuLES
GOVERNING HABEAS CoRPus PROCEEDINGS 8, NOTE. However, the better view is that S 2254 comes into
play only after the decision to hold a de novo hearing has been made. The Harvard Law Review has
suggested the following analysis:
On its face and in the light of the legislative history, the amendment [S 2254] is not directed
at the question whether to hold a federal evidentiary hearing. Instead, it assumes that a hearing
is to be held and attempts to decide if the state's factual conclusions are to be deemed presumptively correct at that hearing. Though their purposes are distinguishable, the amendment and
Townsend do reinforce each other. If the procedure at the state hearing was so inadequate that
a Townsend hearing is necessary, it would be inconsistent, as the statute recognizes, for the judge
at the federal evidentiary hearing to treat the state decision as presumptively correct.
Developments, supra note 2, at 1122 n.46; accord, LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 93 S. Ct. 1203, 1209 n.2 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see Ramirez v. Rodriguez, 467 F.2d 822, 823 (10th Cir. 1972). The provisions of § 2254 going to the burden and standard of proof in the evidentiary hearing will be discussed in Part VII-C infra.
5 See Developments, supra note 2, at 1113-54; Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 923-35 (1966).
' Thus the Court held that a petitioner is not necessarily entitled to a federal hearing merely because
he can establish shortcomings in state procedures. He must show that his version of the facts, if proved,
would require his release. See Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 451 (1971); Sloan v. Wainwright,
469 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the second logical step: "whether the District Court was required to hold
a hearing to ascertain the facts which are a necessary predicate to a decision
of the ultimate constitutional question. ' The resolution of this second
question required the Court to finish the task it had begun ten years earlier
in Brown v. Allen." In Brown, the Court had announced that a hearing
was required in "exceptional circumstances" or when a "vital flaw" in state
fact-finding proceedings was shown."' 4 Now the Court recognized that the
Brown standards did not "serve adequately to explain the controlling criteria
for the guidance of the federal habeas corpus courts." 585 Accordingly, the
Court set out a new test. When the facts are in dispute, a federal habeas court
must hold a hearing if the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary
hearing on his claim at some point in the state proceedings prior to his federal
petition."5 Specifically, the Court said:
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas
applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is
not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure em-

ployed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4)
there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material
facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the 7state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a
53
full and fair fact hearing.

The student or practitioner seeking an evidentiary hearing for his inmateclient must, then, bring his case within the Townsend criteria. The petition
should plead and, to the extent possible, substantiate that any state court hearing on the prisoner's claim failed one or more of the six prongs of the
Townsend test.58
a. Merits Not Resolved in the State Court Hearing
The first instance described in Townsend in which a federal habeas court
must hold its own evidentiary hearing was when the state court did not
decide the factual issues presented. If a hearing was held and the state court
made express findings of fact, a new hearing is not required under this
heading. One who hears the evidence is in the best position to determine the
facts from conflicting evidence. The state court may choose to believe or dis372 U.S. at 309.
"344 U.S. 443 (1953).
See text accompanyng notes 31-34, supra.
372 U.S. at 313.
tId. at 312. Gibson v. Blair, 467 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1972); see Ingram v. McCarthy, 470
F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1972); Thomas v. Wingo, 469 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Swenson, 469
F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1972).
531372 U.S. at 313. To the extent that the new test is inconsistent with Brown, the Court stated
that the new criteria should be taken as superseding the old guidelines. Id. at 312.
'In many if not most cases, a hearing will have been conducted in state court in the course of
the petitioner's exhaustion of state remedies. The Townsend Court noted, however, that the states are
not required to hold hearings in order to avoid federal hearings later on habeas corpus. 372 U.S. at
313 n.9.
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believe pertinent testimony, and its superior ability to judge the credibility
of witnesses will be respected. " '
On the other hand, state courts are not constitutionally required to set
down findings of fact54° and, in the event express findings do not appear in
the record, the federal habeas court must decide whether the facts were impliedly found. Judge Skelly Wright, in dealing with this Townsend problem,
has suggested a helpful analysis of the steps through which the federal court
must go.54' First, the court must determine whether the state court dealt
with the petitioner's claim or instead dismissed the action on some procedural
ground. Townsend suggested that if relief was denied without opinion in a
state collateral proceeding, it is likely that the basis of the denial was procedural and that the judgment was therefore not on the merits. In such a
case the federal court may not rely on implied state court findings but must
conduct its own hearing. 42 In contrast, if the claim was denied in the course
of the criminal prosecution, as in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence,
the court probably passed on the substance of the claim. Accordingly, if the
proper legal standard was applied in the state court, the federal court may
infer from the state court's judgment that facts were found showing the
petitioner not entitled to relief.54 '
Again assuming that the state court made no express findings, if the
federal court determines that the state court passed on the merits of the
claim, a second inquiry must be made. It must be decided whether, in the
particular case, the facts can be reconstructed from the state court's vague or
ambiguous opinion.544 The principal method of fact-reconstruction mentioned in Townsend was the process of drawing inferences from the state
court's application of legal standards. 45 Judge Wright in considering this
issue has suggested that there are three possibilities: (1) It may appear that
an erroneous constitutional standard was applied in state court; (2) The
correct standard may have been applied; and (3) It may be unclear what
standard was applied in state court. 4
If the state court applied an incorrect standard, the factual findings cannot
29.06 (1959).
' Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 n.9 (1963).
r'Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 935-46.
'5 See K. Dvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT S

...
372 U.S. at 314.

5 Id. Judge Wright suggests an "in-between
situation." If the claim was presented in a motion
for new trial and there has been no substantial lapse of time since the conviction judgment was entered
it is suggested that the federal court may assume that the state court dealt with the claim on the
merits. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 937. If the state court purports in its opinion to pass on
a possible claim that was not actually presented to it by the petitioner, a substantial question arises as to
whether the claim received the full consideration necessary to a decision on the merits. On the other
hand, even if the state court's comment cannot be taken as on the merits under Townsend, the summary
rejection of the claim should suffice for exhaustion purposes. Lacklineo v. Tahash, 331 F.2d 58 (8th
Cir. 1965).
Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 937.
r The Townsend Court also stated that the district court may reconstruct the findings of the state
trier of fact because the view taken is plain from "other indicia." 372 U.S. at 314. What the Court
meant by "other indicia" has never been made clear and, consequently, the legal standards test discussed
in the text is the only method of fact-reconstruction dealt with in the cases.
Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 938.
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legitimately be reconstructed without a de novo hearing.547 Clearly the facts
that are found in a given case may be influenced by what ultimate facts are
in issue, so that the application of an erroneous standard of law will almost
certainly affect the factual inquiry detrimentally. In such a case Townsend
made it clear that the federal court cannot assume that the state court found
facts showing the prisoner not entitled to relief. The district court's inability
to assume that particular facts were found does not, however, necessarily
lead to the conclusion that a federal hearing must be held. In Rogers v. Richmond,54 the Court held that a state court's application of an erroneous constitutional standard requires a new trial in state court. In such a case, the
Court said that a hearing de novo in a federal habeas court would not adequately protect the rights of the prisoner or take into account the "large
leeway which must be left to the States in their administration of their own
criminal justice."54 It was said that the prisoner has a right to have the
issue of his guilt tried fairly in a state court with the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment rather than in a federal collateral
hearing where the court examines only the constitutional issue in abstraction.
Accordingly, under the Rogers rationale, if the state court clearly applied an
incorrect rule of federal law the federal habeas court must grant relief outright
and release the prisoner subject to retrial under the proper standard in
550

state court.

If, on the other hand, the state court expressly applied the correct constitutional standard in considering the petitioner's claim, the federal habeas court
is entitled to assume that facts showing that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief were found. 51 A correct statement of the law, coupled with a hearing
on the claim, permits the inference that the state court afforded the petitioner
the full and fair hearing to which he is entitled at some point. 52
57 372 U.S. at 314-15.
s365 U.S. 534 (1961).
w d. at 547.
'United States ex tel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973). On the other hand, a
federal district court has no general power to direct a state court to hold an evidentiary hearing on a
federal claim. Anderson v. Beto, 469 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1972). When a state court hearing is
desirable, the proper procedure is to retain the case on the federal docket for a period of time within
which the state court may act. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Cavell, 468 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1972).
For a more thorough examination of these issues, see Developments, supra note 2, at 1145-48.
' 372 U.S. at 315.
'Even in a case where the proper standard was applied, reconstruction of factual findings involves
some degree of speculation. Accordingly, the Townsend Court noted:
In any event, even if it is clear that the state trier of fact utilized the proper standard, a
hearing is sometimes required if his decision presents a situation in which the "so-called facts
and their constitutional significance [are] . . . so blended that they cannot be severed in consideration." Rogers v. Richmond, supra, at 546. See Frank v. Mangum, supra, at 347 (Holmes,

J., dissenting). Unless the district judge can be reasonably certain that the state trier would have
granted relief if he had believed petitioner's allegations, he cannot be sure that the state trier in
denying relief disbelieved these allegations. If any combination of the facts alleged would prove
a violation of constitutional rights and the issue of law on those facts presents a difficult or novel
problem for decision, any hypothesis as to the relevant factual determinations of the state trier
involves the purest speculation. The federal court cannot exclude the possibility that the trial
judge believed facts which showed a deprivation of constitutional rights and yet (erroneously)
concluded that relief should be denied. Under these circumstances it is impossible for the federal
court to reconstruct the facts, and a hearing must be held.
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Judge Wright's third situation is the case where the state court did not

articulate the constitutional standard applied to the petitioner's claim. On
first blush, this would appear to be the strongest case for requiring a federal
evidentiary hearing. If the state court expressed neither its factual findings
nor the legal standard it applied to those findings, an attempt by the federal
habeas court to reconstruct the facts would be speculative. Nevertheless, in
view of "the coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges in the administration of federal constitutional law," the Townsend Court held that
"in the ordinary case in which there has been no articulation" the district
court may assume that the state court applied the correct standard.55 This
was qualified only by the Court's concession that the assumption may not
be made if there is evidence that creates doubt as to whether the proper
standard was applied.554 Judge Wright has suggested that such doubt exists
when the constitutional standard is not well settled but novel and extremely
difficult or when there are indications in a particular case that the correct
standard was not applied. 5
The upshot is that the student or practitioner seeking a federal evidentiary
hearing on the ground that the facts were not resolved in the state courts
should, if possible, first allege that the state courts did not reach the merits
of the dispute but instead denied relief on a procedural ground. Then, in
the alternative, he should argue that even if the merits were reached in state
court a de novo federal hearing is mandated because the state findings are
not clear from the record and cannot be reconstructed.
b. State Court Determination Not Supported by the Record as a Whole
Even if the federal habeas court is able to identify express or implied
state factual findings, a federal hearing is mandatory under the second
Townsend criterion if the state determination is not fairly supported by the
record. Townsend did not clearly articulate the standard of review to be
applied to state findings. Apparently the federal district court should scrutinize
the state record at least to the extent that the Supreme Court will reexamine
mixed questions of law and fact on direct appeal.55 Consequently, the proper
standard must be the "substantial evidence" test borrowed from administrative
372 U.S. at 315-16. Thus the Court recognized that a federal hearing may be required if the issue is
a mixed question of law and fact and presents a novel legal problem. Cf. LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 93
S. Ct. 1203, 1206 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), discussed in Part VII-C infra.
78372 U.S. at 314-15; see Dempsey v. Wainwright, 471 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1973). As an example,
the Townsend Court said that, if third-degree methods of obtaining a confession are alleged and the
state court admitted the evidence, the federal habeas court may assume that the state court found the
facts to be otherwise. The example is, of course, an easy case. In a more difficult situation, however,
where the constitutional standard is not so well settled, the assumption that the state court applied the
proper standard may be questioned. See Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 940.
372 U.S. at 315 n.10.
For a fuller discussion, see Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 940-46.
See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208-09 (1960); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50
(1949); United States ex rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 738 (3d Cir. 1973).
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law557 or the "clearly erroneous" test applicable to appellate review of trial
court factual determinations.5 58
Since the difference between the two tests is elusive at best, 59 the precise
verbal formulation used by the federal habeas court to describe the scope of its
review of state factual determinations may be inconsequential. As a practical
matter, the significant point is that the federal court must look behind the
state findings and come to its own conclusion as to whether there is fair
support for those findings. Generally, however, the lower courts have adopted
the "clearly erroneous" test as proper."' This position seems appropriate
inasmuch as the circuit court in reviewing the district court's findings will
apply that standard. 6 ' If the state findings will not survive appeal to the
circuit court, quite clearly they should not be relied upon in the first instance
by the district court. That is, if the circuit court will reverse the district
court's findings if they are clearly erroneous, it makes little sense to allow
the district court to apply a less stringent standard to state findings, to adopt
those findings, and then to be reversed at the circuit level.56 2
Notwithstanding the clear Townsend language requiring the federal habeas
court to evaluate the state courts' findings of fact, it is advisable to avoid
undue reliance on this second criterion. The federal courts are loath to
engage in an extensive reexamination of facts that appear to have been fairly
determined. Judicial review of factual findings always involves some degree
of speculation. Consequently, and perhaps properly, courts tend to avoid
the problem by finding fair support in the state court record."' Any other
rule might lead to the retrial of every criminal case in federal court, leaving
state court judgments with little significance. With that possibility in mind,
the federal courts will be slow to accept the argument that the record does
not support the state court determination. The student or practitioner should,
accordingly, propose additional or alternative grounds for granting a de novo
federal hearing.
'See

Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64

HARV.

L.

REV.

1233

(1951).
'FEn.
R. Civ. P. 52(a). The "clearly erroneous" test has been defined as follows: "A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
'.See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 615 (1965); McCutcheon v. Beto,
300 F. Sipp. 142, 145 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (relying on both tests).
'Ci. United States ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1973); see Wright &
Sofaer, supra note 530, at 946-53; Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Treatment of State Fact-Finding: A
Suggested Approach, 76 H~atv. L. REV. 1253, 1262 (1963).
MOaks v. Howard, 473 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1973); Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1972);
see United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelker, 466 F.2d 1092, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the "clearly
erroneous" test to the district court's issuance of the writ); but see United States ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1973) ("clearly erroneous" test inapplicable if the credibility of witnesses is not in issue).
' Cf. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 471 F.2d 264, 267 (3d Cir. 1973).
'E.g., Jones v. Swenson, 469 F.2d 535, 537 (8th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Burke v. Illinois,
465 F.2d 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1972); see Hasty v. Crouse, 308 F. Supp. 590 (D. Kan. 1968), afl'd, 420
F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1970).
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c. Inadequate State Court Fact-Finding Procedure
The third Townsend criterion for determining when a federal evidentiary
hearing is mandatory involves the notion that the procedure employed by
the state court must have been adequate to afford the petitioner a full and
fair hearing on his claim. If the state procedure was inadequate, a de novo
hearing in federal court is required. There are essentially two situations in
which the state procedure may be questioned. First, the procedure followed
64
in state court may have been so defective as to be unconstitutional in itself.
Second, the defect in the state procedure may have been less grave but still
serious enough "to deprive the state evidentiary hearing of its adequacy as56a5
means of finally determining facts upon which constitutional rights depend."
The only example given by the Townsend Court was improper allocation
of the burden of proof in the state court."' Thus, if the state court improperly
placed on the defendant the burden of proving that evidence had been seized
illegally, a federal hearing is required. 67 Of course, in the new hearing the
burden of showing that the evidence was lawfully obtained will be on the
state. 68 Similarly, if the state court applied a standard of proof different from
that applicable in federal habeas, a de novo federal hearing is necessary. That
situation may arise when a state demands that petitioners in its postconviction
hearings prove they are entitled to relief by "clear and convincing evidence,"
while the standard in federal habeas is proof by a "preponderance of the
evidence." ' In such a case, it can be argued that a federal hearing is
mandatory. 7 ° A third example is the case in which, because of a peculiar
state procedural rule or a misapprehension of the proper standard, the state
court declined to consider the petitioner's testimony 57 ' or other evidence.572
In all probability the cases in which state procedure is found inadequate
will be few and will probably not involve a systematic practice of the state
court system but a failure in a particular case to afford the petitioner a full
and fair hearing. Therefore, once again it is appropriate to caution that heavy
reliance on this or any other single criterion from Townsend is unwise from
a tactical standpoint. Quite obviously the six criteria overlap and lend themselves easily to an argument that a given case presents elements of each
'E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
' Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963).
'm Id.
'Id. at 314-16; accord, Hamilton v. Smith, 450 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); Goodwin v. Smith,
439 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1971); Arrington v. Maxwell, 409 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.

944 (1969).
Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965).
'Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelker, 466 F.2d
1092 (2d Cir. 1972).
Wright & Sofaer, supra note 530, at 955.
' Dixon v. Caldwell, 471 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1972) (state court refused to consider the petitioner's
uncorroborated testimony).
' Gibson v. Blair, 467 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1972) (state court refused to permit evidence showing
the fact of discrimination in the selection of juries in the mistaken belief that only proof of intentional
discrimination would support the constitutional claim).
"'
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criterion, and that, at least in cumulative effect, the facts alleged mandate
a federal evidentiary hearing.
d. Newly Discovered Evidence
The Court stated in Townsend that a federal hearing is mandatory if the
petitioner makes substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence that
could not reasonably have been introduced in state court. The evidence must
be plausible and must bear on the constitutional question in issue rather than
the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.573 Thus a state prisoner who obtains
new evidence that was not and could not have been presented at trial, and
who is barred from moving the state court for a new trial because the statutory
time limit has expired, is entitled to offer the new evidence in a federal forum.
There are few cases dealing solely with the question of newly discovered
evidence, though a number of opinions treat the argument in connection
with other Townsend criteria for a mandatory hearing. 74 It seems fair to
say, however, that federal habeas courts will apply the test for granting a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence relevant to the defendant's
guilt or innocence.575 The general rule in that context is that the evidence
must have been discovered following the trial and, with due diligence, could
not have been discovered earlier. The evidence must not be merely cumulative
or impeaching and, finally, it must be material in that, if it were available in
a new trial, the defendant would probably be acquitted. 7 8 Application of
such a rule to federal habeas corpus would severely limit the petitioner's
entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on the ground of newly discovered
evidence going to the constitutional claim. On the other hand, since a habeas
corpus hearing is unnecessary if the petition does not allege facts that, if true,
would entitle the prisoner to relief, a requirement that newly discovered evidence be material and not cumulative may be justifiable.
e. Material Facts Not Adequately Developed
The final specific criterion set out in Townsend was that a federal hearing
is required when the material facts were not adequately developed at the state
court hearing. While the newly discovered evidence criterion goes only to
evidence obtained since the state court hearing, the inadequate development
criterion takes in facts which were known to the petitioner or his attorney
during the state court hearing but which were, for some reason, not presented
fully at that time. The relevant facts may have been withheld from con,' The guilt or innocence of the petitioner is, of course, irrelevant in habeas corpus. Accordingly,
newly discovered evidence that goes to that issue will not entitle the petitioner to a federal hearing.
Shaver v. Ellis, 255 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1958) (the confession of another to the crime of which the
petitioner had been convicted was not a ground for relief in habeas).
'E.g., Fast v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1971) (considered in connection with the
allegation of inadequate fact development).
'Cl.
Everitt v. United States, 353 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1965) (a § 2255 case); Developments, supra
note, 2, at 1128.
"e°Hudson v. United States, 387 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir. 1967). The newly discovered evidence
issue must be considered in light of FED. R. Cirv. P. 60(b) and FaD. R. CRIM. P. 33.
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sideration altogether or presented without full and fair development. In such
a case, the Townsend Court held that a de novo reexamination of the facts
as they relate to the petitioner's constitutional claim is mandated to assure
that the federal rights involved are adequately protected."'
After stating this general proposition, the Court established two limitations. First, the facts alleged to have been inadequately developed in state
court must be "crucial" to the petitioner's federal constitutional claim." 8
While the Court did not articulate the standard for deciding when the petitioner's allegations are "crucial," the test for harmless constitutional error seems
to be applicable. Thus a petitioner is not entitled to a federal hearing under
the inadequate development criterion if the facts alleged, even if true, would
not affect the determination of his federal claim beyond a reasonable doubt." 9
Of course, the harmless constitutional error rule applies when it is alleged
that the error affected the ultimate determination as to guilt or innocence.
In the Townsend context, on the other hand, the question is whether the fact,
if proved, would affect the determination of the petitioner's federal claim,
his guilt or innocence aside. And, while a finding of nonharmless constitutional error will entitle the defendant to a new trial, a finding that a "crucial"
fact was inadequately developed in state court will require only a federal
evidentiary hearing.
This is consistent with the Townsend Court's application of the inadequate
development criterion to the facts in that case. The fact that the defendant
had been under the influence of a drug having the properties of a "truth
serum" at the time of his confession had not been made known to the state
court. Disclosure of that fact was, in the Court's opinion, "crucial"5 ' and
"indispensable to a fair, rounded, development of the material facts." ' ' The
quoted language is so similar to that used in other contexts to describe the
test for harmless constitutional error that it may reasonably be concluded that
the two standards coincide. 5"
The second limitation placed on this criterion by the Townsend Court
was that, if the facts were not adequately developed due to "inexcusable
neglect" on the part of the petitioner or the "deliberate by-passing" of state
procedures, a federal hearing need not be held. 3 The Court borrowed the
test from Fay v. Noia,"4 the landmark case which decided when a federal
court may refuse to consider a habeas corpus petition on the basis of a pro' For a recent example of the application of the inadequate development criterion, see Boyd v.

Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972).
578372

U.S. at 317.
' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250

(1969).

5'372 U.S. at 321.
' Id. at 322.
'E.g.,
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)
"overwhelming evidence").
"372 U.S. at 317.
'372 U.S. 391 (1963).

(error harmless in the face of other
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cedural default in state court.585 However, in the Townsend context, a petitioner's deliberate by-passing of state process goes only to the question whether
he is entitled as a matter of right to a de novo federal evidentiary hearing.
Inasmuch as Townsend and Noia were decided on the same day, it is perhaps
not surprising that the Court sought to square the two cases as to the issue
of a petitioner's duty to comply with legitimate state procedures. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the language in Townsend referring to a petitioner's
right to a hearing is superfluous in light of Noia. The latter case made it
clear that a prisoner who deliberately by-passed the remedies available to him
in state court is not entitled to habeas relief, unless the federal court in its
discretion chooses to overlook the default. A fortiori such a petitioner is not
entitled as a matter of right to an evidentiary hearing, except when a hearing
is necessary to determine whether a deliberate by-pass actually occurred. 8
The student or practitioner preparing a habeas corpus petition that seeks
a federal evidentiary hearing on the inadequate development ground should
specifically allege both that the facts relied upon are "crucial" to the determination of the claim and that the petitioner did not deliberately by-pass an
opportunity to develop the facts in state court. Alternatively, the deliberate
by-pass issue might be omitted from the petition on the theory that, if the
respondent raises it in the return, the petitioner's case can be made in the
traverse. In that way the argument is not raised in the respondent's mind at
the outset. Nevertheless, experience has shown that collateral petitions are
usually dealt with summarily by the courts, and the student is well advised
to make his initial pleading complete so as to ward off dismissal before the
respondent comes into the case. It will be seen below that many courts require
a petitioner to allege specifically why his state court hearing was inadequate." 7
That requirement usually relates to the weight the state court record is to be
given by the federal habeas court,58 ' but the same pleading rule may be applied to the Townsend question whether a hearing is mandatory." 9
Finally, the Court in Townsend included a sixth category, requiring a federal hearing if "for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing." ' The Court recognized
that all the situations in which a hearing would be mandatory could not be
foreseen, saying:
Our final category is intentionally open-ended because we cannot here anticipate
all the situations wherein a hearing is demanded. It is the province of the district
judges first to determine such necessities in accordance with the general rules.
See discussion of Noia and the deliberate by-pass rule in Part V-B-2 supra.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). See Part V-B-2 supra.
See cases cited in and text accompanying note 606 infra.
'z See note 529 supra for a comment on the relationship of the Townsend criteria and S 2254, the
section of the Habeas Corpus Act setting forth the burden and standard of proof in federal evidentiary
hearings.
'
Cf. Braxton v. Wainwright, 473 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1973).
"'372 U.S. at 313.
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The duty to try the facts anew exists in every case in which the state court has
not after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.5"8

Thus the Court hinted that its criteria are to be construed liberally toward
the end of deciding whether the general test, a full and fair hearing, is met.
2. Discretionary Hearings

As a postscript to its major holdings in Townsend, the Supreme Court
reminded the federal district courts that, even if none of the six guidelines
makes a federal evidentiary hearing mandatory, they have power in their
discretion to grant a hearing."9 2 The Court expressed confidence that the
district judges would not abuse their discretion to "subvert the integrity of
state criminal justice or to waste the time of the federal courts in the trial
of frivolous claims."5 ' The Court thus recognized that, while undue activism
on the part of the federal courts in reexamining state judgments would
effectively uproot state criminal trials and place them in the federal court
house, such a radical change in general practice is unlikely. Indeed, the
federal courts are hesitant to relitigate constitutional claims. In holding that
discretionary hearings may be appropriate in some cases, the Court apparently
hoped to encourage the lower courts to use their plenary power on habeas
corpus in such a way that all petitioners are afforded fair treatment.
The meaning the district court's discretionary power has for the student
or practitioner preparing a habeas corpus petition is apparent. As stated
earlier, he should first argue that an evidentiary hearing is required under
one or more of the Townsend criteria. He should then contend that, even
if a hearing is not mandatory, enough doubt has been raised as to the adequacy
of the state court judgment that the federal court should grant a hearing in
the exercise of its plenary discretionary power. 94
B.

CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL CONVICTIONS

While the preceding section dealt with the right of a prisoner seeking
federal habeas relief from a state criminal conviction to demand a federal
evidentiary hearing on his claim, the present section is concerned with the
similar right of a prisoner challenging a federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (1970). In Kaufman v. United States,"'8 the Supreme Court expressly

adopted all but one of the Townsend criteria, developed in the context of a
collateral challenge to a state conviction, for application in the section 2255
situation. The Court said that, even though the prisoner seeking to challenge
SId. at 317-18.
m"372 U.S. at 318.
'Id.

t'There may be some overlapping of this argument with the sixth Townsend criterion which makes
a federal hearing mandatory if "for any reason [other than the five specific situations mentioned] it
appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing." 372
U.S. at 313; see text accompanying note 590 supra. There should, however, be no difficulty in making
both arguments.
394 U.S. 217 (1969).
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his federal sentence had an opportunity to assert his claim in a federal forum
during the course of trial or on appeal, he still has the right to a de novo
hearing if he can meet one or more of the tests from Townsend. The provision
of federal collateral remedies was said to be grounded upon the recognition
that a prisoner's constitutional rights cannot be adequately protected without
the continued availability of a mechanism for collateral relief. The Court
drew no distinction between state and federal prisoners on the point and thus

applied Townsend's guidelines to both.
There is only one exception. Under Townsend's third criterion, a federal
district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if the fact-finding procedure
followed in the state court hearing was inadequate. Since a prisoner challenging a federal sentence first raised his claim, if at all, in a federal court, that
particular Townsend guideline is inapplicable. In the Kaufman Court's
language, "federal fact-finding procedures are by hypothesis adequate to assure the integrity of the underlying constitutional rights."59
It follows from Kaufman's adoption of the Townsend habeas corpus standards that a hearing is not required if it appears that the petitioner had a full
and fair hearing on his claim during the course of prior proceedings. Thus,
if the court's preliminary examination reveals that the claim was examined
in a hearing that met the Townsend guidelines, the section 2255 challenge
may be dismissed without a new hearing." 7 Section 2255 itself similarly provides that a hearing is not mandatory if "the motion and the files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. . .. ""'
And, inasmuch as the court that entertains a section 2255 motion is the
same court in which the original trial was had, the records of earlier proceedings are readily available for review.
It seems also to follow from Kaufman's heavy reliance upon Townsend
that a section 2255 court has discretionary power to hold a hearing even when
one is not required. The Court did not take that position expressly, but it is
certainly consistent with the tenor of the Kaufman opinion, which essentially
equates section 2255 with habeas. Indeed, the Court was at pains to make
it clear that federal prisoners stand in the same position regarding access to
collateral relief as do state prisoners.5 99
Finally, the Kaufman Court held that the deliberate by-pass rule from
Fay v. Noia °° is applicable in section 2255 cases.6 ' Consequently, if it ap-

pears that the petitioner had an opportunity to raise his claim during prior
proceedings but failed to do so under circumstances that constitute a deliberate
by-pass, the district court may summarily deny relief without a hearing. This
'md. at 227.
'Id. at 227 n.8.
See note 495 supra.

Ci. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963).
U.S. 391, 438 (1963); see Part V-B-2 supra.
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1969); see Montgomery v. United States,
'Kaufman
469 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1972) (burden of showing no deliberate by-pass on the petitioner); Brown v.
United States, 468 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972) (failure to appeal not a deliberate by-pass).
in
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is consistent with other aspects of the Kaufman opinion and, as in the case
of a state prisoner applying for habeas relief, seems justified as a means of
maintaining an efficient federal system of criminal justice. Once again, however, a hearing may be necessary to determine the fact of by-pass.
The student or practitioner preparing a section 2255 motion should, accordingly, rely upon Kaufman for the proposition that the Townsend guidelines are applicable. Then he should construct arguments that place his case
within as many of the Townsend criteria as possible. He should, if possible,
specifically contend that the petitioner had no opportunity during the criminal
prosecution or on appeal to raise his claim and therefore that no such opportunity was deliberately by-passed.
C.

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

1. Challenges to State Convictions
Once the federal habeas court has determined that a de novo evidentiary
hearing must or should be conducted, the next question is the weight to be
given the state court factual findings as evidence in the federal hearing.
Clearly, if the federal court is compelled to hold its own hearing because the
state court hearing was inadequate, it would be inconsistent to give the state
court determination binding weight in the federal hearing." ' Consequently,
section 2254(d) of the Habeas Corpus Act provides that a state court determination is presumed correct only if it does not appear that the state court
hearing failed one or more of a number of tests, which essentially are the
Townsend criteria for a mandatory federal hearing.6
' See note 529 supra.
'In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1970) provides as follows:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing
on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding
to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties,
evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indica,
shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or
the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of
the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional
right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicint did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court
proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State proceeding in which the determination of
such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal
court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual
determination is nbt fairly supported by the record;
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such
factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances
respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant,
otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to
provisions
.he'
of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceedings, con-
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Section 2254(d) contemplates that the respondent must first present "due

proof" of the state court factual determination by introducing "a written
6 04
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indica ....
Then, unless the respondent concedes the point or the court finds on its own
motion that the state court hearing was inadequate, the petitioner must show
that the state hearing failed one of the listed standards and is therefore not
entitled to be presumed correct." °5 In practice, the courts expect the petitioner
to allege in his application specific circumstances that he contends make the
state court determination unreliable." 6 The standard of proof at this point
is apparently a preponderance of the evidence. That is, if the petitioner can

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the state court hearing was
inadequate under one or more of the section 2254(d) standards, the case is
taken out of the statute altogether. In that event, the state court determination
is not presumed correct, and the federal hearing must be a fresh one. Still, the
petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is entitled to relief, 0 7 but he is no longer faced with a presumption in favor
of the state court findings. Furthermore, once the petitioner establishes a
prima facie case for habeas relief, the respondent has the burden of coming
forward with evidence in rebuttal. 08 If the respondent is unable to rebut
the petitioner's case or establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"°9 appropriate relief must be granted.
It has been suggested that section 2254(d) never comes into play if a
federal hearing is mandatory under Townsend. 1 ' In such a case, the court
has already determined that the state court hearing was inadequate under
one of the Townsend criteria which, again, are essentially repeated in section
2254(d). The apparent requirement in section 2254(d) that the petitioner
show that the state court hearing was inadequate seems superfluous; that has
already been established. The upshot is that a determination that a hearing
is mandatory under Townsend automatically takes the case out of section
sidered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon
the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State
court was erroneous.
The newly discovered evidence criterion from Townsend arguably is incorporated by the overlapping
inadequate development standard. Developments, supra note 2, at 1141. In addition, § 2254 lifts the
presumption of correctness if the state court lacked jurisdiction, if counsel was not provided when
constitutionally required, and if the petitioner was denied due process. These points did not appear in
the Townsend opinion but are clearly consistent with it.
' The quoted language refers to findings of the court that heard the evidence and not to a recitation
of facts in a state appellate court opinion. No presumption of correctness is due the latter under §
2254(d). Hill v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 1346, 1347 (9th Cir. 1972).
"See Jones v. Swenson, 469 F.2d 535, 537-38 (8th Cir. 1972).
'United States ex rel, Henderson v. Brierley, 468 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1972) (petition made
allegations in the language of § 2254(d) without specific facts); see Jones v. Swenson, 469 F.2d 535,
53738 '(8tCir. 1972).
"'SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938); Dodge v. Johnson, 471 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir.
1973); United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelker, 466 F.2d 1092, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972); Goins v. Brierley,
464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972).
'United States ex rel.
Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1973); Garland v. Cox, 472
F.2d 875 (4th Cit. 1973).
'See Yarnal v. Brierley, 468 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1972).
'Developments, supra note 2, at 1144-45.
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2254(d) and leaves the parties in their traditional positions: the petitioner has
the burden of proving a prima facie case and the respondent must then go
forward with rebutting evidence.
On the other hand, when Townsend does not mandate a hearing but the
federal habeas court grants one in its discretion, 1' section 2254(d) may have
a decisive effect. In such a case, there has been no determination that the state
court hearing was inadequate under the Townsend guidelines, and the petitioner may not be able to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
it failed one of the very similar section 2254(d) tests. In that event, section
2254(d) provides that the state court factual determination is presumed to
be correct, unless the petitioner shows by convincing evidence that the state
determination was erroneous. While the difference between "a preponderance
of the evidence" and "convincing evidence" is elusive, it seems clear that the
latter is a more stringent standard. In point of fact, a petitioner faced with it
will often find his task insurmountable. 12
The Supreme Court has dealt with section 2254(d) in only one case. In
LaVallee v. Delle Rose,"i ' a state prisoner had sought federal habeas relief on
the ground that two involuntary confessions had been admitted into evidence
at trial. The state court record showed that the trial court had found, on the
basis of "all evidence, both at the trial and at the [voluntariness] hearing, and
after considering the totality of the circumstances," that the confessions were
voluntary and therefore admissible." 4 The federal district court noted that
the record did not state the extent to which the state court had considered
the prisoner's testimony. That omission was held to bring the case within the
first test of section 2254(d)-the merits of the dispute were not resolved in
the state court hearing. Accordingly, the district court refused to presume
the state record to be correct and to impose upon the petitioner the burden
of proving otherwise by convincing evidence. Instead, the court held its own
hearing, found the confessions involuntary, and ordered the petitioner to be
released subject to a new trial.
The respondent appealed the decision unsuccessfully to the Second Circuit
and then to the Supreme Court. A majority of the Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court with a direction to give the state court
determination a presumption of correctness under section 2254(d) and to
impose upon the petitioner the burden of showing by convincing evidence
that the state determination was erroneous. The majority reasoned that the
case was controlled by the language in Townsend authorizing the federal district court to assume that the state court applied the correct legal standard
See Part VII-A-2 supra.
'Cf. Braxton v. Wainwright, 473 F.2d 1371, 1371-72 (5th Cir. 1973). In point of fact, § 2254(d)
may well be Congress' way of telling the federal district courts to limit the use of their discretion to
relitigate factual issues once considered in state court.
"193 S. Ct. 1203 (1973) (per curiam).
'14 The facts arose prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the "totality of the circumstances" test was, accordingly, applicable.
'
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in the absence of a clearly articulated holding. Thus the district court should
have assumed that Delle Rose's self-serving testimony was rejected; if his
story had been believed, the state court would have applied the proper
standard and concluded that the confessions were inadmissible.
The majority opinion thus illustrated the close relationship between the
Townsend criteria for a mandatory federal hearing and the section 2254(d)
standards for determining when a state court factual determination may not
be presumed correct. Presented with a problem in construing the first section
2254(d) standard, the majority turned directly to the Townsend explication
of an identical test in a different context. A powerful dissent by Mr. Justice
Marshall seemed to agree that Townsend was in point but argued that the
majority misread the language they purported to apply. 15
The dissent made a number of persuasive arguments. First, it pointed

out that "[i]nsofar as the Court relies upon this language from Townsend in
interpreting Sec. 2254(d) (1), the Court effectively ignores the discretionary
character of the decision lodged with the district judge who is faced with a
question as to the adequacy of unexplained state court findings." '1 6 Townsend
held that a district court may assume that a proper standard was employed, 17
but "[t]oday

. .

. the Court effectively indicates that the district court often

must assume in such cases that the proper standard was applied." 1 ' The
dissent thus recognized that a correct standard might have been inferred
from the state court's summary order stating a "totality of the circumstances"
test. But Townsend did not make that inference mandatory and certainly
there is nothing to require the district court to take the further step of presuming on the basis of the state court's application of the correct test that the
facts were found against the prisoner.
Second, Mr. Justice Marshall maintained that, even if the correct constitutional standard had clearly been applied, a plenary federal hearing was appropriate because the issue-the voluntariness of the two confessions-was a
mixed question of law and fact.1 9 In the language of Townsend, the "socalled facts and their constitutional significance [were] . . . so blended that
they [could not] be severed in consideration ..
,"2o The record revealed

allegations of a series of coercive actions by the police, and it was unclear
which allegations the prisoner proved to the state court's satisfaction and which
were rejected. For the dissent, the record presented "substantial uncertainty
"Inasmuch as three other Justices concurred in the dissent, the case might have been set down
for oral argument. However, Mr. Justice Marshall stated at the outset of his opinion that, "in light of
the majority's firmly held views," argument would have been fruitless. Thus the Court was split 5-4
with each side so well-entrenched that neither could be moved, perhaps a rare circumstance when only
a procedural issue is in question. Quite possibly the dissenters considered the case significant because of
the implication that at least five Justices seem willing to restrict the state prisoner's use of federal habeas
corpus to the maximum extent allowable under Townsend.
0193 S. Ct. at 1207 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314-15 (1963); see text accompanying note 553 supra.
" 93 S. Ct. at 1207 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
"Id. at 1207; see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963); accord, United States ex rel.
Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1973) (decided before Delle Rose).
'°372 U.S. at 315; see note 552 supra.
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in a factually complex case.., as to whether the state court correctly applied
the abstract legal standard and did not instead commit constitutional error."62 '
Accordingly, the district court was authorized to determine the issues anew
without giving to the state court determination a presumption of correctness
under section 2254(d).
Finally, the dissent carefully noted what the majority had not held. 2
The issue in Delle Rose was the proper allocation of the burden and standard
of proof in a federal habeas corpus hearing. The majority did not hold that.
the district court had erred in conducting a hearing; it had at least discretionary power to do that. What the majority held was that, once having
decided to grant a federal hearing, the district court failed to give the prior
state court determination the presumption of correctness made applicable
by section 2254(d). Additionally and also pursuant to section 2254(d), the
district court should have required the prisoner to overcome the presumption
with convincing evidence.
This final comment by the dissent seems clearly correct; the majority
made no attempt to question the federal courts' plenary power to grant habeas
corpus hearings. On the other hand, if the majority's position in Delle Rose
prevails over time notwithstanding its substantial shortcomings, the availability
of habeas corpus may be severely limited. Once again it must be emphasized
that the tests in section 2254(d) correspond to the Townsend criteria. Thus,
when the Court construes one of the section 2254(d) tests, it effectively interprets Townsend. It follows that, if the Court gives to the other section 2254(d)
standards constructions similar to that in Delle Rose, the circumstances in
which a de novo hearing is mandatory will be restricted. Moreover, when
a district court grants a hearing in its discretion, cases like Delle Rose may
impose an insurmountable burden and standard of proof upon the petitioner.""'
2. Challenges to Federal Convictions
Section 2254(d) by its terms applies only
corpus relief from state criminal judgments.
proof in proceedings under section 2255 are
The section 2255 petitioner bears the burden

to petitions for federal habeas
The burden and standard of
governed by traditional rules.
of showing that he is entitled

an 93 S. Ct. at 1208.

6" 93 S. Ct. at 1209 n.2.
"5T
It should be noted that Delle Rose was remanded for proceedings consistent with the Supreme
Court's opinion. The circuit court seemed obligated to remand in turn to the district court for a new
hearing-this time with the burden on the petitioner to show by convincing evidence that the state
factual determination was erroneous. Instead, the circuit court directed the district court to dismiss.
The petitioner immediately sought another writ of certiorari to challenge the circuit court's order, but
review was denied. 14 Crim. L. Rptr. 4074 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 1973). Mr. Justice Marshall, joined
by justices Douglas and Brennan, again dissented. He said that Delle Rose should have been given an
opportunity to sustain his heavy burden of proof in a hearing. By denying the petitioner an opportunity
to meet his burden, the circuit court "in effect turned the presumption of correctness in Sec. 2254(d)
into an irrebutable presumption." Id. Clearly, if approval of the circuit court's action is a proper
inference to draw from the Court's denial of certiorari, then Delle Rose does indeed portend a contraction
of the availability of habeas corpus in the future.
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to relief.. 3 by a preponderance of the evidence." 4 The petitioner challenging
a federal sentence may be confronted with the less stringent rule that the

judgment of a federal trial court carries with it a presumption of regularity
and will not be "lightly set aside by collateral attack." '2 5 However, there is
no clear statutory presumption of correctness arising out of prior proceedings.
Nor is there any provision for an enhanced standard of proof.
D. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
It is appropriate to conclude the present discussion of a collateral petitioner's right to a federal evidentiary hearing with a brief note on the availability of professional representation at the hearing once it is granted. The
question whether there is a constitutional right to counsel in a collateral
proceeding has long been debated. Inasmuch as a criminal prosecution in
the sixth amendment sense ends with sentencing,626 the constitutional basis
for the argument that counsel must be appointed for indigents seeking to
challenge criminal convictions collaterally lies, for state prisoners, in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and, for
federal prisoners, in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 27 To
date no absolute right to counsel has been recognized,62 s but some lower courts
have held that under limited circumstances assignment of counsel may be
necessary to fundamental fairness. Thus the Second Circuit held in United
States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins2 9 that the appointment of counsel may
be required in a factually complex case to assure that the petitioner receives

a fair and meaningful hearing. And, in Roach v. Bennett, 630 the Eighth
Circuit held that in some circumstances the Townsend standards for a "fair"
and "adequate" hearing implicitly require the appointment of counsel.
While the district court may not be constitutionally obligated to assign
counsel to assist an indigent petitioner, it has statutory power to see that proper
representation is afforded. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1915 (1970) provides that in
any civil or criminal case a federal court may authorize indigent parties to proceed in forma pauperis and "may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel ... .31

Curiously, the statute states only that the

v. United States, 468 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1972).
'See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
'Smith v. United States, 339 F.2d 519, 526 (8th Cir. 1964), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 468 (1938).
'Compare Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sixth amendment right to counsel at deferred
sentencing proceeding), with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973) (no absolute right to counsel
at a probation revocation hearing); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
'See generally Jacob & Sharma, supra note 4, at 516-26; Miller, The Right to Counsel in Collateral
Proceedings-HabeasCorpus, 15 How. L.J. 200 (1969); Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal PostConviction Review Proceedings, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 970 (1963); Comment, Right to Counsel in Federal
Collateral Attack Proceedings: Section 2255, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 583 (1963); Comment, Right to Appointed Counsel at Collateral Attack Proceedings, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 432 (1965).
6 Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969); see Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 7 n.2 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (no absolute right to counsel in state collateral proceeding).
6281 F.2d 707, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1960); see United States ex rel. Cole v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 61,
66 (2d Cir, 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 957 (1971).
°392 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1968).
28 U.S.C. S 1915(d) (1970).
'Lee
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court may request counsel's participation; there is no specific provision for
the appointment of counsel in civil proceedings.3 ' The distinction has, however, not been considered significant. Indeed, the Supreme Court commented
in Sanders v. United States,"'3 a section 2255 case, that on remand the district
court "might find it useful to appoint counsel to represent the applicant.6 34
Until recently one major hindrance to the assignment of counsel in collateral proceedings was the federal courts' lack of authority to compensate a
participating lawyer. Congress has now amended the Criminal Justice Act,
however, to provide for payment not to exceed $250."' While that figure
may appear to be quite low, there is provision for waiving the maximum
amount whenever the court certifies that payment in excess of $250 is necessary to provide fair compensation for extended or complex representation.
In order to avoid abuse, an excess payment must be approved by the chief
judge of the supervising circuit court."6 Hopefully, courts will feel free to
grant excess payments in appropriate cases so that attorneys will be encouraged
to devote enough time and effort to habeas corpus and section 2255 cases to
assure that they are handled fully and competently.
In practice, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas 7
and most others"' furnish counsel to indigents as a matter of course whenever an evidentiary hearing is to be conducted.' 9 The reasons are apparent.
Counsel can provide the prisoner with the professional advice necessary for
success in the complexities of postconviction litigation. He can delineate the
issues and, if necessary, amend the petition to incorporate all possible grounds
for relief. At the hearing itself, counsel can present the prisoner's case in the
best possible light, interrogating favorable witnesses so as to elicit desirable
testimony and cross-examining adverse witnesses in order to limit the effect
of damaging evidence. Moreover, the presence of counsel has advantages
for the court and the respondent. Counsel's sound advice may help the
prisoner avoid procedural traps that may complicate and prolong the proceedings. A lawyer can fully investigate the case and bring every possible
claim to the court's attention in a single hearing, thereby conserving resources
and avoiding piecemeal litigation. Significantly, counsel can assure that the
hearing is conducted in a professional manner so that his client has his day
in court under circumstances conducive to careful consideration of specific
issues.
'Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970) a district court is authorized to appoint counsel to represent
an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution. Counsel in collateral proceedings may be furnished
under § 3006A(a), but still there is no clear authorization for the appointment of an attorney to assist a
habeas corpus or § 2255 petitioner.
m 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
..Id. at 21 (emphasis supplied); accord, Schoultz v. Hocker, 469 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1972); Fryer
v. MacDougall, 462 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1972).
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2), (g) (1970).
e 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (1970).
057
Ratley v.Crouse, 365 F.2d 320, 321 n.3 (10th Cir. 1966).
'See PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 8,NOTE.
"* The proposed rules require the appointment of counsel if a hearing is granted. PROPOSED RULES
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 8; PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 8.

GOVERNING
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As a practical matter, at least when the prisoner's claim rests on the development of supporting facts in a federal hearing, success depends upon the
district court's decision to furnish the petitioner with professional representation. Consequently, the student should always attach a request for the appointment of counsel to any pleading filed in federal court. This manual
has emphasized that the thrust of the Kansas Defender Project is toward
stating the prisoner's legitimate claim in such a way that the court can consider it fairly and can hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the relevant
facts. Hopefully, once the court determines that it must or should hear the
case, counsel will be appointed to make that hearing meaningful. Of course,
after counsel is appointed the student's task is at an end. Success in the
Defender Project is obtaining for the inmate-client a hearing on his claim
and assigned counsel to present it.
VIII. SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS

Because most prison inmates lack legal counsel and have little hope of
obtaining professional assistance, a large number of petitions for collateral
relief are filed by inmates themselves. These pro se pleadings are usually
poorly drawn, substituting for specific factual allegations an endless legal
argument buttressed by citation to an equally endless string of irrelevant
cases.'
Consequently, they often receive short shrift in the courts. The result is that the Defender Project student or practitioner may come into a case
after his inmate-client has unsuccessfully sought relief on his own. This part
will examine the relevant provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act and the
decided cases in point in an effort to determine the extent to which prior
unsuccessful collateral petitions may affect subsequent proceedings.
A. SANDERS V. UNITED STATES-THE GUIDELINES
The guidelines governing the effect to be given prior unsuccessful applications for collateral relief were set down by the Supreme Court in Sanders v.
United States," 1 the landmark case that combined with Fay v. Noi6 42 and
Townsend v. Sain 48 to form the famous trilogy of postconviction procedure
cases decided in 1963. The Sanders Court held that controlling weight may be
given to the denial of a prior collateral petition only if "(1) the same ground
presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the
applicant, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends
of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent ap'
plication." 644
"40
For an in-depth examination of the problems confronting both the pro se litigant and the court
charged with interpreting his pleadings, see Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456.
041373 U.S. 1 (1963).
'"372 U.S. 391 (1963); see Part V-B-2 supra.
"'372 U.S. 293 (1963); see Part VII supra.
'373
U.S. at 15. The proposed rules would not change the Sanders guidelines. See PROPOSED
RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 9; PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 9.
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In the course of the Sanders opinion the Court made two preliminary
observations that help to clarify the standards it established. First, the Court
reaffirmed the traditional view that res judicata is inapplicable to habeas corpus
proceedings. 45 Moreover, since a motion to vacate sentence in behalf of a
federal prisoner is a remedy commensurate with habeas corpus, res judicata
is also inapplicable in section 2255 cases. 46 This is not to say that prior proceedings can have no effect on subsequent applications for relief. The Sanders
Court pointed out that a prior refusal to grant relief on a similar ground may
have a "rational bearing" on the propriety of granting relief on a subsequent
application. 47 Significantly, however, the prior unfavorable judgment is not
conclusive against the prisoner. Even if the earlier ruling was squarely on
the merits, a federal district court may disregard all that has gone before,
reexamine the evidence and, if appropriate, grant relief.
Second, the guidelines established in Sanders apply to both habeas corpus
and section 2255 cases. Sanders itself was a section 2255 case, but in formulating the general standards by which future cases would be judged the Court
saw "no need to differentiate" between the federal motion to vacate sentence
under section 2255 and habeas corpus.64
B.

ELABORATION ON THE

GUDELINES

Turning to the first specific guideline it had adopted, the Sanders Court
defined a "ground" as "simply a sufficient legal basis for granting the relief
sought by the applicant."64 A single ground may be supported by different
factual allegations. Thus the argument that a confession admitted into
evidence at trial had been coerced is the same ground whether it is based on
an allegation of psychological or physical coercion. Similarly, a single ground
for relief may be supported by different legal theories. The cases cited by
the Court as authority for this proposition are not directly in point,"' but it
seems clear that good examples do exist. One possibility is the case where
the petitioner complains of an ex parte communication with a juror. He
might argue alternatively that he was denied the right to be tried by an impartial and indifferent jury65 ' and that he was denied the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the unsworn, out-of-court speaker. 52 Finally,
the Sanders Court made it clear that "[s]hould doubts arise in a particular
s373 U.S. at 7; see Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122 (1968).
all 373 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 9, quoting Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62, 66 (C.C.S.D.
S373 U.S. at 15.
id. at 16.
'sSee Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 481 (1946); Dewey
The Sanders Court also commented that identical grounds
vary in immaterial respects. These possibilities seem to blur
ments may support the same ground for relief.
i E.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
'aE.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).

Cal 1889).

v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 198 (1899).
may be couched in different language or
with the notion that different legal argu-
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case as to whether two grounds are different or the same, they should be
'
resolved in favor of the applicant."653
The Court recognized two instances in which the prior denial may be
considered to have been on the merits within the meaning of the second
guideline. If the court in the earlier proceeding denied relief after finding
that the files and records conclusively show that the prisoner is not entitled
to relief, or if relief was denied after an evidentiary hearing, the prior judgment was on the merits and a new application presenting the same ground

need not be entertained.654
Next the Court gave a qualified indication of what it meant to accomplish
by including the third guideline, permitting district courts discretion to reexamine any issue if the ends of justice would be served by doing so. With
the caveat that no attempt would be made to exhaust the possibilities, the
Court mentioned two situations in which a successive application must be
entertained, implying that a district court's failure to consider such a case
would constitute an abuse of discretion. The first is when facts are in issue
and the petitioner shows that the fact-finding hearing on the prior application

was inadequate under the standards established in Townsend v. Sain.655 Thus
a prior determination of a collateral claim after a hearing will not bar a second
or successive action if the earlier hearing was not a full and fair evidentiary
hearing. 56 Second, if only legal questions are involved, a new petition must
be entertained if the prisoner sustains the burden of showing "an intervening

change in the law or some other justification for having failed to raise a
'
crucial point or argument in the prior application."657
C.

ABUSE OF REMEDY

The Sanders Court concluded its discussion of successive collateral petitions with a note on the applicability of the defense of abuse of remedy.
Since collateral relief has traditionally been considered equitable in nature,
the Court deemed it appropriate to permit the respondent to plead and prove
that a successive application should be dismissed because the petitioner has
abused the equitable remedy made available to him. In all cases the burden
is on the respondent to show that the prisoner's conduct has been such that
he should be denied the relief he seeks.65 8
Consistent with its announced purpose to establish a complete framework

for handling successive petitions, the Court expressly adopted the principles
' 373 U.S. at 16. The Fifth Circuit apparently took the hint in Harris v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d
190 (5th Cir. 1972) (prisoner permitted to assert identical grounds a second time because the first
proceeding had involved an attack on a related but separate conviction).
373 U.S. at 16; see Zavala v. Craven, 433 F.2d 335, 337 (9th Cir. 1970).
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
See Part VII supra.
''373 U.S. at 17; see Pritchard v. Henderson, 440 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971) (no intervening change
in the law having been shown, the subsequent petition was properly dismissed); Schlomann v. Moseley,
340 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Kan. 1970), afi'd, 457 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1972).
65373 U.S. at 17; cf. Latham v. Crouse, 347 F.2d 359, 360 (10th Cir. 1965).
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developed in Fay v. Noia6 59 and Townsend v. Sain. ° for application to the
present problem. In essence the Court stated that a petitioner may not be

held to have abused a collateral remedy unless the respondent shows that he
deliberately by-passed an opportunity in a prior proceeding to raise and have
adjudicated the claim he now wishes to present."6 ' If a deliberate by-pass is
not shown, a claim not raised and considered on the merits in a prior proceeding cannot be disregarded, "[n]o matter how many prior applications
for federal collateral relief a prisoner has made ... .""' The Court recognized

that strict application of the deliberate by-pass rule may preclude consideration of otherwise meritorious claims but felt that the federal courts need some
mechanism for protecting themselves from "needless piecemeal litigation . . .
'
In any
or ... proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay."663
reach
to
and
event, a federal court clearly has power to lay aside all guidelines

the merits of a collateral petition if, in its discretion, the court deems it appropriate. 6 4 In point of fact, if the court determines that the ends of justice
would be served, there is an affirmative duty to deal with the merits.6
D.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

After Sanders was decided, Congress amended the Habeas Corpus Act
to take account of the standards established by the Supreme Court. The
present section 2244(b) essentially codifies, as to state prisoners seeking federal
habeas corpus relief, the guidelines set out in Sanders.66 The provision in
section 2255 regarding successive motions to vacate sentence in behalf of
federal prisoners remains as it was in 1963 when Sanders was decided."
Accordingly, while there may be minor discrepancies between the statutory
language and the Sanders guidelines, the handling of successive collateral
petitions is governed by the principles established in Sanders.
At the same time that it amended section 2244(b) to affirm Sanders,
Congress added section 2244(c) to control a situation not dealt with by the
'0372 U.S. 391 (1963); see Part V-B-2 supra.
in 3 7 2 U.S. 293 (1963); see Part VII supra.
See Part V-B-2 supra.
373 U.S. at 17.
Id.at 18.
1d. at 18-19.
follows from the Sanders holding that only if justice would not be served may the district
'This
court give controlling weight to the result in prior proceedings.
'Specifically, § 2244(b) provides:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing
on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has
been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release
from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and
is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application
for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the
earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
Section 2244(a) governs successive habeas corpus applications in behalf of federal prisoners seeking to
challenge the conditions of their confinement.
2255 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "The sentencing court shall not be required
'Section
to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
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Sanders Court. Section 2244(c) now provides that in a habeas corpus action
in behalf of a state prisoner, a prior judgment by the Supreme Court of the
United States is conclusive as to all issues of fact or law which were actually
adjudicated by the Court. Consequently, unless the prisoner pleads and proves
that a "material and controlling fact" did not appear in the record in the
Supreme Court and that he could not have caused the fact to appear "by the
exercise of reasonable diligence," a habeas corpus petition based on an adjudicated claim is barred. 08
The Supreme Court has dealt with section 2244(c) in only one case. In
Neil v. Biggers.. the Court held that the affirmance of a state criminal conviction by an equally-divided Court is not an actual adjudication of the merits
so as to bar a subsequent habeas corpus application. The Court reasoned that
section 2244(c) was designed to cover the case where the Supreme Court has,
in the course of direct appeal or review on certiorari, afforded the prisoner
the same kind of federal redetermination of constitutional claims to which
he would otherwise be entitled in a federal habeas court. If the Supreme
Court has once fully and fairly determined the issues, a subsequent collateral
petition in a district court would serve no purpose. On the other hand, if
the Supreme Court judgment was not the product of actual adjudication but
instead a procedural denial, the prisoner is still entitled to habeas corpus consideration. Since a Supreme Court judgment resting on an equal division
of the Justices lets the lower court judgment stand because the Supreme
Court cannot agree and therefore cannot enter an order, such a judgment
is not based upon an actual adjudication and cannot under section 2244(c)
bar a subsequent habeas petition.67°
The lower federal courts have reached consistent results in similar cases.
There is general agreement that a denial of certiorari is not an actual adjudication on the merits within the meaning of section 2244(c)."' On the other
hand, if the merits of the claim were considered in an opinion dismissing a
writ of certiorari, section 2244(c) is applicable and a subsequent habeas application is barred. 72 Similarly, if the Supreme Court dismissed for want of
Specifically, S 2244(c) provides:
In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States on an
appeal or review by a writ of certiorari at the instance of the prisoner of the decision of such
State court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of
a Federal right which constitutes ground for discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually
adjudicated by the Supreme Court therein, unless the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus shall
plead and the court shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which did not appear
in the record of the proceeding in the Supreme Court and the court shall further find that the
applicant for the writ of habeas corpus could not have caused such fact to appear in such record
by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
While S 2244(c) by its terms applies only to challenges to state convictions, the same result may be
reached in a § 2255 case under the Sanders guidelines.
8093 S. Ct. 375 (1972).
OId. at 378-79; 4. United States ex re. Senk v. Brierley, 471 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1973) (dismissal
by circuit court for failure to exhaust state remedies analogized to Biggers and held not to be on the
merits).
'E.g., Miller v. Carter, 434 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
'" CI. Duncan v. Carter, 299 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1962) (decided before S 2244(c) was enacted).
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a substantial federal question, the judgment was on the merits and is conclusive as to the questions of fact or law actually decided. 7 '
E. SUMMARY

The student or practitioner confronted with a prior denial of a pro se
collateral petition must, of course, argue that the Sanders guidelines and the
relevant provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act require the district court to
entertain another application for relief. If circumstances permit, it should
be argued that the claim in the new petition differs from that raised earlier,
that the prior judgment was not on the merits and that, in any event, the ends
of justice would be served by reaching the merits of the second application.
If the claim sought to be presented is distinguishable from that made in
the prior proceeding, the successive petition problem may be negligible. The
new ground must be considered unless the respondent sustains the substantial
burden of showing a deliberate by-pass."' On the other hand, if the student
or practitioner wishes to present the same ground a second time, his task
is more difficult. A prior dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies may
be at once the most common and the easiest case. Quite clearly the earlier
judgment was not on the merits, and a subsequent application must be entertained. 75 If a hearing was held on the prior application, it may be vulnerable
to attack as being inadequate under the Townsend criteria, or the student
may be able to argue that an intervening change in the law requires a reexamination of the case. In a case where the prisoner's prior pro se petition
was dismissed without a hearing, it can at least be contended that the petition
was drafted by a layman and did not present the inmate's valid claim in an
understandable manner. Quite possibly it failed to frame the issues clearly
and stated only general, legal arguments, unsupported by allegations of
specific facts. Accordingly, it can be argued that the denial of that petition
was merely a holding that the pleading was inadequate, rather than a full
and fair determination of the merits.67 Finally, the student or practitioner
' 5 See United States ex rel. Epton v. Nenna, 318 F. Supp. 899, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd, 446
F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971).
o' The Eighth Circuit has explained why the burden of showing a deliberate by-pass is heavy and
why courts are hesitant to dismiss a petition on that ground. In Harris v. Brewer, 434 F.2d 166 (8th
Cir. 1970), Judge Lay wrote:
It seems virtually inconceivable that a prisoner who seeks his liberty will not allege every
known basis which might support his release. This is undoubtedly why so many frivolous
grounds are alleged in post-conviction petitions since the prisoner, unschooled in the law, seeks
his freedom on every ground he can imagine. It is in the prisoner's self-interest to allege all
constitutional infirmities, not because of procedural forfeiture, but because of continued imprisonment. Judicial anathema will never surpass a prisoner's unending quest for release as an effective
limitation on fragmented consideration of his claims. And as long as the judicial process wears
no blinder to meritorious constitutional claims, judges must continue to evaluate all petitions.
id. at 169 (emphasis in the original). The court went on to find merit in a successive petition.
ePryor v. Beto, 460 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1972).
6See Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1354 (4th Cir. 1970). In point of fact, the petitioner in
Sanders had submitted a prior application that "stated only bald legal conclusions with no supporting
factual allegations." 373 U.S. at 19. The summary dismissal of that petition was held not to have
been on the merits. Essentially the same argument can be made when a hearing on the prior application
was erroneously denied. See Cancino v. Craven, 467 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1972).
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should conclude by pointing out that the court has plenary power to entertain
the new application in the interest of justice, notwithstanding what has gone
before.677

IX.

APPEALS IN FORMA PAUPERIS

If a federal district court denies collateral relief in a habeas corpus or
section 2255 proceeding, it may be desirable to appeal to the appropriate circuit
court of appeals. The procedure on appeal is governed by pertinent provisions
of the Habeas Corpus Act, augmented by the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.67 This section will examine the appellate process in some detail,
with particular attention to potential hazards that may await the unwary.
A. CHALLENGES TO STATE CoixcrIoNs

1. Notice of Appeal and Certificate of Probable Cause
Section 2253 of the Habeas Corpus Act provides that a final order in a
habeas corpus proceeding shall be subject to review in the circuit court.6"'
Irrespective of the outcome in the district court, the unsuccessful party may
appeal. Thus, because of the essentially civil nature of habeas, an appeal by
the state is not precluded by the fifth amendment.8 ' Appeal is begun by the
filing of a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court 81 within thirty
days of the district court's order disposing of the prisoner's application." 2
The prisoner's right to appeal a denial of habeas relief is, however, qualified
by the third paragraph of section 2253.8' An appeal may not be taken to
the circuit court unless the district court or a circuit judge issues a "certificate
of probable cause." While the question is not free from doubt, and many
judges may treat the standards as the same, it appears that "probable cause"
in this context means something more than the absence of frivolity." 4 Rather,
the test is whether there has been "a substantial showing of the denial of a
federal right." ' 5 The habeas petitioner is, accordingly, not entitled to a
certificate of probable cause as a matter of right but must show that the issue
'See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963).
" FED. R. App. P. 1(a); see Developments, supra note 2, at 1192-93 n.262.
The text of § 2253 is as follows:
In a habeas corpus proceeding before a circuit or district judge, the final order shall be
subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had.
There shall be no right of appeal from such an order in a proceeding to test the validity of
a warrant to remove, to another district or place for commitment or trial, a person charged with a
criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of his detention pending removal
proceedings.

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus
proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, unless
the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
probable cause.
tm
Cf. FED. i App. P. 22(b).
'FED. R. App. P. 3 (a).
FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
' See note 679 supra.

' Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in S 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43
F.R.D. 343, 352 (1967). In this regard see the discussion in the text accompanying note 717 infra.
'Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), quoting Harris v. Ellis, 204 F.2d 685
(5th Cir. 1953).
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he seeks to raise on appeal has "substantial merit" and thus is "worthy of
further consideration." 8 '
If the district court issues a certificate, the circuit court must consider the
appeal on the merits."' The certificate is forwarded to the appellate court
together with the notice of appeal and the file of proceedings in the district
court."' 8 On the other hand, if the district judge denies the petitioner's request
for a certificate, he must state reasons why the certificate should not issue.
That statement is sent to the circuit level with the notice of appeal and other
records for the consideration of the appellate court. The petitioner, in the
meantime, may address a new request for a certificate to the circuit courtSO
If, in light of the record and notwithstanding the district court's views, a
circuit judge issues a certificate, the appeal may proceed on its merits. In the
event the circuit court also refuses to issue a certificate, the prisoner's only
remedy is an application for a writ of certiorari.'
The principal procedural problems surrounding the requirement that a
certificate of probable cause be obtained arise from the ambiguity of section
2253. The section provides that an appeal may not be "taken" unless a district or circuit judge issues a certificate. First, the argument can be made that
section 2253 incorporates the normal civil rules on timely appeal and therefore adopts for the certificate of probable cause the same thirty-day time
limit applicable to a notice of appeal. It follows from this position that unless
a certificate is actually issued within the time for a timely notice of appeal,
review in the circuit court is precluded. 1 The counter-argument is that,
since section 2253 establishes no time limit for obtaining a certificate, none
should be read into the statute. This view is bolstered by the general rule that
the failure of a party to take some step other than the timely filing of a notice
of appeal does not automatically affect the validity of an appeal. 92 Moreover,
given the slow-moving decision-making process in the federal courts, it
would be unthinkable to punish the prison inmate for judicial inaction on
his prompt request for a certificate. Accordingly, the courts have generally
agreed that, while a certificate of probable cause must be obtained prior to
review in the circuit court,698 it need not be issued within the thirty-day time
limit for a timely notice of appeal." 4
'Vera v. Beto, 332 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (S.D. Tex. 1971); accord, Strode v. Mississippi, 456 F.2d
1295 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court may not issue a certificate regardless of a lack of merit in the
appeal). A certificate of probable cause is not required if an appeal is taken by the respondent. FED.
R. APP. P. 22(b).
WY Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 (1967).
'FED. R. App. P. 22(b).
toId. In 1970, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals received 133 applications for a certificate of
probable cause. Of the 133, only 21 applications were granted. Strode v. Mississippi, 456 F.2d 1295,
1296 (5th Cir. 1972).
oC.
C Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967).
SSee United States ex rel. Kreuter v. Baldwin, 49 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1931).
'FED. R. APP. P. 3(a).
' Hooks v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeals, 442 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1971).
' E.g., Klier v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1972). For an exhaustive treatment of this
and associated problems regarding habeas corpus appeals, see Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d 849
(3d Cir. 1968) (holding that a certificate of probable cause need be neither sought nor obtained
within the thirty-day period).
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A second, related question is whether issuance of a certificate must precede
the filing of a notice of appeal. Since, under the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, an appeal is "taken" by the filing of a notice of appeal,695 section
2253, which provides that an appeal may not be "taken" until a certificate
has been issued, could be read to require the habeas appellant to obtain a
certificate before a notice can be filed. Such a construction would be devastating. Even if the appellant immediately requests a certificate from the district
court, the decision-making process may be so slow that the certificate will not
be issued until after the expiration of the thirty-day time period within which
the notice of appeal must be filed. 6 ' The applicable rule permits an extension of time, not to exceed an additional thirty days, if the petitioner makes
a showing of excusable neglect. 9 7 But there is a substantial question whether
judicial delay will suffice and, moreover, if the delay goes beyond sixty days
an appeal is precluded in any event. The accepted rule is that a tardy notice
of appeal deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction. 9 ' If the prisoner's request
for a certificate is denied by the district judge, he may file a new request in
the circuit court. Again, however, the process is time consuming and, even
if a certificate is eventually obtained, it may be too late for a timely notice
of appeal.
Resolution of the question whether a certificate must be obtained within
thirty days necessarily also disposes of this second problem. It would, of
course, be inconsistent to say on the one hand that a certificate may be procured at any time after the judgment and on the other that one must issue
before a notice of appeal may be filed. Consequently, the general rule is that
a notice of appeal need not await issuance of a certificate but rather is properly
submitted at any time within thirty days after the order denying relief is
entered. 99 On a showing of excusable neglect, the time limit may be extended
'FED. R. App. P. 3(a).
'Cf. Lara v. Nelson, 449 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1971); see Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 221.
'FED. R. App. P. 4(a); see Weaver v. Texas, 469 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1972).
"SE.g., Dunn v. Henderson, 446 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1971).
'Klier v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 1245, 1246 n.1 (5th Cir. 1972); Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d
849, 853 (3d Cir. 1968).
In practice, the problem in the text has caused unconscionable difficulties for pro se litigants. In
Holley v. Capps, 468 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1972), the petitioner, apparently believing he must obtain a
certificate before filing a notice of appeal, never submitted a notice but instead was very prompt with
his request for a certificate. His misunderstanding, coupled with judicial delays and failure of notice,
resulted in a tragic comedy of procedural tangle. The circuit court appeared to throw up its hands and
remanded the case to the district court for further briefing, ostensibly hoping that a fair resolution could
be worked out. Even that action was of dubious value, however, inasmuch as the petitioner was not
represented by counsel.
Obviously unfair circumstances such as occurred in Holley have prompted the federal courts to treat
documents lodged by pro se petitioners as effective to accomplish whatever they show on their face to
intend. The best example is the Third Circuit's explicit rule:
A paper will not be deemed inadequate as a notice of appeal because of informality in its
form or title, so long as from its nature it evidences an intention to appeal. Thus, while the
filing of a formal notice of appeal is preferable practice, an application for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis or an application for a certificate of probable cause, will be treated as a notice
of appeal if no formal notice has been filed....
A certificate of probable cause may be applied for informally, and a paper will be deemed
an application for a certificate of probable cause regardless of its form or how it is entitled if
its contents disclose the purpose to obtain a certificate of probable cause.
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an additional thirty days."'0 The certificate of probable cause may be requested and issued at any time before the circuit court reviews the case.7 '
This result seems consistent with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
which substitute for the language of section 2253-to the effect that an appeal
may not be "taken"-a provision that an appeal may not "proceed" unless a
certificate is issued. 0 2 The best practice is to submit both a notice of appeal
and a request for certificate as soon after the judgment as possible.
2. Leave to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis
a. An Objective Test for "Good Faith"
While the requirements of a timely notice of appeal and a certificate of
probable cause apply to all habeas corpus petitioners,70 3 indigent prisoners
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis have an additional burden. The general
federal statute governing forma pauperis process, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970),
empowers any federal court to authorize an indigent party to proceed without
prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor.7" 4 However, an appeal
may not be taken in forma pauperis if the district court certifies that it is not
taken "in good faith."70
The Supreme Court cases dealing with appellate forma pauperis standards
have arisen in direct appeals in the criminal context. However, while the
bearing they may have on appeals in habeas corpus may be questioned, it is
generally agreed that the standards are the same in both contexts. 0 8 That
being the case, it is appropriate to turn to the Supreme Court's examination
of the certification problem in Coppedge v. United States.' 7 There the Court
asked specifically: "What meaning should be placed on the 'good faith' of
which the statute speaks? '"7 °8 And the answer was: "We hold ...

that 'good

faith' in this context must be judged by an objective standard. We consider
a defendant's good faith in this type of case demonstrated when he seeks appellate review of any issue not frivolous."7 9 The Court held that "[u]nless
the issue raised [by the indigent seeking leave to appeal in forma pauperis]
are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant ...

the request of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma

Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d 849, 853-54 (3d Cir. 1968). In the same vein, FED. R. App. P. 22(b)
provides that, if no express request for a certificate of probable cause is filed in the circuit court, the
notice of appeal is deemed to be such a request addressed to the circuit court. See Lara v. Nelson, 449
F.2d 323, 324 (9th Cir. 1971).
'FED. R. App. P. 4(a); see Bryant v. Elliott, 467 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1972).
'Stewart
v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1971) (district court must act first); Fitzsimmons v.
Yeager, 391 F.2d 849, 853 (3d Cir. 1968).
w2FED. R. App. P. 22(b).
'Blackmun, supra note 684, at 351.
'28 U.S.C. S 1915(a) (1970).
7Id.
70Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962); cf. Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring); see Blackmun, supra note 684, at 347-48.
7w369 U.S. 438 (1962).
"8Id. at 444.
SId. at 445 (emphasis by the Court).
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pauperis must be allowed." ' ° The Coppedge Court went on to make it clear
that, if the district court finds the appeal to be frivolous and so certifies in
writing, the prisoner may nevertheless apply to the circuit court for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis. 1 ' In that event, the district court's certificate is
entitled to weight but is not conclusive. 2 The circuit court must inde-

pendently examine the record and determine whether nonfrivolous issues are
raised. If the circuit court determines that the appeal should be heard, the
prisoner's motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis will be granted and
the appeal handled as in any other case. On the other hand, if the circuit

court agrees with the district court, the petitioner's motion will be denied,
leaving him with the doubtful possibility that a petition for a writ of certiorari
will be granted. 3
Coppedge created as many practical problems as it solved. While a sub-

jective definition of "good faith" would have involved the lower courts in the
questionable practice of determining the sincerity of a petitioner's desire to

appeal, the path the Court took to avoid that unworkable result has led inevitably to an increased burden on the system. The frivolity standard injects
the merits of the appeal into the decision whether to permit an indigent to
proceed without paying the fees and costs ordinarily charged. This is quite
different from the test for permitting a collateral petition to be filed in forma
pauperis in the district court. At that point the only question is the prisoner's
indigency 14 Now, however, after relief has been denied and the petitioner

seeks to appeal, the district court must look to both the prisoner's continued
poverty and the merit of his claim. Of course, the court has already determined
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, but now the question is whether
the claim presents even a possibility of a rational argument... or, instead, is
so frivolous that review in the circuit court should be denied. Furthermore,
if the district judge certifies that the appeal is frivolous, the circuit court must

also engage in a preliminary inquiry into the merits in order to determine
the threshold frivolity issue. Then, if it decides that the appeal is not

frivolous after all, the circuit court must examine the merits a second time in
reaching a final decision in the case.
This dual inquiry system required by Coppedge is generally defended as
affording an opportunity to screen worthless cases out of the appellate process
U.S. at 447, quoting Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).
U.S. at 445. Of course, the petitioner may not raise new grounds in the circuit court that he
did not present below. Fuller v. Florida, 473 F.2d 1383, 1384 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973); Ford v. Wingo,
472 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1973).
7" 369 U.S. at 446.
" The Coppedge opinion actually went further. It was expressly held that, if the circuit court
grants leave to appeal in forma pauperis, it should appoint counsel to represent the indigent prisoner.
Moreover, if the substance of the issues is not ascertainable from the face of the application, counsel
must be appointed to assist the prisoner in his attempt to show that the district court's certificate of
frivolity was erroneous. 369 U.S. at 446. While the portions of the Coppedge opinion discussed in the
text clearly apply to both criminal and habeas corpus appeals, the reference to the appointment of
counsel may be limited to the former. See Part VII-D supra.
', See text accompanying note 477 supra.
' Blackmun, supra note 684, at 347.
71369
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in much the same way as the requirement that a habeas corpus appellant
obtain a certificate of probable cause."' Of course, in the case of a habeas
petitioner, a showing of "substantial merit" is a condition precedent to the
issuance of a certificate of probable cause. Since that standard is concededly
higher than mere nonfrivolity, an indigent habeas petitioner who obtains
a certificate is a fortiori entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. 7" Thus, at
least as to habeas corpus cases, the threshold frivolity inquiry seems superfluous. In addition, there remains a significant question whether indigent
petitioners are treated equitably with wealthy litigants. Mr. Justice Douglas
has argued that the consideration of the merits of an indigent petitioner's
claim as a factor in the decision whether to allow an appeal in forma pauperis
violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which incorporates a
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of wealth. He would consider
only the fact of indigency, leaving an examination of the merits to "plenary
deliberation" as opposed to the "summary survey" occasioned by a threshold
frivolity inquiry.718
b. Procedure
Section 1915(a) simply provides that an appeal may not be taken without
prepayment of fees and costs if the trial court certifies that it is not taken in
good faith. While Coppedge established a test for determining when an
appeal is taken in "good faith" and sketched an outline of the procedure in

forma pauperis cases, a good deal of ambiguity still surrounds the process.
Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, governing habeas
corpus actions, to some extent fleshes out the procedure to be followed. If a
petitioner did not proceed in forma pauperis in the district court but wishes
to do so on appeal, he must file a motion to that effect in the district court. The
motion must be accompanied by an affidavit in the form set out in Form 4
of the Appendix of Forms accompanying the rules. Essentially, the affidavit
contains a statement that the affiant is unable to pay the applicable expenses
or give security therefor, a pro forma statement that he believes he is entitled
to relief, and a brief description of the issues he wishes to raise on appeal.
The district court then has a basis for determining whether the petitioner is
indigent and is seeking to present a nonfrivolous claim. If the motion is
granted the appeal proceeds as any other, but if it is denied the court must
state the reasons for its action in writing in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of a certificate of lack of good faith.

If, on the other hand, the petitioner was permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis in the district court, it is unclear whether he must submit a new
" See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 456, at 220.

"The converse is not true, of course. A district judge might conceivably allow an appeal in
forma pauperis on the ground that the issue sought to be raised is nonfrivolous, yet decline to issue a
certificate of probable cause because no "substantial merit" is shown. Blackmun, supra note 684, at 354.
7
Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). But see United States v. Kras,
93 S. Ct. 631 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 93 S. Ct. 1172 (1973).
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motion to proceed the same way on appeal. Rule 24 provides that such a
petitioner may continue to proceed in forma pauperis without further authorization, unless the district court certifies in writing that the appeal is not
taken in good faith. Read literally, the rule permits the petitioner to assume
that he can proceed on appeal in forma pauperis unless the court, on its own
motion, certifies otherwise.719 It has been suggested, however, that many

courts prefer not to act sua sponte but rather appreciate a specific application
for a ruling.72° Accordingly, if a notice of appeal is filed without an accompanying request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the petitioner's authorization may well be questioned. The district court may notify the petitioner

that a specific request should be filed along with the specific affidavit drawn
according to Form 4. In that event, the petitioner will have only delayed the
process by failing to file a request and affidavit at the outset. Worse yet, the
court may simply decide whether the appeal should be allowed without benefit

of the information that would be available in an affidavit. In that case an unfavorable result is likely, and the petitioner may find his appeal certified as
not in good faith before he has had an opportunity to state the specific grounds
he wishes to present to the circuit court. Accordingly, the wary petitioner
should always submit to the district court a motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal and
the request for a certificate of probable cause.
Rule 24(a) further provides that, whenever the district court denies a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis or accomplishes the same result
by certifying that the appeal is not taken in good faith, the clerk must notify
the petitioner of the unfavorable action. Then, within thirty days after receiving notice, the petitioner may file a new motion in the circuit court. If
the petitioner filed in the district court an affidavit drawn according to Form
4, he must attach a copy to his motion addressed to the circuit court. If he
did not file such an affidavit in the district court, he must now prepare and
file one with the circuit court. In either case, the petitioner must attach to his
new motion a copy of the district court's statement of reasons for disallowing
the appeal. The circuit court or a single judge thereof will then make an
independent judgment on the frivolity issue as required by Coppedge.721
'Peterson

v. United States, 467 F.2d 892, 893 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972).
& Hermann, supra note 456, at 224-25. Parenthetically, it may be noted that other courts
have adopted a policy of dealing with appellate procedural issues in the order denying relief on the
habeas petition. Thus the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee recently
concluded an opinion denying relief with the following paragraph:
Should the applicant give timely notice of an appeal, he may proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis without further authorization. Rule 24(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. His
current detention arising out of process issued by a state court, any notice of appeal herein will
be treated as a motion for a certificate of probable cause; and, in that event, this memorandum
opinion and order shall be construed as such certificate. Rule 22(b), Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Huffman v. Moore, 333 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (E.D. Tenn. 1971). This procedure is certainly laudable
and hopefully will be adopted elsewhere. Cf. Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 1968).
' See text accompanying notes 711-13 supra.
'Zeigler
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In general, the appellate procedure in proceedings to vacate sentence
pursuant to section 2255 is similar to that just described regarding habeas
corpus cases. Section 2255 itself expressly provides that "[a]n appeal may be
taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from
a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus." '22 Thus, as in
the habeas situation, either the prisoner or the respondent may appeal from
an unfavorable judgment. Once again an appeal is begun by the filing of a
notice of appeal in the district court.72 It is unclear, however, whether a
section 2255 petitioner must submit his notice within the thirty-day period
applicable in habeas. Arguably, he is entitled to take advantage of the provision that a notice of appeal in a civil case to which the United States is a
party can be filed within sixty rather than thirty days. 2 While the language
in section 2255 that a section 2255 appeal may be taken "as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus" arguably adopts the time
limit in habeas for section 2255 matters, it is doubtful that the statute goes so
far.725 In any event the time limit may be extended an additional thirty days
on a showing of excusable neglect.72 Of course, the best practice is to file a
notice of appeal immediately after the district court judgment denying relief.
The principal point of departure between habeas corpus and section 2255
appellate procedure lies in the absence from section 2255 of any requirement
that the prisoner obtain a certificate of probable cause. While a habeas applicant challenging a state criminal conviction must show a "substantial question" for appeal,727 a section 2255 petitioner has no such burden.72 Accordingly, none of the procedural and timing snarls that so often complicate the
certificate requirement in habeas corpus cases arise.
An indigent section 2255 petitioner seeking leave to appeal in forma
pauperis must, however, satisfy the good faith standard of section 1915.729
7228 U.S.C. S 2255 (1970).
'FED. R. APP. P. 3(a).
'FED. R. App. P. 4(a); Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1959) (§ 2255
petitioner has sixty days within which to file a notice of appeal).
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules seems to have taken the position that,
at present, the thirty-day limit is applicable. Consistent with itsview that a S 2255 proceeding is a
further stage in the criminal case rather than an independent civil action, the Committee has proposed
that FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) (dealing with criminal appeals) be amended to provide a thirty-day appeal
time limit in § 2255 cases. The Advisory Committee note accompanying the proposed amendment states
that its purpose is to make clear "that a defendant whose motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied
has the same time in which to appeal as he formerly had in a habeas corpus proceeding, thus implementing the express statutory provision to that effect." The weakness in the Committee's position lies
in its implication that a S 2255 appeal is in all respects identical to an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding. Yet that is, of course, not true. While the procedure in the two is similar, there is at least
one significant difference: a S 2255 appellant is not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause.
See note 728 infra and accompanying text.
' FED. R. APP. P.4(a).
72 See text accompanying notes 683-86 supra.
'Blackmun, supra note 684, at 354. The Nixon Administration has, however, proposed an amendment to S 2253 which would fasten a certificate of probable cause requirement on § 2255 petitioners as
well as habeas corpus applicants. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Other provisions of the proposed bill are discussed in notes 37 and 71 supra.
'28 U.S.C. S 1915(a) (1970).

1973]

COLLATERAL CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

Here again an objective test is applied: the appeal will be allowed if the petitioner is indigent and presents a nonfrivolous issue for review by the circuit

court.7"' Accordingly, although the section 2255 petitioner need not meet
the higher standard necessary for a certificate of probable cause, his right to
appeal in forma pauperis is still conditioned upon a showing of nonfrivolity.
And in many cases the latter test may be a difficult, albeit lower, hurdle to
negotiate. Inasmuch as the procedure for obtaining leave to proceed on appeal
in forma pauperis is identical to that followed in habeas, repetition of that
previous discussion is unnecessary here.73 ' Suffice it to say that a motion requesting leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, supported by an
affidavit drawn in the manner of Form 4 in the Appendix of Forms accompanying the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should be filed in the
district court simultaneously with the notice of appeal.
C. SUMMARY

A habeas corpus petitioner who is denied relief in the district court has a
right of appeal to the appropriate circuit court, conditioned upon the issuance
of a certificate of probable cause. The test for probable cause is "substantial
merit." An indigent petitioner may be authorized to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis unless the district court certifies that the appeal is not taken
in good faith. The good faith standard is met if the petitioner presents a
nonfrivolous issue that would not be summarily dismissed in the case of a
wealthy litigant. In order to initiate an appeal, the petitioner must file a
notice of appeal in the district court within thirty days after entry of the
order denying relief. That period may be extended for an additional thirty
days on a showing of excusable neglect. In any case, if a notice is not filed
within sixty days, the appeal must be dismissed in the circuit court for want
of jurisdiction.
Although there is conflicting authority on the issue, the better view is
that a certificate of probable cause may be sought and obtained at any time
after judgment and before the appeal is heard. Nor is there a time limit for
requesting leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Moreover, according to some authority, if the petitioner was permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis in the district court he need not request further authorization so
to proceed on appeal, unless the district court sua sponte certifies that the
appeal is not taken in good faith. To guard against procedural snarls, how-

ever, both a request for a certificate of probable cause and a motion for leave
to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis with a supporting affidavit should be
filed with the notice of appeal in the district court as soon as possible after
judgment.
If the district court issues a certificate of probable cause, the circuit court
33
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 707-15 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 703-21 supra.
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must examine the appeal on the merits. However, if a certificate is denied
or the appeal is certified as not in good faith, the petitioner must apply to
the circuit court. In a case where the district court denies leave to appeal in
forma pauperis, the new application must be filed in the circuit court within
thirty days after notice of the district court's action. There is no time limit
on applying to the circuit court for a certificate of probable cause, although a
certificate must issue before the circuit court can decide the case. If the circuit
court refuses to issue a certificate or to allow the appeal in forma pauperis,
the only remaining remedy is a petition for a writ of certiorari.
The appellate procedure applicable to motions to vacate sentence pursuant
to section 2255 is in large part similar to that applicable in habeas. The only
significant differences are that a section 2255 petitioner arguably has sixty
rather than thirty days after judgment within which to file a notice of appeal
and he is not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause before proceeding.
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APPENDIX

KANSAS DEFENDER PROJECT
INTERVIEW SHEET
Name of Interviewer
Date
1. Inmate's full name (including aliases): ..........................................................................
2. Institution identification number: ....................................................................................
3. Institution in which confined: ................................................................................
.
4. Financial data (including funds in institution account and earnings from institution em ploym ent): ............................................................................................................................
5. Date and place of birth: ...................................................................................................
6. M arital statu s: ........................................................................................................................
7. Name and address of spouse: ......................................................................................
8. Occupation prior to incarceration: ....................................................................................
9. Offense(s) of which convicted (including criminal code citations if known): ........
10. Description of sentence(s) now being served (e.g., length, concurrent or consecutive): ............................................................................................................................................
11. Dates of:
A. P arole eligibility: ............................................................................................................
B. Mandatory or conditional release: ..............................................................................
C. Expiration of sentence: ..................................................................................................
12. Dates of:
A. Offense(s): ............................................................................................................
B. Arrest(s):......................................................
C. First Appearance(s): ...............................................................................................
D . Ind ictment(s): ................................................................................................................
E. Preliminary hearing(s): ................................................................................................
F. Arraignment(s): ........................................................................................................
G. Trial(s): .................................................................................................................
H. Sentencing proceeding(s): ............................................................................................
13. Name(s) and address(es) of attorney(s) currently involved: ....................................
14. Name(s) and address(es) of attorney(s) involved during the criminal prosecution(s) (including designation as to the stage of proceedings when each was involved
and whether counsel was retained or assigned): ........................................................................

15. Name(s) and address(es) of material witness(es): ....................................................
16. Name(s) of court(s) which imposed sentence (s):
............................................................................................................................

........................
[....................................

17. Name(s) of judge(s) involved (including designation as to the stage of proceedings when each was involved): ........................................................................................................
18. Inmate sentenced after:
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A . Jury trial: .......................................................................................................................
B. Trial to the court:................................................
C . Plea of guilty or nolo contendere: .............................................................................
19. In the case of a guilty plea:
A. Description of what was said by the court and/or others at the arraignment
proceeding(s): ...............................................................
..............................................................................................................................................
.. . . . . . . . . . . . .

..........................

......................................................................................---

B. Description of signed w riting(s): ................................................................................
20. Description and present status of direct appeal(s): ......................................................
.........................
....................

...............................

.................................................................................................

......

........................................................................................................................................

21. D escription and present status of collateral proceeding(s): ..........................................
............................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................

22. Description and present status of pending detainer(s): ................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
.......................................

.........................................................................................................................

23. Description of present legal problem about which the inmate seeks help: ................
...........................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................

..........

............... ..........................................................................................................................................
I
............................... ........................................................................................................................
.......................

.........................................................................................................................................

24. O ther m atters which require investigation: ....................................................................

............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
.......................

.........................................................................................................................................

............................................................................................................................................................
.......................

..............................................................................................................................

.........

25. Interview er's prelim inary plans for further inquiry: ....................................................

......................................................................................................................................

..........................

................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................

.........

............................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................

..........................

......................................................................................................................................

..........................

.......................................................................................................

..........................................................

...................................................................................................................................

.........................

26. Caseworker's nam e and pertinent com ments: ................................................................

................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................

